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Introduction 
In what follows I seek to articulate a romantic hermeneutics, that is, an interpretive 
approach to texts acknowledged as central to the canon of English Romanticism, 
that articulates the human relationship to artistic creation, the natural world and 
metaphysics. Through this methodological approach I hope to integrate philosophy 
with the study of English Romanticism, and delineate a coherent, inter-disciplinary 
corpus of intellectual ideas, all of which can be subsumed under the rubric of 
“Romanticism.” Using this hermeneutical approach, I offer Hegel’s teleological 
theory as an example of a romantic mythology—that is, a story that attempts to re-
integrate the human subject into the natural world whilst at the same time retaining a 
sense of imaginative autonomy. I offer a reading of Hegel, which combines his 
social philosophy with his philosophy of art, and integrate the two areas of his work 
using an expanded understanding of his notion of recognition. What motivates the 
philosophical approach to English Romanticism, and the use of Hegel as an 
exemplar of a romantic narrative, is the conviction that the English romantic 
tradition is philosophically rich in ways not always appreciated by traditional 
commentary. I posit a connection between seemingly disparate Romanticisms such 
as those of Wordsworth, Coleridge and the later P.B. Shelley. All of these thinkers 
and artists present us with varying forms of romantic mythology, each looking to 
retain a contingent, autonomous subjectivity, whilst retaining a necessary connection 
to the empirical world. Working on this assumption, I explicate these different 
romantic narratives, whilst illustrating the structural features common to them all. 
Central to my thesis is the idea that this philosophical-narratorial template gives the 
critic a useful hermeneutical reading tool with which to approach texts, which, 
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whilst subsumed under the generic category of Romanticism, offer contradictory 
conclusions in their treatment of artistic creation, nature and metaphysics.1 Of 
course, this is only one approach amongst many, and as such a romantic 
hermeneutics, that whilst not exhaustive, hopes to add to the other critical prisms 
through which Romanticism has been explicated as an aesthetic movement, or a 
substantive canon of texts.2 
     I contend that all the major canonical romantic poets covered here approach the 
problem of philosophical certainty through the romantic ideal that there is an 
intuitional assent to knowledge through aesthetics. Using a Hegelian approach as an 
interpretive guide is therefore useful in that Hegel endorses art as a way of 
apprehending philosophical certainty on the one hand, yet on the other places 
philosophy on a higher interpretive level. This means that in using Hegel we can 
gain a double-awareness of our subject matter; we see the strengths of art in its 
approximation of philosophical certainty, and we can critique it in terms of its 
relationship to speculative philosophy, which acts as an alternative narrative for 
attaining philosophical certainty. I aim to argue in this thesis therefore that both the 
romantic poets and Hegel share a common romantic purpose, which is explored in 
their romantic mythologies.  
  
1. A discrimination of criticisms… 
Hegel’s connection to and criticism of Romanticism has previously been 
acknowledged by thinkers such as A.C. Bradley3, M.H. Abrams and Morse 
Peckham. For example Abrams famously aligned the dialectical critical school of 
Yale criticism4with the Hegelian system of dialectics, particularly as it was initially 
outlined in the Phenomenology.  
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For as Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit translated the manifold 
particularities of human and individual history into diverse moments 
of the transactions between consciousness and its alienated other, so 
these critics [the Yale school] view the manifold surface 
particularities of Romantic poems as generated primarily by a single 
submerged plot: the sustained struggle of the poet’s consciousness 
(operating in the mode often called “imagination”) to achieve 
“autonomy,” or absolute independence from that adversary which is 
not itself—namely, “nature,” the world of sensible objects.5 
 
Abrams acknowledges the connection between modern dialectical criticism and 
Hegelian philosophy; however, as with the critics of the Yale school, he fails to 
bring in the more specific subject of recognition in the Phenomenology, or to even 
mention any connection to Hegel’s Aesthetics and the implicit teleology of Hegel’s 
Aesthetics. In this I hope to advance substantially upon previous Hegelian readings 
of the subject.  
     Peckham views Hegel’s Phenomenology as the epitome of Romanticism, and as 
exhibiting the tensions inherent in modernity. He further reads the Phenomenology 
as characterising the need for cultural receptivity in order to avoid what he terms an 
“apocalyptic” form of negative freedom. His reading of the correlating tensions in 
Hegel’s system and the romantic’s system is characterised thus: 
The problem of what precipitated the cultural alienation [utilised by 
the Romantics] was most fully worked out by Hegel, whose 
Phenomenology all students of Romanticism, I am now convinced, 
should read—repeatedly.[…] The Phenomenology was at once the 
profoundest response to the crisis and the profoundest theory of it.6 
 
This is a position that I think accurately describes the tensions that plagued both the 
English Romantics and Hegel, and also concurs with my idea that Hegel is the 
ultimate romantic thinker. Where Peckham is incorrect in his analysis however, is 
his contention that Hegel’s system was actually anti-metaphysical; Peckham not 
only offers an early “deflationary” reading of Hegel but also reads Hegel himself as 
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deflationary.7 Peckham also claims of the tension between subject and object that 
permeates Romanticism: 
…to the Romantic the categories of the object cannot exhaust the 
attributes of the subject, nor the categories of the subject exhaust the 
attributes of the object. Rather, subject and object are conceived of as 
in a condition of irresolvable tension. This is Hegel, and it is, I 
believe, a more general explanatory formulation which subsumes 
both Kroeber’s notion of Romanticism as commitment to temporal 
continuity and Adams’ notion of Romanticism as an acceptance of 
change.8 
 
Whilst I agree with Peckham that Hegel explores the “irresolvable tension” of 
subject and object, Peckham is incorrect to assume this was Hegel’s whole 
philosophical system. As I show in the next chapter, Hegel attempts to find 
subjective autonomy through his teleological notion of Spirit, but remains 
philosophically bound to the objective world, requiring receptivity to both culture 
and the physical world. The romantics, and indeed Hegel, helped attune us to this 
irresolvable tension. Therefore, whilst I disagree with Peckham’s overall reading of 
Hegel’s system in the Phenomenology, which is not only deflationary, but actually 
postulates that Hegel himself was a deflationary anti-metaphysical philosopher, I 
agree with his account of the Phenomenology as fully addressing the aporias of the 
romantics. Hegel’s work tackles the philosophical tensions in the work of the 
romantics, however Hegel himself was a metaphysical thinker who felt he had 
succeeded in transcending the aporias of the romantic poets. Therefore, Abrams and 
Peckham in their reception of Hegel vacillate between critical positions of absolute 
autonomy and receptivity—these are in fact the tensions that I argue drive the 
romantic corpus of writing, and I will return to them below. 
     Present romantic criticism, whilst offering undoubted insights into the subject 
matter, has been more recently predominantly historicist9 or has treated the subject 
in terms of elements that in preceding criticisms were ignored or omitted; for 
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example Ann Mellor’s ironist critique of Abrams’ seminal text Natural 
Supernaturalism.10 I feel that these approaches of criticism are themselves 
progressivist and dialectical, and as they have progressed have given us a richer 
understanding of the Romantic movement: Mellor’s criticism supplements Abrams’ 
criticism, as Jerome McGann further builds upon and supplements Mellor’s and 
Abrams’ criticism. This may all seem like basic commonsense; however, if we view 
criticism as leading us progressively to a better understanding of Romanticism, then 
the next stage is to supplement McGann’s and Marilyn Butler’s historicist awareness 
with a higher form of awareness, or a further Gestalt from within which to approach 
our subject matter. Whilst McGann would argue that this Hegelian approach falls 
into the trap of Romanticisms’ self-representations,11 I believe that in effect, and to 
pun on A.O. Lovejoy’s historicist criticism, there has been hitherto a discrimination 
of criticisms.12 In responding to these criticisms, as René Wellek responded to 
Lovejoy’s argument, we can see common factors to them all.  
     For example, critics such as Mellor, whilst critiquing Abrams’ lack of use of 
irony in his work, actually supplement the neo-Hegelian bent in Abrams’ secular-
theological approach by pointing out the reception in criticism of absolute infinite 
negativity13 of poets such as Coleridge and Byron. These differences between 
different poets are inevitably present, and previous criticism has adequately 
heightened our awareness of these differences; what it has not done however, has 
adequately drawn a narrative line under all of these Romanticisms. It may of course 
be contended that there is indeed no need to discern a holistic connection, or a 
teleological pattern in all of these Romanticisms. However, the useful point in 
drawing a speculative narrative thread between some of these forms of Romanticism 
is that we develop a new interpretive approach through which to read a number of 
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these works. This in turn can help us to better understand as critics for example, the 
apparent nihilistic ambiguity of a poem such as “The Triumph of Life,” in light of 
Shelley’s philosophical relationship to his predecessors, Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
Furthermore, although there is an obvious Coleridge-Kant connection and later on 
George Eliot-young Hegelians connection, I feel poets such as Wordsworth and 
Shelley can be approached in new and innovative ways if reread philosophically. In 
short therefore, whilst previous criticism has adumbrated interpretive tensions within 
Romanticism and its attendant reception, it has not located what I think is a 
commonly recurring theme, or search, of a number of the romantics, a search for 
philosophical and intuitional certainty. This search, or as I sometimes term it, 
struggle, is one a number of the romantics shared with Hegel, and consequently a 
rereading of English Romanticism in a neo-Hegelian light can bear fruitful results.  
     McGann has indeed correctly acknowledged the Hegelian bent in much romantic 
criticism, and draws our attention to what he believes are the critical limits of this 
form of interpretation: 
     The earliest comprehensive effort to reconcile this root conflict of 
impulses in Romanticism was made by Hegel in his “Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Art.” This influential document argued that 
Romanticism, which is epitomized in the medium of poetry, 
represented a higher synthesis of two anterior forms of art: The 
Symbolic and the Classical. This contemplative and spiritual line—
indeed, this late Christian view of art—underlies the approach taken 
by Abrams, as well as the many variants and derivatives which 
persist in contemporary criticism. Its force as criticism rests in its 
ability to reconcile conceptually that fundamental conflict of concepts 
which we have already noted in Romanticism and its scholarship 
alike.14 
 
There are two main problems with McGann’s historicist line of argument, which 
criticises these “Hegelian” forms of criticism as being uncritically absorbed into 
Romanticism’s own self-representations. Firstly, McGann himself uses a critical 
vocabulary couched in the self-representations of Romanticism. A phrase like “Its 
 10 
force as criticism rest in its ability to reconcile conceptually that fundamental 
conflict of concepts” sounds distinctly Coleridgean itself. It is not a matter for 
criticism of “reconciling” to use McGann’s (and Coleridge’s critical vocabulary) but 
more a matter of encapsulating the tensions and differences inherent in the romantic 
project as a whole. Abrams certainly doesn’t reconcile the “conflict of concepts” in 
works such as Natural Supernaturalism. In fact, as McGann himself points out, vis-
a-vis Mellor, Abrams largely ignores a large portion of the movement, such as much 
of Keats and pretty much all of Byron. The Hegelian line, which I take in this thesis, 
does however encapsulate the differing concepts adumbrated by McGann: the 
secularised Judaeo-Christian line deployed by Abrams, the subject of romantic irony 
rehearsed by Mellor and the unaccountable aspects of romantic irony, or the darker 
aspects of irony and scepticism, outlined by writers such as Kierkegaard, Muecke 
and Praz.15 Secondly, Abrams himself also openly acknowledges the dangers of 
becoming absorbed into historical and ideological representations in his own 
analysis: 
An inveterate under-reading of the textual surface, however, turns 
readily into a habitual over-reading. The problem is, to what extent 
do these recent critical perspectives on Wordsworth [those 
predominantly of the Yale school of criticism] simply bring into 
visibility what was always, although obscurely, there, and to what 
extent do they project upon his poems the form of their own 
prepossesions?16 
 
Abrams himself recognises the dangers of reading a thinker like Hegel “into” the 
romantic poets. McGann’s historicist line, based upon the criticism of Heine in The 
Romantic School (1835), is itself supposedly dialectical. His argument is that there is 
an incomplete take on Romanticism, exemplified in a Lovejoyan sense, by the 
divergent criticisms of scholars like Mellor, Abrams and Praz that historicism helps 
to remedy. However, the philosophical approach I’ve adopted argues that the 
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varying Romanticisms can also be read at times as corresponding aspects of the 
same philosophical narrative. This does not mean however that one has to subscribe 
to Hegel’s philosophy wholesale; this is the reason for the so-called recent 
“deflationary” Hegel of thinkers such as Peckham, Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard. 
The critic may use Hegel’s progressivist dialectical method as a tool for analysis, a 
tool that enables the reader to better understand the rational kernel of the romantic 
plot as a whole, whether in a Hegelian formulation of the plot or that of the English 
romantics. 
     Marilyn Butler has also been critical of the philosophical perspective; however 
her criticism is aimed at the more general nature of this approach. She argues that 
the historicist approach is a more coherent line of enquiry than the philosophical 
line—whereas I believe that both lines of enquiry are not mutually exclusive in the 
first place. She specifically criticises Wellek for using the philosophical method in 
his analysis of Romanticism: 
   Wellek’s concern with Romanticism is less heady and intuitive than 
Bloom’s. His is essentially the approach of the philosopher, who is 
trained to consider his subject’s arguments ahistorically, as a series of 
propositions disinterestedly reaching after truth. […] Another 
[solecism of philosophical criticism] is an inclination to take the most 
coherent expositor of an intellectual position—who for the Romantics 
might be Hartley, say, or Rousseau, Godwin, Kant or Coleridge—and 
use his formulation to interpret the work of an entire group of writers. 
The very existence of a coherent ‘Romantic movement’ arises 
perhaps from some such intellectual manoeuvre.17 
 
This is of course a criticism that could be levelled at my own research, which is an 
exposition of the British Romantic movement using a Hegelian lens. However, 
philosophical criticism need not be ahistorical; and indeed Hegelian criticism relies 
on an historical awareness in order to fulfil its dialectical kernel. Therefore, Butler is 
firstly wrong in her assumption that philosophical criticism and historical criticism 
are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the use of a “coherent expositor of an intellectual 
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position” such as in this case Hegel, to interpret an entire group of writers is a 
hyperbolic formulation. One may use Kant, Hegel and Coleridge as exemplars of 
varying intellectual positions, at a given time in history, and one is therefore using 
coherent (or incoherent) but different positions in order to aid criticism in shining 
light upon particular poetic manoeuvres. Once again, the historicist method and the 
philosophical method are not mutually exclusive as Butler claims. Stanley Cavell 
has countered this kind of historicist reasoning by his own defence of combining 
philosophical methodology and literary criticism of the Romantics: 
The fact that these texts do not undertake to quote and refute 
particular passages from Kant’s writing would not for me be enough 
to show that, on a reasonable view of argument, they are not in 
argument with his philosophy. This too depends on what you 
understand Kant to have accomplished (what you think the name 
Kant, means) and on what you understand to be the cause of the kind 
of writing in which romantics have expressed themselves.18 
 
This is closest to my own position in analysing the English Romantics with the aid 
of Hegel’s philosophy. I also believe that the kind of writing, (or more precisely 
discourse) in which the “romantics have expressed themselves” partakes in the 
discourse of thinkers such as Kant and Hegel, even though there was little or no 
contact between many of the thinkers. The English Romantics were arguing within 
the same historical and philosophical paradigm as Kant and Hegel, and are engaged 
in the process, both historical and philosophical, of a certain epoch in history. It is 
therefore presupposed in this thesis that using the philosophical assumptions of a 
thinker such as Hegel is a legitimate academic line of enquiry, which can help 
substantially in our understanding of the English romantics.   
     The English romantics’ reception of philosophy has been adequately charted in 
previous research19, and one should remember here that I am not claiming that 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, or Shelley had a satisfactory knowledge of Hegel, or were 
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heavily influenced by Hegel’s theories. My aim, as I claimed above, is to use the 
work of Hegel in order to draw a narrative/interpretive connection between a 
number of canonical romantic poets and to illustrate how their poetic struggle 
towards gaining intuitional insights broadly matched Hegel’s. 
 
2. Why “philosophical romanticism”? 
“Philosophical romanticism” is a way of addressing the world, which on the one 
hand looks towards rejuvenating the experiences and philosophy of the romantics 
whilst at the same time examining the present world in new and exciting ways. The 
term denotes a series of contemporary writings by philosophers who are using the 
techniques of traditional Romanticism, with a view to re-inheriting and re-orienting 
them towards an analysis of contemporary global society. These writers tend to 
interrogate issues such as the relationship between aesthetics and philosophy, the 
individual and society, and humanity’s overall adaptation to the dynamics of 
modernity. This group also adapts traditional romantic concepts such as irony, 
metaphysics, individualism and imaginative autonomy into a modern context. Key 
thinkers in this group include Rorty, Cavell, Pippin, Bernstein, Bowie, Eldridge and 
Beiser.      
     For the purpose of this thesis I use “philosophical romanticism” in order to reread 
the English Romantics whilst at the same time approaching their work through the 
prism of contemporary philosophical criticism. The relationship between the 
philosophical preoccupations of the romantics and the present has never been so 
pertinent. According to Bowie: 
   My contention is, therefore, that it is possible to tell a different 
story about the relationship of Idealism and early Romanticism to 
subsequent philosophy, which shows that very few of their concerns 
have really disappeared from the agenda of philosophy. This is 
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already evident if one looks at the role of aesthetic theory in the 
philosophy of the period with contemporary eyes. That Richard Rorty 
should now regard philosophy as a kind of literature, because he does 
not think it possible to establish a privileged role in relation to other 
ways of articulating the world, is not fortuitous. Such a notion has 
nothing surprising about it for a romantic thinker, and is not alien to 
Schelling’s STI [System of Transcendental Philosophy], which sees 
art as able to show what philosophy cannot say.20   
 
This correlation between the contemporary philosophical scene and the scene of the 
original romantics is central to my thesis as a whole. The question of whether art is 
able to say what philosophy cannot say, is also one that becomes more pertinent 
when we reread English Romanticism with the double awareness enabled by 
applying Hegel’s own philosophical system to the romantic movement towards what 
I term “aesthetic recognition”: a struggle towards an intuitive recognition of 
themselves within and as part of the external world in and through the medium of 
art.  This raises the question of the relationship between art and philosophy, and is 
one that is answered differently by Hegel and the romantics, even though both 
experience the same philosophical tensions. Bowie goes on to write of the 
philosophical tensions experienced by romantics and idealists: 
There is, then, an essential tension in Idealist and Romantic thought 
which resides in the uneasy coexistence of the (Idealist) desire to be 
able to say what it is in thinking that is unlimited, with an 
accompanying (Romantic) sense of the impossibility of saying it, an 
impossibility which seems to make the philosophical enterprise of 
grasping the absolute itself questionable. The Romantic attachment to 
art can be seen as deriving from an awareness of the need to respond 
to this tension.21  
 
As Bowie claims, Richard Rorty, as a philosophical romantic, has stressed a new 
trend in modern thought towards the use of literature in saying what cannot be said 
in philosophy, as has Cavell and, even if from a Marxist perspective, has Terry 
Eagleton.22 
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     Interestingly however, the English romantics also responded to this tension in 
different ways as a sub-group of writers. For example, Wordsworth’s response was 
very different from that of Shelley and Coleridge, although it was premised upon the 
same philosophical recognitive search for an absolute intuition or aesthetic 
aesthesis. Wordsworth expresses the idealist desire to “say what it is in thinking that 
is unlimited” through the vehicle of his poetry—whereas Coleridge and Shelley both 
respond to the same tension with a stronger negativity, or infinite absolute 
negativity. Wordsworth, I contend, is much closer to the Hegelian position than 
Coleridge or Shelley—however his response is aesthetic whereas Hegel’s is 
philosophical.  
     Other areas of interest in more recent philosophical romanticism are imaginative 
autonomy and receptivity—two areas which are also key to my thesis as a whole—
and areas which I believe are perhaps more accurate in analysing the aporias 
inherent in romantic philosophy than a simple subject/object distinction. Nikolas 
Kompridis has said of the impetus towards receptivity in modern philosophical 
romanticism: 
For philosophical romantics, thinking about receptivity in this way 
[letting oneself be determined by extant present actualities] also 
invites a reconsideration of our inherited conceptions of agency. The 
more we emphasise the positive role of receptivity, the more we 
stress the embodied nature of human agency, and its historical and 
cultural dependencies, the less likely are we to make mistake mastery 
for agency. We will come to see agency as a matter of what we let 
ourselves be affected by rather than a matter of exercising control 
over what we encounter.23  
 
This sense of receptivity, or letting oneself be determined is indeed central to my 
own reading of a number of examples of English Romanticism, and also ties in with 
a gradual orientation towards embodiment that I also argue is implicit in the struggle 
towards aesthetic recognition of some of the English romantics. This struggle for 
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recognition takes a different form for Hegel, in both his social and aesthetic theories, 
but I argue corporeality is central to both. Thus, rereading both Hegel and a number 
of the English romantics through the prism of philosophical romanticism not only 
gives us a shared sense of their mutual bent towards an absolute intuition, but also a 
strong sense of their unconscious reliance upon receptivity to the external world and 
to the body. As my thesis progresses, the phenomenological relationship to the body 
of the poet’s romantic imagination becomes more distinct, and what I term the 
‘romantic fantasy of disembodiment’ comes to the fore. This tension between 
romantic imaginative autonomy and receptivity is a key driving factor behind the 
tensions alluded to by Bowie, and one that is now openly not only acknowledged, 
but embraced by modern philosophical romantics such as Kompridis, Seel and 
Kolb.24  
 
3. Romantic embodiment      
The sense of receptivity and embodiment in traditional Romanticism and idealism, 
more discernible upon reflection through the prism of philosophical romanticism, 
has also been examined by Jay Bernstein, in his analysis of perhaps the idealist par 
excellence: Fichte. He has recently introduced materialism into Fichte’s philosophy 
of right and programme of mutual recognition, emblematised by the notion of the 
summons. In so doing, Bernstein is also enabling us to take the first step in re-
approaching idealism in terms of embodiment: 
…to posit oneself as one among others presupposes being an 
embodied being among other embodied beings who can mutually 
influence one another casually and intentionally. Self-consciousness 
is thus just as much inter-bodily as intersubjectively constituted.25 
 
These philosophical “embodied recognitions,” although touched upon by thinkers 
such as Hegel and Fichte, were as such not really acknowledged as they ran counter 
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to the self-representations of idealist philosophy. However, through the critical 
prism of philosophical romanticism, we can read these tensions in the overall 
idealist philosophical programme, as we can read parallel tensions in the work of the 
romantic poets.  
     Moreover, and more specifically in terms of Hegelian idealism, writers such as 
Stephen Houlgate have also pointed to the implicit materialism in which his idealism 
abounds. When writing about Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature Houlgate claims: 
For Hegel, the self that feels itself in sensibility is the very one that in 
humans produces an abstract conception of itself: the “sentient self” 
is itself “that which in spirit is the I” (was im Geiste das Ich ist). This 
means that, since sensation is necessarily embodied, human 
consciousness, thought and spirit—in their very freedom and 
autonomy—must also be embodied. The human capacity to abstract 
in thought from its body and its immediate sensations and let itself be 
guided by reason must itself be rooted in and made possible by our 
organic, animal body.26 
 
Houlgate goes on to examine Hegel’s ideas on thought as our ultimate instantiation 
of autonomy, and the correspondent realisation of a symbiotic relationship to our 
sensuous body in order to enter into the conceptualisations of thought; or in short, 
the requirement of organic embodiment and receptivity: 
Thought also understands itself to be fully free and self-determining: 
it knows that its fundamental logical categories are generated 
spontaneously by itself (and not abstracted from sensuous 
experience), and it knows that the way to discover the truth about 
things in the world is not through observation alone but through its 
own autonomous rational activity. In its most sophisticated form, 
however, thought is also aware that, even when it is silent and 
inward, its consummate freedom is dependent upon names and thus, 
ultimately, on the ability to use spoken signs: it knows that “we think 
in names.” Such thought understands, therefore, that it is fully free, 
self-determining, embodied thought. Consequently, it realises that its 
concepts serve to clarify and render comprehensible what is given in 
sensation and intuition, that its free rational activity thus requires the 
aid of imagination and memory, and, indeed, that such activity is 
made possible by the organic structure of the human body.27 
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Any free and rational thought will ultimately remain dependent upon receptivity to 
the organic human body and a fortiori the organic world at large. Therefore, whilst 
discussing the Romanticism of Hegel and the English romantics I will keep as a 
presupposition in my thesis an acknowledgment of what I term the symbiotic 
alterity28 of imaginative autonomy and receptivity to the external world; one which 
at times these romantic thinkers will attempt to transcend, either through poetic 
disclosures of being or through speculative idealism, and at times displace into other 
forms such as organicism or absolute idealism. A lack of awareness (or 
acknowledgement) of this symbiotic alterity of receptivity and autonomy is what 
leads Coleridge to his despair in canonical poems such as “Dejection” and 
“Constancy,” whilst a partial acknowledgement leads P.B. Shelley from the 
visionary hope and despair of “Alastor” to the autonomous hope of “Adonais” and 
the final breakdown of “The Triumph of Life.”   
     In the concluding chapter I argue for the displaced role of corporeal embodiment 
in Romanticism, arguing from a hermeneutical-phenomenological perspective that 
romantics such as Hegel, Coleridge, Wordsworth and P.B. Shelley develop 
narratives based upon romantic mythologies of disembodiment. However, we gain a 
deepened critical appreciation of these narratives when reread in terms of the 
relationship between the mind and corporeality. 
 
4. Chapter breakdown 
The thesis is broken down into five chapters. The first chapter explores in detail the 
relationship between Hegel, his theory of recognition and Romanticism as a theory, 
especially German Romanticism. I examine Hegel’s theory of recognition in terms 
of a vacillation between receptivity and imaginative autonomy, before showing how 
Hegel’s philosophy remains within the symbiotic alterity of receptivity and 
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autonomy. I go on to argue that this same symbiotic alterity is at work in, and is the 
driving creative force of, romantic aesthetics. In Chapter Two I examine four 
canonical works of Coleridge, and show how Coleridge attempts imaginative 
autonomy, only to finally realise, by the time of his poem “Constancy to an Ideal 
Object”, the futility of this attempt, and the requirement of receptivity to external 
processes. In Chapter Three I examine the work of Wordsworth, and show how 
Wordsworth uses an aesthetic approach to the Hegelian movement toward Absolute 
Spirit. I also describe what I term Wordsworth’s own organic concrete universal 
conceptualisation of the universe, arrived at through the medium of aesthetics—as 
opposed to reason in the case of Hegel’s concrete universal. Chapter Four examines 
both the early and latter work of P.B. Shelley and elaborates upon Shelley’s own 
philosophical struggle to go beyond the organicism of Wordsworth to a state of pure 
imaginative autonomy. This progress is traced from “Alastor” through to “The 
Triumph of life” by which time Shelley fully realises the inability of the romantic 
imagination to transcend the contingency and historicity of the world, and leads to 
Shelley’s own aporetic experience of romantic irony. In Chapter Five I examine the 
ironist state of romantic knowledge, reached by P.B. Shelley and opposed to the 
romantic metaphysics of Wordsworth and Coleridge. Read from the standpoint of 
contemporary philosophical romanticism, I argue that the contingent and ultimately 
embodied nature of knowledge is further explored and critiqued by Mary Shelley, in 
her novel Frankenstein.  
 
5.  Methodology 
The main body of this thesis attempts to offer a philosophical mode of interpretation, 
opting for a neo-Hegelian rubric through which to reread some major English 
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Romantic works. This however does not mean that the thesis argues for a 
supersession of existing approaches, rather it seeks to compliment these approaches 
by offering a distinct framework that draws upon philosophical romanticism. The 
proposed philosophical romantic reading is one among the other “discrimination of 
criticisms.”  
     Further, it is important to acknowledge that Hegel is an enormously complex 
philosopher whose legacy is contested.29 With respect to the argument presented 
here, it is worth noting that in the Science of Logic (1812-1816) the dialectical 
nature of reason arguably places a higher emphasis on an autonomy of pure spirit 
which is by no means as receptive as it appears in The Phenomenology. For 
example, Hegel writes in the first preface to the Logic: 
In this fashion have I tried to portray consciousness in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. Consciousness is spirit as a concrete, self-
aware knowledge—to be sure, a knowledge bound to externality, but 
the progression of this subject matter, like the development of all 
natural and spiritual life, rests exclusively on the nature of the pure 
essentialities that constitute the content of the logic. Consciousness, 
as spirit which on the way of manifesting itself frees itself from its 
immediacy and external concretion, attains to the pure knowledge 
that takes these same pure essentialities for its subject matter as they 
are in and for themselves. They are pure thoughts, spirit that thinks its 
essence. Their self-movement is their spiritual life and is that through 
which science constitutes itself, and of which it is the exposition.30   
 
One can see this as an instance of a philosophical movement away from the 
receptivity to the historical world and the timeliness of culture, which can be found 
in the Phenomenology and which I emphasise on my reading, arguing against an 
essentialist conception of autonomy which parallels the romantic fantasy of 
disembodiment, and outlining instead a movement between receptivity and 
autonomy. This is a tension which be found in Hegel’s own thought, and as Bowie 
argues, is never fully resolved by Hegel himself: 
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We are therefore left with a tension, which has influenced Hegel’s 
effect on modern thought ever since, between his radically modern 
sense of thought as being reliant solely on our social practices and 
their intersubjective justification, rather than on some immediate 
form of empirical access to the truth, and his systematic urge, which 
points back to earlier forms of metaphysics as the expression of the 
universalia ante rem.31   
 
     Further contradictions and developments in Hegel’s actual use of recognition as a 
tool in his overall philosophical system have also been indicated by Axel Honneth. 
In appropriating Hegel’s model of mutual recognition (Anerkennung) for a dynamic, 
modern ethical theory, Honneth outlines how Hegel’s theory of recognition mutates 
from an Aristotelian conception only to be superseded by a theory of consciousness 
that subsumes intersubjectively negotiated human relations beneath the Ousia of 
Spirit, thus fundamentally changing the structure of Hegel’s romantic “plot.”  
Hegel no longer uses it [nature] to designate the constitution of reality as a 
whole, but only of the realm of reality that is opposed to spirit as its 
other—that is, prehuman, physical nature. Of course, at the same time that 
the concept of nature was thus restricted, the category ‘spirit’ or that of 
‘consciousness’ increasingly took over the task of characterizing exactly 
that structural principle according to which the social lifeworld is 
demarcated from natural reality. Here, for the first time, the sphere of 
ethical life is thus freed up for the categorical definitions and distinctions 
that are taken from the process of Spirit’s reflection. The place occupied 
by Aristotelian natural teleology, which still had a complete hold on the 
System of Ethical Life, gradually comes to be taken by a philosophical 
theory of consciousness.32  
 
Hegel of course clings to his central ideal of the ethical construction of the state, 
however his theory has moved from a naturalistic-communitarian theory to a 
metaphysical-ethical theory. This also illustrates a Hegelian vacillation between a 
deeper receptivity to ‘natural’ processes and teleology and an attempt to transcend 
these with the metaphysical architectonic of Absolute Spirit.  
     These actual contradictions, as stated, are inherent in both the oeuvre of Hegel 
and the English romantics, and actually go some way towards substantiating my 
thesis that there is at times a play at work in these various romantic “plots” between 
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receptivity and autonomy. Crucially, neither Hegel nor the romantics can “fix” this 
dialectical issue so to speak, but utilise different conceptual apparatus to deal with 
this problematic, and have therefore many complexities in their overall corpus, 
which transpire partly as a logical outcome of a broader vacillation between 
receptivity and autonomy.   
     As for vacillations in the work of the romantic poets discussed here, I 
acknowledge in Chapter Five for example, that Wordsworth’s own large oeuvre 
countenances a much darker metaphysical doubt in works such as the five “Lucy” 
poems. Additionally, political vacillations in Wordsworth are encountered in the 
earlier versions of The Salisbury Plain poems (1795) or on an imaginative and 
personal note in “Elegiac stanzas: suggested by a picture of Peele Castle, in a storm, 
painted by Sir George Beaumont” (1807). Further, the series of Ecclesiastical 
Sonnets (1822) also displays a much more orthodox political and religious bent, 
similar to the religious switch to Trinitarianism of the older Coleridge, discussed in 
Chapter Three.33  
     Furthermore, the poems I have selected aptly illustrate the philosophical 
problematic with which my thesis is concerned, and given their centrality to the 
canons of the poets concerned, serve their purpose as exemplary texts. This once 
again does not mean that all of the poems of these poets address this philosophical 
issue, but that there is evidence for this engagement in poems central to the canons 
of the respective poets. Moreover, other poems within the respective oeuvre of each 
poet are not implicitly weaker upon my reading, in not dealing with these 
philosophical issues; I offer these poems as examples of a particularised 
philosophical discourse that I argue permeates central areas of English 
Romanticism—however this is not a unitary definition of the multifarious term 
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“English Romanticism.”   This philosophical aspect of Romanticism is one that is a 
single problematic that does not necessarily run though all of the various 
romanticisms, but which at certain times seems central to the work of a number of 
key romantic thinkers. Further research in this vein would possibly be beneficial in 
addressing the work of the other of the “big six” English romantics, Blake, Keats 
and Byron, and may of course yield far different results.34  
     The editions of the poems I have used are the editions as cited in scholarly 
volumes, and I have not chosen to note any variant versions unless they affect the 
philosophical reading, for which I use each poem as an illustrative example. For 
example, when reading Coleridge’s “Dejection: An Ode” I have used the two- 
volume Bollingen variorum text edited by J.C.C. Mays (2001) partly because of the 
revisions the poet made to the text between 1802 and 1817. However, I have once 
again only noted any changes that bear light on my philosophical reading, or that 
help to illustrate what I argue are Coleridge’s recognitive displacements in the 
poem, such as those between Wordsworth (Edmund) and Sara, who both function in 
a philosophical sense for the hopes of Coleridge the poet. I have used this series for 
all of the Coleridge poems quoted here and also for the Biographia Literaria. 
     Wordsworth’s Prelude has its own editorial and philological challenges, and 
there are actually 17 manuscripts in the Wordsworth library at Grasmere. Having 
examined variant texts, including earlier fragments such as MS JJ, I have found 
again that the philosophical reading still holds weight, although it is clear that by the 
first published version of MS E in 1850, (wherein there are also over 60 changes 
exercised by his executors) Wordsworth was avowedly a more conservative thinker, 
and that the earlier versions more clearly reflect his nascent philosophical 
considerations and his dialogues, metaphysical, personal and political, with 
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Coleridge. This is the reason for my selection of the earlier two-book and thirteen 
book versions of the poem. For all of my readings of Wordsworth I have used the 
new three-volume Cornell edition of Wordsworth’s poems, (taken from the 21-
volume Cornell edition), edited by Jared Curtis: The Poems of William Wordsworth: 
Collected Reading Texts from the Cornell Wordsworth (2008-09). 
     The generally accepted scholarly edition of Shelley’s poetry is the current four 
volume edition edited by Kelvin Everest et al., the most recent volume of this 
edition was Volume Three, published in 2011. This volume covers Shelley’s work 
up until the autumn of 1820. Unfortunately, the final volume (the forthcoming 
Volume Four) contains both “Adonais” and “The Triumph of Life,” composed in 
1821 and 1822 respectively. For the following scholarly reasons I have therefore 
used The Norton Critical Edition (2002), edited by Donald Reiman and Neil Fraistat 
for the texts of these two poems.   
     Firstly, there is no surviving fair-copy MS of Adonais. There is available the first 
edition, of what Shelley wrote to Ollier "is beautifully printed, & what is of more 
consequence, correctly..."35 furthermore, there is Mary Shelley's version of 1839, 
that contains 3 minor verbal changes at lines: 72, 143 and 252. The version in the 
Norton Critical Edition incorporates these three minor (1839) changes, which again 
do not affect my philosophical reading of the text. 
     With regards to the more complex debate regarding the extant MS of “The 
Triumph of Life” in the Bodleian Library, Donald Reiman engaged in a major 
discussion of the efficacy of different readings of the MS in 1960/1965 with G.M. 
Matthews. Matthews published a newly authoritative version in Studia 
Neophilologica, 32:2 (1960): pp. 270-309. The version in the Critical Edition is 
taken from Reiman's (1965) version, revised in light of editorial discussions with 
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Matthews himself in 1967 and more importantly a joint analysis of the text by 
Reiman and Matthews at the Bodleian library in August 1971. There was also later 
scholarly work incorporated by Donald and Helene Reiman in 1986. This is 
therefore presently recognized as the most authoritative version, and is the version 
from the Norton text that I have used for my own analysis. 
     These readings hopefully bear fruit in light of their own philosophical basis, in 
comparison to more philologically literary-critical approaches.36 My hope is that the 
use of this philosophical methodology will bear fruits for future scholars of 
Romanticism, and help extend the already expanding and interdisciplinary area of 
“philosophical Romanticism,” whilst using a neo-Hegelian praxis in which to frame 
fruitful and adventitious readings of English Romanticism. Finally, reading the 
poems as instances of a wider philosophical praxis, one which perhaps the poets 
were not even themselves conscious of (one remembers here Hegel’s own famous 
comment on the owl of Minerva flying at dusk; or perhaps his maxim that every 
man is a child of his time) but which we can see more clearly retrospectively does 
not preclude other readings that view the poems as a dialogue for example between 
Wordsworth and Coleridge on their own poetic and personal experiences, or their 
relationship to the French Revolution. These variant readings may indeed sit 
comfortably with the idea of a dialectical praxis operating at a philosophical level 
and one that perhaps, as “children of their time,” the poets were not directly 
conscious of.    
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Notes 
1. See for example the work discussed below by critics such as Mellor, Abrams 
and Praz, whereby different senses of the term Romanticism come to the 
surface and tend to problematise a unitary theory of the subject. Mellor for 
example, concentrates on ironic aspects of the subject, in books such as 
English Romantic Irony (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), 
whereas Abrams provides a more unified, secular-Judaic narratorial reading 
in Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic 
Literature (New York: Norton, 1971).  Praz however, concentrates on darker 
aspects of the subject in The Romantic Agony (London: Oxford Paperbacks, 
1978). 
2. I must acknowledge the importance of the different critical (and 
philosophical) reception of Romanticism which is facilitated when using the 
“close reading” methodology engaged in for example by critics such as 
Simon Jarvis and Keston Sutherland, which provide enlightening 
philosophical readings. Additionally, the close reading work of Michael O’ 
Neil and Nancy Moore Goslee opens up space for additional interpretation of 
the work of the romantics. The methodology I have employed in this 
research relies on scholarly publications, without employing the close 
analysis of variant manuscripts and notebook versions.  
     My own approach aims to examine these poems as instances of various 
romantic mythologies or plots; other such “plots” being those of Hegel and, 
upon my reading of autonomy and receptivity, thinkers such as Kant. For 
examples of close textual readings of Wordsworth see Keston Sutherland, 
“Happiness in Writing,” World Picture 3: Happiness, Summer, 2009: 
(www.worldpicturejournal.com) and Simon Jarvis, Wordsworth’s 
Philosophic Song (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For 
examples of close readings of Shelley see Nancy Moore Goslee, 
“Dispersoning Emily: Drafting as Plot in Epipsychidion,” Keats-Shelley 
Journal, 42, (1993): pp. 104-19 and Michael O’ Neil, “Shelley’s Lyric Art,” 
in P.B. Shelley, Shelley’s Poetry and Prose A Norton Critical Edition, 2nd 
edition, ed. Donald H. Reiman and Neil Fraistat (New York: Norton, 2002).      
3. A.C. Bradley’s essay on Wordsworth is generally regarded as the first 
Hegelian reading of Wordsworth, see “Wordsworth” in Oxford Lectures on 
Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1909). 
4. By the Yale school of criticism I include the seminal Yale critics Bloom, de 
Man and Hartman.    
5. M.H. Abrams, The Correspondent Breeze: Essays in English Romanticism 
(New York: Norton, 1964), pp. 151-52. 
6. Morse Peckham, “On Romanticism: Introduction,” Studies in Romanticism, 
9:4 (1970: Fall), p. 218. 
7. “Deflationary” readings of Hegel are readings or uses of Hegel’s work that 
remove the metaphysical basis of Hegel’s thought, in order to re-apply it to a 
contemporary context. Most recently, deflationary readings of Hegel have 
been offered by Pippin, Brandom and Pinkard. Peckham’s reading of Hegel 
is also deflationary, in fact more so; Peckham actually reads the actual 
historical Hegel himself as constructing a system that whilst demonstrating 
how metaphysical systems are constructed, (and in so doing preceding 
modern transcendental phenomenology) is objectively anti-metaphysical.  
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8. Peckham, p. 219. 
9. In particular, two important examples of the new-historicist take on 
Romanticism are Marilyn Butler, Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries: 
English Literature and its Background 1760-1830 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981) and for a more theoretical discussion: Jerome J. 
McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1983). 
10. See above, Mellor, English Romantic Irony.    
11. Central to McGann’s thesis in The Romantic Ideology is the idea that 
criticism of the romantics has itself fallen into the self-representations of the 
romantics and has therefore operated without an acute historicist awareness 
that would provide the criticism with a more objective and critical stance, 
rather than duplicating the ideological assumptions of the original romantics. 
The methodology of “philosophical romanticism” would not therefore sit 
well with McGann’s historicist approach.  
12. Lovejoy famously wrote his article on the discriminations of Romanticisms 
as a historicist critique of the critical attempts to formulate a unified theory 
of Romanticism. Wellek famously responded to this with a theory of 
Romanticism that argued for common characteristics such as symbol, myth 
and pastoral imagery common to all Romanticism. See A.O. Lovejoy “On 
the Discrimination of Romanticisms” PMLA, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1924): pp. 
229-253 and R. Wellek “’The Concept of “Romanticism” in Literary History 
II. The Unity of European Romanticism.” Comparative Literature, Vol.1, 
no.2 (Spring, 1949): pp. 147-172.       
13. Mellor actually writes in English Romantic Irony “Most modern 
commentators on irony have ignored the enthusiastic creativity inherent in 
Schlegel’s concept of romantic irony. Perhaps they have been overly 
influenced by Hegel’s description of irony as “infinite absolute negativity,” 
which Kierkegaard endorsed in The Concept of Irony (1841). […] Even D.C. 
Muecke’s excellent analysis of romantic irony in The Compass of Irony 
subtly shifts the emotional emphasis of Schlegel’s concept from celebration 
to desperation.” p. 23.   
14. McGann, p. 32. 
15. See McGann’s discussion of these differing critical conceptualisations of 
Romanticism on pp. 21-31 of The Romantic Ideology. 
16. Abrams, p. 155. 
17. Butler, p. 185. 
18. Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 
Romanticism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 
29. 
19. Previous studies of the canonical British romantic reception of philosophy, 
(particularly German idealism) have included, on Wordsworth’s knowledge 
of philosophy, both Continental and British: Melvin Rader, Wordsworth: A 
Philosophical Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) and for detailed 
speculations on Wordsworth’s connection to Schelling’s idealism, E.D. 
Hirsch, Wordsworth and Schelling” a typological study of Romanticism 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960). Eldridge also discusses 
philosophical influences in Wordsworth in “Internal Transcendentalism: 
Wordsworth and a “New Condition of Philosophy” in The Persistence of 
Romanticism: Essays in Philosophy and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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University Press, 2001), pp. 102-126. Simon Jarvis also offers a stimulating 
philosophical account of Wordsworth’s major work in Wordsworth’s 
Philosophic Song (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Amongst 
the numerous accounts of Coleridge’s reception of German idealism see, 
Bishop C. Hunt, Jr., “Coleridge and the Endeavour of Philosophy” PMLA, 
Vol. 91, No. 5, (Oct., 1976): pp. 829-839, Thomas McFarland, “A Complex 
Dialogue: Coleridge’s Doctrine of Polarity and its European Contexts” in 
Walter B. Crawford, (ed.) Reading Coleridge: Approaches and Applications 
(Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979), and Jonathan Wordsworth, “The 
Infinite I AM: Coleridge and the Ascent of Being,” in Richard Gravil, Lucy 
Newlyn and Nicholas Roe (ed.) Coleridge’s Imagination  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 22-52. For a more detailed 
discussion of Coleridge’s relationship to Kant and Schelling see, Tim 
Milnes, “Through the Looking Glass: Coleridge and Post-Kantian 
Philosophy,” Comparative Literature, Fall, 1999: pp. 125-147. Coleridge’s 
relationship to Hegel is discussed in Ayon Roy, “The Spectre of Hegel in 
Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria,” Journal of the History of Ideas, April, 
2007: pp. 279-304. For detailed biographical discussion of P.B. Shelley’s 
reception of philosophy throughout his career see the excellent biography, 
Richard Holmes, Shelley: The Pursuit (London: Harper Collins, 1974). For a 
good discussion of philosophical influences, including materialism, 
empiricism and neoplatonism on “Mont Blanc” see I.J. Kapstein, “The 
Meaning of Shelley’s ‘Mont Blanc,’” PMLA, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Dec., 1947): 
pp. 1046-1060. Further discussion of general philosophical influences on 
Shelley can be found in Frederick L. Jones, “Shelley’s ‘On Life’,” PMLA, 
vol. 62, No. 3 (Sep., 1947): pp. 774-783, and Earl Wasserman “Speculations 
on Metaphysics: The Intellectual Philosophy” in Shelley: A Critical Reading, 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University, 1971), pp. 131-153.  
Abrams’ seminal work, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution 
in Romantic Literature (New York: Norton, 1971) provides detailed analysis 
of the Hegelian connection to Romanticism (both German and British). The 
book also draws a number of comparisons between the German idealist 
tradition in general and the British romantic movement; however it does not 
go into any detail about Hegel’s own Aesthetics or the idea that there is a 
movement towards recognition that can be discerned both in Hegel’s work 
and in Romanticism.  
20. Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche 2nd 
edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press), p. 54. 
21. Bowie, p. 81. 
22. See especially, Terry Eagleton, After Theory (London: Penguin, 2003).     
23. In Nikolas Kompridis (ed.) Philosophical Romanticism (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), p. 5.     
24. See all three writers’ contributions to Kompridis (ed.) Philosophical 
Romanticism, as well as other contributions by Beiser, Pippin and Bernstein 
in the same volume. 
25. Jay Bernstein, “Recognition and Embodiment (Fichte’s Materialism)” in 
Espen Hammer (ed.) German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives 
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 184. 
26. Stephen Houlgate, An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and history 2nd 
edition (London: Blackwell, 2005), p. 169.   
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27. Houlgate, p. 179.  
28. The terms symbiosis and alterity may in ordinary usage appear incompatible. 
For example, alterity is usually used when there is a state of otherness that 
has to be taken into account; Levinas makes this point with regards to 
consciousness and Derrida uses it in this sense too. By flagging a symbiosis 
however we are presupposing two things in an organic (and possibly even 
antagonistic) relation. However, in my usage Coleridge for example 
constantly posits a standpoint of autonomy and this is quickly reduced to a 
state of alterity as he acknowledges the need for example of the external 
world, culture, timeliness etc. This relationship is also symbiotic in that the 
relationship to the other is in effect organic. This is something that Coleridge 
constantly rejects as part of his poetic procedure and then re-affirms. For 
example, and as I discuss in Chapter Three, Coleridge’s use of a marriage 
trope in “Dejection”. The organic (and symbiotic) relationship is something 
that in a Cavellian sense Coleridge fails to fully acknowledge, but it is 
always implicit in his ontology. Wordsworth on the other hand, whilst 
experiencing the same tension, and whilst recognising (acknowledging) a 
relationship of his imaginative mind to the otherness of the empirical world, 
gradually embraces this organic trope, and so realises the symbiotic 
relationship between his mind and the external world. This is why I argue 
that the correct phraseology for this tension and dynamic is “symbiotic 
alterity.” The relationship in many romantic thinkers is one of alterity, whilst 
at an even deeper (organic) level it is in fact a symbiotic (synthetic) one, 
hence these thinkers, at least at a conscious level, experience an alterity 
which is in terms of ontology, symbiotic. 
29. See Katerina Deligiorgi “Introduction” in Katerina Deligiorgi (ed.) Hegel: 
New Directions (Chesham: Acumen, 2006), pp. 1-9.  
30. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 10.  
31. Bowie, p. 151. 
32. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), p. 27. 
33. Other romantics such as F.W. Schlegel also became more conservative in 
later years; Schlegel himself became Catholic in 1808 and edited an anti-
Napoleonic newspaper in his later years in Austria. 
34. I do however reference Byron’s attitude as being one of “Absolute infinite 
negativity” in Chapter Four when discussing Shelley’s treatment of the One 
in “Adonais.” This is due to Byron’s ironic stance in relation to the idealist 
Shelley. 
35. P.B. Shelley, (Letters, II, 311). Quoted in P.B. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose A 
Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edition, p. 408.  
36. I must acknowledge in turn however that close philological readings and 
philosophical readings are of course not mutually exclusive and this is 
explored in Simon Jarvis’ excellent study Wordsworth’s Philosophic Song, 
where Jarvis argues that Wordsworth’s philosophy is worked out through the 
syntactical structures of his poetry, and is based upon a close analytical 
reading of the poems under consideration.   
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Chapter One 
 
Hegelian Romanticism and the Symbiotic Alterity of Receptivity and 
Autonomy 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I will develop the argument that German philosophical romanticism 
and Hegelian speculative philosophy offer an interesting space in which to 
undertake re-readings of English Romanticism. Starting from a Hegelian stance I 
argue that Romanticism can be re-read in terms of a vacillation between two 
positions; one of imaginative autonomy and one of necessary receptivity. I argue 
that what I term this symbiotic alterity of autonomy and receptivity reaches a pivotal 
historical stage in romantic metaphysics and is something that at the same time 
remains implicit in Hegel’s dialectic—thus making Hegel a major romantic thinker. 
I would like to situate my argument in a teleological context, integrating Hegel’s 
social philosophy with his philosophy of art. Furthermore, I briefly outline some 
current readings of German romantic metaphysics, in order to help contextualise 
Hegelian aesthetics with regards to Romanticism as an overall movement. I 
conclude the chapter by examining a number of current readings of Hegelian 
aesthetics and assess how these readings can be appropriated in part for my own 
project of a rereading of some aspects of English Romantic poetry.  
     The chapter consists of four sections: in the first section I offer some comments 
on Hegel’s social philosophy, in particular the concept of recognition. In so doing, I 
set the groundwork to expand the idea of recognition into the realm of aesthetics. 
Further, I set the teleological framework for what I propose is the ambivalent 
relationship of the romantic artist to the world—one which is characterised by a 
dialectical struggle between imaginative autonomy and receptivity, and one which 
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ultimately remains unresolved. This is a situation in which the artist attempts to 
recognize a transcendental truth within their work; or one might say, the artist 
through the vehicle of their art negotiates a better understanding of themselves and 
their relation to the external world. Following on from the social framework, I will 
discuss Hegel’s own treatment of romantic art and then illustrate other recent 
discussions of romantic metaphysics. I will outline Hegel’s theory of art in the 
context of the philosophical romanticism of his contemporaries in order to set the 
scene for my own reading of English Romanticism, utilizing the tools available from 
a Hegelian perspective in engaging with philosophical romanticism’s self-
representations. I conclude by discussing the theory in terms of more recent 
reception and in so doing discuss any consequent implications for this thesis.  
 
2. Hegel’s concept of recognition in an aesthetic light 
In this section I will discuss Hegel’s concept of recognition, with the aim of 
identifying its value for a deepened critical understanding of romantic aesthetics.  
Although I will commence with a discussion of recognition in the sense of 
Anerkennung, I will additionally place my discussion of romantic aesthetics in the 
context of recognition as a form of cognition that entails a sense of acknowledgment 
of something outside of an individual consciousness, a re-cognition that adds to 
one’s overall conceptual apparatus. This second sense of recognition is also akin to 
an extension of the notion of acknowledgment as posited by Stanley Cavell.1 This 
broader understanding of recognition is particularly well-suited to conceptualise 
romantic ideas, especially the way that the relation of acknowledgment or of 
avoidance of nature displaces the recognitive function of a human other into the 
natural world. This is the case despite the fact that the romantics also at times seek 
recognition through another human agent to a fortiori guarantee the validity of their 
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visions, as I will also show throughout the thesis. I draw upon the symbiotic 
relationship between receptivity to the external world and imaginative autonomy, 
which I believe is central in Hegel’s teleology of recognition and also to high 
romantic aesthetics in its own search for aesthetic autonomy—a form of aesthetic 
autonomy that in Romanticism translates as a search for an aesthetic aesthesis.  
Paradoxically, this alleged autonomy is only available through acknowledgment of 
nature and more specifically the subject’s organic connection to the natural world.  
Moreover, the status of imaginative autonomy and receptivity in Hegel’s schema of 
recognition is something that is ultimately reflected in the art of a number of the 
romantics, and for this reason Hegel can be considered a romantic, or is at least prey 
to the same vacillations that constitute romantic art in some aspects of its own 
formations.  
     After the first three chapters of the Phenomenology, the consciousness under 
observation of the phenomenological observer reaches a point of self-consciousness, 
but still has to secure the authenticity of this self-consciousness. It seeks therefore 
another self-consciousness for recognition (Anerkennung), or as Hegel has it: 
Spirit is—this absolute substance which is the unity of the different 
independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy 
perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is 
‘I’. It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that 
consciousness first finds its turning point, where it leaves behind it 
the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike 
void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual 
daylight of the present.2 
 
In the process of attaining self-consciousness or ‘mutual recognition’ the 
consciousness enters the dialectical struggle of interaction with an alien 
consciousness that leads through the life and death struggle to the lordship and 
bondsman stage and finally, after the experience of unhappy consciousness, mutual 
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recognition. H.G Gadamer states the wider aim and achievement of recognition in 
Hegel thus: 
The dichotomization of reality into universal and particular, idea and 
appearance, the law and instances, needs just as much to be 
eliminated as does the division of consciousness into consciousness 
on the one side and its object on the other. What is then thought of in 
the new way is termed the “inner difference” or “infinitude” by 
Hegel. Specifically, insofar as that which differentiates itself within 
itself is not limited from the outside by the boundary of something 
else from which it differentiates itself, it is infinite in itself.3 
 
Gadamer neatly sums up the Hegelian project of ‘recognition’ here; the “inner 
difference” that unfolds with the dialectic gives rise to the establishment of the parts 
of the concrete universal.4 Hegel appropriates Aristotle’s concept of formal-final5 
cause by taking this universal both to precede and to be the telos of its parts. Hegel, 
in his absolute idealism, will therefore transcend oppositions such as the 
phenomenal/noumenal, subject/object or the “I/Not I.”  
     One of the key elements in Hegel’s theory of recognition is the social nature of 
recognition; one can have self-consciousness before recognition (as with Fichte)6 but 
one cannot be fully self-conscious or partake in the universality of consciousness 
without the recognition of another self-consciousness that will allow identity-in-
difference. This is the movement of consciousness that allows for the realm of Spirit 
(Geist) itself; this social and practical aspect of recognition has been stressed more 
recently by thinkers such as Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard.7 For example, in 
describing freedom in connection with recognition Pippin claims: 
[…] freedom is understood by Hegel to involve a certain sort of self-
relation and a certain sort of relation to others; it is constituted by 
being in a certain self-regarding and a certain sort of mutually related 
state. Such states are active, involve deeds and practices, but are 
understood to be free by being undertaken in certain ways, not by 
having certain causal conditions.8 
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This explicitly social side of Hegel stresses the rationality of freedom and 
recognition, and proposes a relational sense of freedom and recognition. It implies a 
mediated status of autonomy: true autonomy is gained through another and therefore 
requires receptivity. Robert Williams also comments on the novel nature of 
autonomy that is apparently inaugurated with the theory of mutual recognition, in 
both Hegel and Fichte: 
Hegel appropriates from Fichte the concept of recognition, according 
to which freedom is intersubjectively mediated, and individuality is a 
reciprocal concept with community. At the very least, this implies 
that autonomy is mediated, and surely the notion of a mediated 
autonomy is not part of the standard picture of the “philosophy of 
subject.”9 
 
Therefore, Hegel’s transition to self-consciousness through mutual recognition 
(Anerkennung), requires mediation in a relationship with another subject; 
consequently, a subject’s autonomy rests upon receptivity towards other subjects. 
     A case can be made for applying Hegel’s concept of recognition into other areas 
of his philosophy.10 One advantage of such an extension is that recognition can be 
seen as the mechanism behind the dialectical teleology that permeates Hegel’s 
systematic thought and the relational state of autonomy that is preserved among 
these different domains. A second sense of cognitive recognition is central for the 
traversal of each dialectical Gestalt. Only once cognitive acknowledgment has taken 
place does the mind move into the next shape of consciousness. I will illustrate the 
claim here and show its plausibility, with examples from Hegel’s treatment of 
religion and art.   
     With regards to religion for example, Williams has pointed out the development 
in terms similar to that of Hegel’s subjective struggle for recognition. Williams 
argues that Hegel holds Judaism as a stage in which the mighty transcendent Jaweh 
is in a relation of master to slave with humanity, in which people fear a 
 35 
transcendent, omnipotent god. In this stage of development in the philosophy of art 
Hegel also claims that the God of Judaism stands above the corporeal world of man 
and nature; man stands in an essentially negative relationship to the great Jewish 
God. In the Aesthetics this is also one of the forms in the early symbolic stage of art 
for Hegel. However, by the time of Christianity man and God are reconciled through 
mutual recognition. This is exemplified in the crucifixion, as Williams claims: 
The alternative, [to Judaism] with which Hegel now identifies 
Christianity, is a tragic vision whose leading categories are not sin 
and punishment, but tragic conflict and its resolution in the 
reconciliation of fate. Thus, the alternative to heteronomy is no 
longer Kantian moral autonomy and its faith in a moral universe, but 
rather tragic conflict and its resolution. […]Incarnation—which 
Hegel reformulates as the mutual recognition of God and man—
replaces the royal metaphor (of Judaism).11 
 
Thus, we see an instance of recognition through Hegel’s treatment of the religious 
sphere, and once again a step away from complete autonomy to an onto-theology 
that presupposes receptivity in the development of religious consciousness. Hegel 
himself further expands recognition into the formal structures and dynamics of the 
modern state in Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1821)12 and this culminates in 
the requirement of recognitive acknowledgment at the level of the nation state: 
The nation state [das Volk als Staat] is the spirit in its substantial 
rationality and immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute 
power on earth; each state is consequently a sovereign and 
independent entity in relation to others. The state has a primary and 
absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power in the 
eyes of others, i.e. to be represented by them. At the same time, 
however, this entitlement is purely formal and the requirement that 
the state should be recognised simply because it is a state is abstract. 
Whether the state does in fact have being in and for itself depends on 
its content—on its constitution and [present] condition; and 
recognition, which implies that the two [i.e. form and content] are 
identical, also depends on the perception and will of the other state.13 
  
 In the context of this thesis however, the central question is how recognition and the 
symbiotic alterity of receptivity and autonomy are relevant to aesthetics. 
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     Frederick Beiser, writing of the status of art in relation to religion and 
philosophy, and following the trajectory of Hegel’s Aesthetics, explains the 
ostensible reason for art’s lower status in terms of Spirit. Hegel claims that art only 
belongs to the first stage of Spirit where Spirit goes outside of itself and finds itself 
in another. However, we have seen the return to self in religion (the incarnation) and 
the self-in-other and return to the self in the Phenomenology. In contrast, with works 
of art the self never returns into itself, but just has itself instantiated in the external 
work of art: 
Part of Hegel’s argument here is that aesthetic experience doesn’t 
involve the structure of identity-in-difference characteristic of spirit. 
That structure requires that self and its other, subject and object, have 
the same status; but in the case of art the object is something dead 
and external, and so not on the same footing as the subject itself. 
Hence Hegel explains how the artist can distance himself from his 
object, ridiculing and even destroying it.14 
 
Beiser’s reading of Hegel in terms of the dialectical nature of Spirit is correct, 
however there is more to be said on this point; in order to open up the argument one 
needs to once again broaden the use of recognition in Hegel and to include the 
concept of “cognition” or “re-cognition” (Erkenntnis). This cognitive sense of 
recognition is implicit in the movement of consciousness as it cognises the external 
world and acknowledges it as part of the overall Concept (Begriff) or Notion. With 
this broader conceptualisation of recognition there is equally a teleological 
development and a necessary receptivity presupposed in order for the subject to 
cognise self-knowledge—however no requirement of an alien consciousness or 
mutual recognition. Paul de Man writes of recognition in this second sense and 
claims that there is an externalisation of the mind as it projects itself before 
returning into itself in Hegel, which gives once again a sense of a struggle for 
recognition that entails a certain kind of receptivity: 
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Thought is proleptic: it projects the hypothesis of its possibility into a 
future, in the hyperbolic expectation that the process that made 
thought possible will eventually catch up with this projection. The 
hyperbolic I projects itself as thought in the hope of re-cognizing 
itself when it will have run its course. This is why thought (denken) is 
ultimately called by Hegel Erkenntnis (which implies recognition) 
and is considered to be superior to knowledge (wissen). At the end of 
the gradual progression of its own functioning, as it moves from 
perception to representation and finally to thought, the intellect will 
refind and recognise itself.15 
 
 Here thought “projects” itself into the externality of the future before synchronically 
returning into itself, and thus “re-cognizing itself when it has run its course.” In this 
broader sense of recognition one can also see a struggle for the cognition for thought 
of it-self, and there is a similar projection of thought in the realm of aesthetics.  
     The object of art opens up the subject (artist) to itself, and the subject also returns 
into itself  (or re-cognises itself) through the formation or cognisance of the aesthetic 
object. If art simply entailed disinterested contemplation then the whole edifice of 
Hegelian aesthetic theory would collapse—as it presupposes the lifting of inner 
Spirit by the subject through art into the corporeal world of representation. The work 
of art requires explication and identification within the subject, whether the putative 
subject is the recipient or the artist. Moreover, Beiser reads Hegel as claiming that 
the “self and its other, subject and object, have the same status.” Again, this is 
clearly true for recognition (Anerkennung) as outlined in chapter four of the 
Phenomenology, but it is not as clear for religion and aesthetics. However, if one 
emphasises Hegel’s belief that Spirit pervades all reality a commonality emerges 
between Hegelian thought and the ontological foundation of romantic aesthetics. 
Schlegel and Novalis both saw the external world as a “thou” which was as such 
imbued with a consciousness of its own.16 This self-conscious mediation is 
something that also binds the Jena romantics to a necessarily receptive relationship 
with the external world, the “I-thou.” Furthermore, the attempt by the romantics to 
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synthesise Spinoza’s monism with Fichtean subjectivity17 was something that 
culminated in their organic philosophy (and something that I shall argue in Chapter 
Three also transpires in the work of Wordsworth). Hegel’s theory similarly draws 
upon Spinoza and Fichte, and similarly produces an organic philosophy, again 
illustrating his own “romantic” tendencies. Although ostensibly not a theory of 
hylozoism, there is in Hegel the romantic idea of the mind being of the same Spirit 
as the natural world, although at a higher level of organisation, thereby implying that 
only through interaction with this world does Spirit gain (through the thinking 
subject) self-consciousness. This further exemplifies the relational autonomy 
postulated with regards to recognition described above. These monistic connections 
(in both Hegel and the Jena romantics) that attempt to transcend the subject/object 
distinction that culminated in Kantian dualism, bring us back to the question of the 
dead and external world. If the thinking subject is the highest emanation of the 
natural world, or as Schelling has it “Nature should be visible spirit, and spirit 
invisible nature,”18 then the symbiotic alterity of autonomy and receptivity once 
again becomes abundantly clear: the subject has to commune with (its apparent 
other), nature, and indeed can never be completely autonomous due to his place 
within the organic system. Therefore, in both Hegel and the romantics there is a 
process of recognition at work, in the sense that in our interactions with the external 
world (to which we are inextricably linked) we divine knowledge of ourselves. This 
in turn can be seen as the outcome of the crisis of reason that leads to our deworlded 
subjectivity19—a subjectivity that has become released or alienated from the natural 
world. In this sense, the response to a mechanised nature on the one hand and a 
deworlded post-Kantian subjectivity on the other, can be recognised as the key 
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elements in creating the play of subjective autonomy and receptivity to the external 
world.    
     The aesthetic experience requires a dialectical interrogation of the subject and the 
universe (or world, externality, culture, etc). This experience problematises the 
‘everyday’, or helps to bring the ‘everyday’ back to the subject, in some other form, 
a form which is imbued (in the case of Post-Reformation art20) with a sense of 
universal Spirit. Given the view that Spirit pervades all reality, treating art-works as 
simply something “external and dead” is something that in Hegelian terms is itself 
problematic. We ought therefore to slightly alter our terms of ‘recognition’; if we 
talk of recognition in terms other than mutual (Anerkennung) recognition and 
expand the term to encompass its use in the wider sense of cognitive recognition or 
acknowledgment, we are permitted to see a new sense of a “struggle” for recognition 
of ourselves in the external world, as opposed to recognition of ourselves in another 
subject—a new recognition in terms of the poet’s response to the external world that 
is configured in subjectivity. The concept of autonomy plays a performative 
conceptual role for the subject in his interactions with the world, however this role 
remains at best regulatory and any true self-knowledge is unattainable without the 
pole of receptivity.    
 
3. Hegel’s response to romantic art 
When discussing Hegel’s aesthetics one has to be aware of the status of Hegel’s 
theory of art, as it is far from unified and the Aesthetics has been subject to scrutiny 
and debate by scholars recently.21 Hegel’s position with regards to Romanticism as 
an art form was varied in that on the one hand Hegel believed romantic art to be part 
of the development of Spirit, a mode in relation to the holistic development of Spirit 
towards its full self-awareness. As such, Hegel afforded art an important cognitive 
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status, as did the contemporary romantics. However, Hegel also demonstrated 
hostility towards Jena Romanticism and its ideals of fragmentation, irony and self-
conscious representation. In discussing Hegel’s approach to romantic art in general 
we therefore have to demarcate between his historical conception of romantic art 
and his treatment of philosophical German Romanticism. I would firstly like to 
adumbrate Hegel’s position towards art in the context of his philosophical theory in 
general and subsequently critique Hegel’s position with regards to philosophical 
romanticism (or romantic metaphysics).  
     For Hegel, art is one of the historical phenomena that define spirit, the other two 
higher categories being religion and philosophy. Examples of art (depending on the 
type of art and the historical period) serve to represent the manifestation, or 
attempted manifestation, of Spirit. Spirit needs to know itself in-itself and for-others, 
and this works in art in a similar way to formal religion, such as Christianity, 
whereby man knows God as defined for the corporeality of man, through the 
incarnation and the resurrection. Man knows himself and is set apart from nature in 
the same fashion as God relates to man; both processes are an extension and 
development of pure Spirit: 
 The universal and absolute need from which art (on its formal side) 
springs has its origin in the fact that man is a thinking consciousness, 
i.e. that man draws out of himself and puts before himself what he is 
and whatever else is. Things in nature are only immediate and single, 
while man as spirit duplicates himself, in that (i) he is as things in 
nature are, but (ii) he is just as much for himself; he sees himself, 
represents himself to himself, thinks, and only in the strength of this 
active placing himself before himself is he spirit. […] The universal 
need for art, that is to say, is man’s rational need to lift the inner and 
outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in which he 
again recognises his own self. The need for this spiritual freedom he 
satisfies, on the one hand, within by making what is within him 
explicit to himself, but correspondingly by giving outward reality to 
this his explicit self, and thus in this duplication of himself by 
bringing what is in him into sight and knowledge for himself and 
others.22 (my italics) 
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     Art has moved through three stages of sensual expression of the Idea for Hegel: 
the symbolic, the classical and the romantic, the romantic being the final stage of art. 
This stage is the point where absolute spirit attempts to turn in on itself—therefore 
losing all clear and beautiful corporeal definition as achieved in the classical stage. 
The development of religion ties in with world historical development and in turn 
correlates with the development of art. Hegel himself points out the movement in the 
Encyclopedia after the symbolic stage in art and religion where the “—figuration 
suitable to the Idea is not yet found, and the thought as going forth and wrestling 
with the figure is exhibited as a negative attitude to it, and yet all the while toiling to 
work itself into it.”23 Hegel identified the works of Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, the 
Egyptians and Judaism as being largely symbolic, whereby art often would serve a 
deictic function, in which the aesthetic signifier stands at a distance from the 
signified. Next, there is the classical stage of Greek art, which moves beyond 
primitive aesthetics and religion into the realm of classical representation and 
anthropomorphic gods. This is the historical period where representational art most 
closely correlates with religious beliefs and is described by Hegel in the 
Phenomenology as the “religion of art.” Here we have the strongest bond between 
form and content. The Idea attempts to find itself and express itself in the most 
beautiful corporeal forms, the highest of which is sculpture, although Hegel also 
writes of the beauty of Greek tragedies, such as Sophocles’ Antigone. However, 
again in an act of infinite negativity, the spirit transcends the corporeal and becomes 
self-conscious, turning in on itself at the stage of romantic art, whereby we have a 
spirit expressed not in anthropomorphic signifiers but as the abstract god of 
monotheism, who signifies a deep Christian love that is transcendent of sensible 
appearance: 
 42 
In another way the Idea and the sensuous figure it appears in are 
incompatible; and that is where the infinite form, subjectivity, is not 
as in the first extreme a mere superficial personality, but its inmost 
depth, and God is known not as only seeking his form or satisfying 
himself in an external form, but as only finding himself in himself, 
and thus giving himself his adequate in the spiritual world alone. 
Romantic art gives up the task of showing him in such an external 
form and by means of beauty: it presents him only as condescending 
to appearance, and the divine as the heart of hearts in an externality 
from which it always disengages itself. Thus the external can here 
appear as contingent towards its significance.24 
 
The concept of love had been hugely important to Hegel in his formative Frankfurt 
years (around 1797) and indeed formed the basis for many of his later ideas, 
including Spirit, the dialectic and ultimately his theory of ethical life—Sittlichkeit.25 
Because of the profound inwardness of its spiritual freedom there is a sense of deep 
expressiveness in romantic art and a gap once again emerges between the aesthetic 
signifier and the signified, or the form and content. Christian art is very important as 
a romantic art in that it in effect humanizes the divine in terms of the sufferings of 
Christ. Moreover, Hegel also celebrates the beauty of inwardness in figures that 
express strong independent character such as Macbeth and the personal virtues of 
characters with strong commitments. These are all very expressive modes of 
profoundly inward-states of feeling, indicative of romantic art. However, after the 
Reformation Hegel believed that art lost its religious significance in that it became 
more secular. Hegel therefore believed that art in effect lost its former power for 
expressing the divine. Art had begun to rest more with representing the bourgeois 
everyday, and Hegel believed that in imbuing the everyday with our inner Spirit we 
could still produce valuable works of art, albeit without the function they once 
played in our religious and ethical life. Hegel admired the seventeenth century 
Dutch masters who imbued objects with the modern, secular, human form of 
freedom, as Stephen Houlgate comments: 
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    By freeing art from religion and by also emancipating the secular, 
Protestantism allows art to explore with a good conscience the subtle 
beauty of the everyday. Once art has become liberated in this way, 
however, its distinctive vocation is no longer to give expression to the 
Divine. Art is thus no longer able to fulfill its highest calling. 
Nevertheless, art is still able to create beauty by giving sensuous 
expression to concrete human freedom and natural life.26 
  
The capture or the concrete embodiment of human freedom in art is therefore still of 
significance for Hegel, even if it has lost its former function of giving sensuous 
expression to the divine.  
     Art in general is for Hegel a form of concrete universality and therefore the 
whole precedes its parts, as in religion and philosophy. However, as representation, 
art works in a sense on a synechdochic level in that it grasps the whole in its 
concrete universality and yet represents the whole through its particular parts. 
Moreover, at the stage of the romantic there is an even wider bridge between the 
representations of the whole through the parts— at this point Hegel argues that the 
concrete universality of religion as intuition is more suited to expression of the Spirit 
in the form of Christianity. Therefore, there is a hierarchy that has developed in 
which art now becomes subordinate to both religion and philosophy, and inferior in 
terms of its ability to represent this new realization of Spirit. It is in this sense that 
Hegel begins to take issue with the Frühromantiker, due to the fact that they placed 
art on a par with (and sometimes above) philosophy, which for Hegel entailed a 
drastic misconception of philosophy’s relationship to the concrete universal, in that 
philosophy sees the whole in relation to the parts and therefore is a more complete 
representation.  
 
4. Hegel and romantic metaphysics 
As I stated above, Hegel recognized the ability of art to grasp the absolute, and 
indeed as concrete universality art was held to be even higher than the discursive 
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understanding for Hegel. However, Hegel’s system meant that in the Post-
Reformation age, art could no longer serve the purpose assigned to it during earlier 
periods of history. The Jena romantics in contrast, argued that art was a self-
legislating form of expression and was therefore of a higher order than philosophy. 
As Beiser claims: 
However, where the romantics went astray, in Hegel’s view, is in 
placing art above philosophy. They could do this, he argued, only 
because they had limited philosophy to the abstract concepts of the 
understanding. They did not have a proper appreciation, therefore, of 
the dialectical form of reason. For two reasons, Hegel held that the 
dialectic is a more adequate form of concrete universality than art. 
First, it grasps explicitly and self-consciously what art sees only 
implicitly and subconsciously. Second, although the institutions of art 
see the unity of the whole, the dialectic also grasps unity-in-
difference, i.e. it sees each part of the whole and how they depend 
upon it.27 
 
The romantic idea of an infinite Sehnsucht is something that Hegel presents as an incomplete 
conception of the speculative Idea. For Hegel, the romantic conception relies on a bad sense 
of infinity, whereby there is no unity-in-difference, and the romantics conceptualised the 
infinite as being that which is never completely attainable, always in a state of becoming or 
flux. Moreover, F.W. Schlegel claimed that the notion of a speculative philosophy that was 
constructed with the grounding notion of a concrete universal was a fiction as philosophy 
had to be started from the centre like an epic poem: 
Philosophy must have at its basis not only an alternating proof 
[Wechselbeweis] but also an alternating concept [Wechselbegriff]. In 
the case of every concept, as in the case of every proof, one can in 
turn ask for a concept and a proof of the same. For this reason, 
philosophy, like an epic poem, must start in the middle, and it is 
impossible to pursue philosophy piece by piece starting from a first 
piece which is grounded and explained completely in and through 
itself. It is a whole, and thus the path to recognizing it is no straight 
line but a circle.28  
 
The dynamic and non-reductive movement of the world-in-flux is also mirrored by works 
such as Novalis’  ‘Monolog’, whereby “the self-referential play of language mirrors the 
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dynamic relations between things and expresses the soul of the world.”29 Or equally, it is 
represented by the theoretical self-consciousness of a novel like Schlegel’s Lucinde. Frank 
describes the romantic reaction to totalising epistemology such as Hegel’s thus: 
If moreover we assume that this process continues to infinity, i.e. that 
there is never any final certainty, then we have to abandon the idea of 
definitive justification altogether. In place of the infinite we get 
(romantic) ‘yearning’ for it; and in place of an evidential theory of 
truth we get one that has to show all the relationships in the world 
and in consciousness in the greatest possible ‘harmony’ (as Erhard 
puts it).30 
 
For Hegel however, romantic irony as postulated by theorists such as Schlegel was 
premature and not a true recognition of the third stage of the liberated idea (Aufhebung) into 
the realm of absolute spirit both in and for-itself and for-others. Moreover, in Hegelian terms 
they would share the fate of the German writer and critic Solger, who almost transcends the 
world of romantic irony postulated by Schlegel:  
In this process he (Solger) came to the dialectical moment of the 
Idea, to the point which I call ‘infinite absolute negativity`, to the 
activity of the Idea in so negating itself as infinite and universal as to 
become finitude and particularity, and in nevertheless cancelling this 
negation in turn and so re-establishing the universal and infinite in 
the finite and particular. To this negativity Solger firmly clung, and 
of course it is one element in the speculative Idea, yet interpreted as 
this purely dialectical unrest and dissolution of both infinite and 
finite, only one element, and not, as Solger will have it, the whole 
idea. Unfortunately Solger’s life was broken off too soon for him to 
have been able to reach the concrete development of the 
philosophical Idea.31 
 
“Infinite absolute negativity” is the stage at which the Jena romantics after Kant 
remain, within a subjective mode of consciousness, exemplified in works such as the 
subjective Athenaeum poetics, “yearning for the infinite” without a complete and 
concrete apprehension of the absolute idea. Schlegel had indeed famously claimed 
at the end of Athenaeum fragment 116: 
The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in 
fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never 
be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and only a divinatory 
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criticism would dare try to characterize its ideal. It alone is infinite, 
just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment that 
the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself.32 
 
On this view, the romantic work of poetry is the same as philosophy; it partakes in 
the poesy that can be found both within the world and in subjects within the world, 
an infinite play, with no ultimate grounding, and hence no sense of a concrete 
universal. Here we have also the ideal of art as the highest expression of this 
process. Furthermore, Schlegel also regards the work of art as a hetorocosm, or a 
technical world unto itself. As he claims in fragment 206 “[a] fragment, like a small 
work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete 
in itself like a porcupine.”33 (my italics) Into this world we have the representation of 
ultimate autonomy, an autonomy that represents the play of poesy. Of course, even 
though the fragment is isolated from the world and complete in itself, it stands in 
relation to other fragmentary representations of the world, each partaking in the 
infinite Sehnsucht and each notionally self-representing.34Again therefore, in 
romantic metaphysics there is on the one hand a sense of the autonomy, which 
discloses a sense of freedom, at least from “the surrounding world” yet at the same 
time, a receptivity to a process of poesy which necessarily entails an infinite 
yearning, and can never be exhausted.  
     In a recent paper, Jay Bernstein claims that Schlegel attempts to free (romantic) 
aesthetics of their bond to the sensible world, thereby developing his position 
beyond that of Lessing into a fully romantic theory of art.  
In Lessing, the idea of painting as a constitutive constraint on poetic 
language is the final moment of resistance to the emptying of the 
natural world of any authority, since what it means for Lessing to 
make poetic language painterly is to make linguistic meaning appear 
as if natural. The claim for the universality of poesy, as premised on 
the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, necessarily dissolves even this 
constraint.35 
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Thus, according to Bernstein’s radical reading, Schlegel moves beyond any 
medium-bound constraints and in doing so maneuvers towards the position of 
fragment and irony that becomes central to romantic philosophy and is central to the 
conception of aesthetic autonomy in self-creation, or a sense of aesthetic aesthesis. 
Moreover, Bernstein cites the works of Blanchot and de Man as bringing 
Schlegelian philosophy into its poststructuralist fruition, and the event of non-
meaning or “the knowing of non-knowledge.”36 This is a concept to which I will 
return in Chapter Four, when discussing Shelley’s own scepticism at the end of his 
life; however, Shelley I argue reaches this conclusion through acknowledgment of 
the delimitations of receptivity to the empirical world.   
     Bernstein takes a much more negative view of the space inhabited by romantic 
irony and fragment than Rush. According to Fred Rush, the dialectical nature of 
Schlegel’s position is ‘historical, contextual and open-ended: Hegelian dialectic is 
historical, teleological and closed.”37 Rush further goes on to defend romantic irony 
by claiming that it is an offshoot of Schlegel’s attempt to distance himself from 
subjective Fichtean foundationalism: 
Reality for Schlegel then is not reducible to subjectivity; rather, the 
capacity of a subject to comprehend reality itself presupposes much 
on the part of reality that is not due to the constitutive role of the 
subject, or, even stronger, is incomprehensible. […] The ability to 
detach (in part) from one’s life involves at least an intimation that 
what transcends experience constrains experience in ways that cannot 
be exhaustively understood. In dialectical terms, subjects externalize 
themselves in the world, partly forming it, but likewise they “come 
back to themselves” from that world, internalizing it and coming to 
recognize limitation in virtue of that activity.38 
 
For Rush, romantic irony is a positive philosophical move that helps not only with 
our modern experience of the world but also gives us once again a sense of context 
and historicity that has perhaps been overlooked in totalizing philosophies such as 
Hegel’s. Moreover, the use of dialectic is also prevalent in his reading of 
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Schlegelian irony. In fact, contra Beiser, who claims Hegel rejected the romantics 
due to their failure to appreciate “the dialectical nature of reason,” Rush argues that 
the central point of difference was more a question of the nature of Schlegel’s 
“open-ended” dialectic as opposed to Hegel’s “closed” dialectic. Bernstein posits a 
much stronger sense of autonomy in Schlegel, whereas Rush reads a much stronger 
sense of receptivity. However, both readings are instructive when we read romantic 
metaphysics in terms of the vacillation between autonomy and receptivity.  
     Hegel did argue that aesthetic discourse should necessarily accompany art and 
that there was more need for aesthetics in the Post-Reformation age. Again, for 
romantics such as Schlegel there was no “law” above the poet and as such the work 
of art was in some sense a transcendental self-reflection or critique. Therefore, the 
whole question of aesthetics as a discipline was also at stake for both Hegel and 
Schlegel. For Hegel of course, philosophy is the highest form of knowing, one that 
moves beyond both art and religion and recognises the full nature of the organic 
relationship between the concrete idea and its parts. As Hegel claims at the end of 
the Phenomenology: 
Thus, what in religion was content or a form for presenting an other, 
is here the Self’s own act. For this Notion is, as we see, the 
knowledge of the Self’s act within itself as all essentiality and all 
existence, the knowledge of this subject as substance and of the 
substance as this knowledge of its act. […] This last shape of spirit— 
the Spirit which at the same time gives its complete and true content 
the form of the Self and thereby realizes its Notion as remaining in its 
Notion in this realization— this is absolute knowing; it is Spirit that 
knows itself in the shape of Spirit, or a comprehensive knowing [in 
terms of the notion].39 
 
Spirit has become self-aware through an awareness of the universal 
conceptualization that is inherent in the active consciousness, having traversed the 
various Gestalten of consciousness. This therefore is a stage past the state of aporia 
inherent in Romanticism and something that Solger almost realized, but for his 
 49 
untimely death. Indeed, for Hegel the very state of Kantian dualism in itself gives 
the thinking subject the spur to the absolute. This unity of apperception is itself 
something only experienced through consciousness but this acts as a stimulus to the 
consciousness—in terms of Hegel’s logic this spurs the subject forward; objects in a 
sense are being-for-knowledge of the absolute. In fact Hegel claims that knowledge 
moves through the various epistemic Gestalten until it gives in-itself an awareness 
of the absolute; this movement is forever driven by the nature of the very reflective 
process of positing in-itself. Hegel also addresses this in the introduction to the 
Phenomenology: 
But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial 
progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go 
beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Notion 
corresponds to object and object to Notion. Hence the progress 
towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to 
be found at any of the stations on the way. Whatever is confirmed 
within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond 
its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by something else, 
and this uprooting entails its death. Consciousness, however, is 
explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond 
limits, and since these limits are its own, it is something that goes 
beyond itself.40  
 
Consciousness, by being aware of itself, goes beyond its own limits by paradoxically 
realizing these limits in being fully self-aware. Of course, one can argue that this 
sounds like Hegel is proposing a kind of aporia, which is entailed within our self-
awareness, and is therefore not entirely alien to the sensibilities of Jena 
Romanticism. However, Hegel goes on to decry the bad faith of a conscience that 
retreats into itself, as pure ego (a possible reference to Fichte or the romantics) and 
denies the universal: 
This conceit which understands how to belittle every truth, in order to 
turn back into itself and gloat over its own understanding, which 
knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same 
barren Ego instead of any content— this is a satisfaction which we 
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must leave to itself, for it flees from the universal, and seeks only to 
be for itself.41 
 
This appears the crux of Hegel’s attack on romantic subjectivism: a position 
opposed to the consciousness that “flees from the universal” in whatever path this 
thought may take, including that of irony. It appears that the mistake of the romantic 
ironist is not to conceive of the metaphysical logic implicit in Hegel’s overall 
system.  
     Furthermore, for Hegel the grandest examples of art are indeed the classical 
manifestations of Spirit, whereby the idea is not greater than the medium that 
renders the idea; i.e. is anthropomorphic. Therefore, art’s best examples of Spirit in 
its development are embodied. Whereas for the romantics the autonomy of poesy 
(whether it be as a reflection of the natural world, or as an ultimate form of aesthesis 
on Bernstein’s reading) is of central importance to the work of art, and thus requires 
a strong sense of disembodiment. For example, Schlegel’s move away from even the 
“painterly constraints” proposed by Lessing insinuates a certain autonomy and 
disengagement from sensible representation to a celebration of the disembodied 
freedom of poesy and the imagination. Following Rush’s “contextual” reading of 
Schlegel’s project however, one sees the need to arguably embody this aesthetic in 
something external to the poet’s imagination. Again, the romantic poet can use 
autonomy as a regulative principle of sorts, but ultimately needs to render his 
autonomy contextual, and consequently receptive to external constraints; or perhaps 
one could say the poet can only experience autonomy through receptivity. I will 
further discuss my embodiment thesis in the section below. 
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5. Hegel’s Aesthetics in the modern context 
In this section I would like to show how modern reception of Hegel may be drawn 
on in order to help explicate Romanticism. I will assess how these readings of Hegel 
depend upon the ambivalent relationship between autonomy and receptivity, and 
that in the realm of aesthetics, receptivity entails a necessary embodiment, within 
either another person, a landscape, or another physical vessel. In the case of abstract 
art, this relationship is pushed towards a post-romantic sense of imaginative 
disembodiment, whereby the artist attempts a complete disengagement from the 
vessels of embodiment, and attempts to move towards an absolute aesthetic 
aesthesis. However, the artwork still requires receptivity to cultural norms, history 
and the timeliness of art, and as such the space within which the art operates is never 
completely autonomous.  
     A major position towards Hegelian aesthetics in the twentieth century was that 
adopted by Arthur Danto,42who claims that art has indeed lost its former relevance, 
however not in the romantic period but in the 1960s after Warhol’s Brillo Box. 
According to Jason Gaiger however, Danto has misread the bent in Hegel’s 
aesthetics. For one thing, Hegel’s view of contemporary Romanticism was a major 
factor in his viewpoint: 
However, his views are also motivated by what he saw as the failure 
of Romanticism. His insistence that thought and reflection have 
‘taken their flight above fine art’ can be seen as a response to those 
artists and theorists who continued to identify art as the highest and 
most vital form of human self-expression.43 
 
The important thing to note is that Gaiger adopts a more neutral view of the 
Aesthetics, however he also picks up on what I feel is a profoundly important point 
in Hegel’s overall theory, the idea of representation and its variance during the three 
different historical periods of art. On Hegel’s ideas of aesthetic representation, 
Gaiger claims that “Central to his account, however, is his recognition that a work of 
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art cannot be a mere sign (Zeichen). For what distinguishes a sign from a symbol is 
that the meaning and the vehicle through which this meaning is expressed are 
connected with one another in a purely arbitrary way.”44 Gaiger goes on to explain 
that throughout the history of art Hegel has identified one period of “adequation” 
which is the classical stage of art, a relatively short time period of only “a few 
centuries.”45 Gaiger then makes another strong point in that the importance in 
Hegel’s theory is not his neoclassicist evocation of antiquity but the dynamics 
involved in the other representative arts. 
It is only if judged by the standards of eighteenth-century classicism 
that Symbolic and Romantic art can be said to “fail”. Not for the first 
time, we need to turn Hegel on his head and declare that the true 
character of art is best captured by the distances, contradictions, gaps, 
and incompletion of Symbolic and Romantic art. Herein lies not the 
breakdown of art as a form of sensuous expression but the source of 
its continuing strength and vitality.46 
 
The tensions inherent in art forms such as Romanticism are indeed varied and mean 
there is usually no straightforward interpretation of a work of art. Here, Gaiger 
teases out what I find to be the reasons for the tensions inherent in the majority of art 
at least after the romantic period. If form and content were ideally suited to one 
another during the period of classical antiquity, then I would agree with Hegel that 
in the modern period there is a space in representation, or a further wedge between 
the signifier and the signified. In fact, one could characterize the relationship 
between the signifier and signified during the Symbolic stage as being centripetal, in 
that the aesthetic signifier is moving towards the central signified (or Spirit in 
Hegel). The classical can thus be read as the stage of ‘adequation’, whereas the 
romantic is characterized by a centrifugal relationship between the signifier and the 
signified, or a stage whereby the signifier moves beyond the central signified. This 
space can be said to open up the horizon of meaning and create more space for 
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imaginative maneuver in both the artist and the recipient. Herein lies also the 
radicalization of art, and the political nature of much romantic art—and later 
modernist art—as a response to a modernity which ‘yearns’ for the stability between 
form and meaning allegedly inherent in the ‘golden age’ of antiquity.  
    At this point I would like to return to the themes of receptivity and autonomy. 
Pippin has written of reading modernist art in terms of Hegelian aesthetics and has 
convincingly argued that abstract artworks represent the subjectivity of the modern 
world in effect enacting itself through representational art. Pippin claims: 
There is, in other words, no negative theology in Hegel’s strange 
humanistic theology. His progressivism is everywhere decisive; we 
have broken free of a fundamental dependence on such sensible 
images not so much because of their inadequacy as because of our 
having made ourselves independent of them, and art must be 
understood as part and parcel of that work. Again, none of this means 
that we become or realize we always were supernatural beings or that 
we can ignore our corporeality. We remain finite, constrained in all 
the obvious ways by natural limitations. But the experience of, the 
very meaning of, such naturality is now to be regarded as a human 
achievement,…47  
 
Pippin’s deflationary humanism entails a self-legislating normativity, found in the 
very positing of freedom in aesthetic practice. As such, the representations are 
purely abstract and without dependence on “sensible images.” This Kantian reading 
of subjectivity also returns us to the state of deworlded subjectivity, and one can 
indeed see an argument for abstract art as being the logical rejoinder to 
Romanticism. It certainly outlines one important aspect of the romantic movement 
after Kant—that of autonomy. Pippin indeed goes on to argue that: 
Representational art cannot adequately express the full subjectivity of 
experience, the wholly self-legislating, self-authorizing status of the 
norms that constitute such subjectivity, thus, cannot adequately 
express who we (now) are. Only philosophy can “heal” such a self-
inflicted wound and allow the self-determining character of 
experience its adequate expression. (“Only philosophy,” that is, on 
Hegel’s official account. I am trying to suggest that there is no reason 
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a form of art, like abstraction, could not make such a point in a 
nondiscursive way.)48 
 
Again, Pippin returns us to the autonomy that in his overall framework pervades 
modernity. Pippin’s subjectivist stance I believe is one also taken up in the period of 
the romantics through their own representations, however it is only one pole—the 
other being necessary receptivity to natural processes. This is the subjectivity taken 
up by romantic poetics, (and later in the ultimately disembodied works of the 
symbolists). Moreover, if we examine the relationship between signifier and 
signified in genres like Abstract Expressionism we find a self-referential trope, in 
which the medium becomes the message: the medium becomes the self-
representational, autonomous signifier, without direct reference to the sensible; this 
is a space in which the artist attempts to develop a self-referential Parole. I believe 
upon consideration, that Hegel would have disliked abstract art, whereas Schlegel 
would have whole-heartedly approved.  
     One criticism of Pippin’s approach would be of his extreme subjectivism. 
Katerina Deligiorgi has argued that artistic practice is dualistic in that the artist in 
the very act of freely choosing their work is subject to an external necessitation. 
Accordingly: 
The key problem is Pippin’s over-emphatic endorsement of 
subjective legislation; in order to guarantee its autonomy, its 
independence from nature, he presents it as an act of self-creation ex 
nihilo.49 
 
One cannot simply ignore the element of externality that goes into artistic 
transmission in the modern world, whereby the artist is of necessity forced to 
acknowledge the demands of modern culture for the “elevation of Humanus”50 and 
in so doing will realise his freedom. This duality is one that a strongly subjectivist 
reading ignores. Deligiorgi’s reading therefore takes on board the sense of 
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receptivity that I feel is necessary in art, whether it be to a tradition51 or a 
philosophical demand, or to the demands of a culture. This experience of the modern 
world by the artist was, I believe, one that was countenanced by the romantics and 
actively engaged within the bounds of their poetry. There is no autonomy without 
receptivity; the two exist symbiotically—hence the symbiotic alterity between the 
two that I postulate throughout this thesis. Houlgate further takes a different reading 
to that of Pippin’s on Hegel and abstract painting, which is more conservative and in 
many respects, more normative. He criticizes abstraction in art by setting it in 
opposition to the concrete freedom that is required according to his reading of the 
Aesthetics. 
If art is to fulfil its distinctive task in the modern, post-Reformation 
era, therefore, it must—where it can—depict or describe concrete 
natural and human forms, because life and human freedom are 
nothing outside or apart from their concrete embodiment.52 
 
Houlgate is expressing what in my thesis is one side of the same coin, and the 
danger for criticism is to become entrenched in either of the camps. True romantic 
art works in a space between these two poles, and needs this space in order to work 
as a process. Houlgate further claims in his reading of Hegel: 
To the extent that painters such as Pollock endeavour to present the 
act of creation in their work, but do not proceed to create images of 
concrete life and human freedom, they, too, would be guilty of 
abstraction, in Hegel’s view—because they give expression to human 
creative activity abstracting from the concrete embodied form that 
human freedom itself takes.53 
 
This is a direct criticism of the abstract painters due their lack of use of “images of 
concrete freedom.” In setting the argument in the context of this concrete freedom 
Houlgate further reads Hegel in terms of his utilisation of nature as essential for the 
embodiment of human spirit in representation: 
If painting is the visual expression of inner subjectivity, it must give 
visual expression to the fact that subjectivity releases the sphere of 
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the external as independent of itself. […] In giving expression to 
subjectivity that has withdrawn into itself and let nature go free, 
therefore, painting is required by its very nature to portray human 
beings as situated in an architectural or natural context.54  
 
Here we have an account of “inner subjectivity” on one hand and the important 
proviso for artistic expression that formulates the idea that humans need to be 
“situated in an architectural or natural context.” This reading suggests once again 
both autonomy and receptivity in the work of art in that the poet requires receptivity 
to the  “sphere of the external” in order for expression of freedom. In effect, the idea 
needs to be couched in the concrete, or embodied. Hegel himself writes in the 
Aesthetics of poetry’s spiritual autonomy, but also it’s continued reliance on 
sensuous or natural contexts for representation, even though it represents at a higher 
stage than even music, absolute Spirit: 
In the first place, externality as such, i.e. objects in nature, can at 
once be excluded, relatively at least, from the subject-matter suitable 
for poetical conception. The proper subject-matter of poetry is 
spiritual interests, not the sun, mountains, woods, landscapes, or 
constituents of the human body like nerves, blood muscles, etc. For 
however far poetry also involves an element of vision and 
illustration, it still remains even in this respect a spiritual activity and 
it works for inner intuition to which the spirit is nearer and more 
appropriate than external objects in their concrete visible and external 
appearance. Therefore this entire external sphere enters poetry only in 
so far as the spirit finds in it a stimulus or some material for its 
activity; in other words it enters as a human environment, as man’s 
external world which has essential worth only in relation to man’s 
inner consciousness and which may not claim the dignity of being, 
purely on its own account, the exclusive subject-matter of poetry. The 
subject-matter really corresponding to poetry is the infinite wealth of 
the spirit.55 
The “human environment” Hegel describes is still however the concrete 
environment, without which there would be no concretely universal apprehension of 
the universal.  
     Gaiger has pointed out the prescriptive nature of both Houlgate’s and Pippin’s 
reading of the Aesthetics, and his view offers a more historicist, or descriptive 
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reading. I feel a close analysis of these two readings however also shows up the 
tensions within aesthetic practice, and the twin poles of autonomy and receptivity; 
on the one hand there is an undeniable deworlding of the subject that leads the artist 
towards an interrogation of autonomy, whilst at the same time there is a receptivity 
required, either for concretisation of that freedom or to necessary cultural forces that 
negate the purely Promethean reading of modernity suggested by Pippin. As Gaiger 
rightly claims, we need to “turn Hegel on his head” in order to get a more fruitful 
reading of the dynamics inherent in Romanticism, and to escape the neoclassicist 
bias that appears implicitly in Hegel’s Aesthetics.  
     Interestingly, one can read the Aesthetics in the sense of a “struggle for aesthetic 
recognition.” This aesthetic struggle can be read as a struggle for recognition of 
absolute Spirit (or a transcendental signified, to take a more deflationary stance), in 
the work of art itself. I would like to couch the thesis in different terms, and see the 
relationship as one that in art has turned from the centripetal to a centrifugal 
relationship of the aesthetic signifier to the signified. Following Gaiger’s descriptive 
historicism, I would like to argue that in turning Hegel “on his head” we can see that 
the tensions inherent in the majority of modern art can be subjected to rich exegesis 
using the Hegelian model, and that this model can also shed light on some of the 
tensions we recognise in the aesthetic of Romanticism. Further, the dynamics 
inherent in Hegel’s theory of recognition are also inherent in his philosophy of art. 
The teleology of Hegel’s social theory can be fruitfully applied to his aesthetic 
theory, even though this was something never intended (or accomplished) by Hegel 
himself. In fact, this could even be one of the reasons for the arguably un-unified 
nature of his aesthetic theory. Finally, the teleology of the aesthetic realm finds itself 
in the space of symbiotic alterity between autonomy and receptivity, which 
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ultimately haunts Hegel’s social theory as well as the Jena Romanticism to which 
Hegel was so hostile. This tension I will now proceed to examine within the context 
of English Romanticism, and in so doing draw a narrative line between the disparate 
poetics and romantic mythologies of Coleridge, Wordsworth and P.B. Shelley.    
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Notes 
 
1. I am here using the term “acknowledgment” more specifically in Cavell’s 
sense in that knowledge acquisition, in a similar vein to that of Rorty, is not 
necessarily a discovery of a truth that is in some way “out there” but an 
acknowledgment of something previously not recognised by a human subject 
and thus literalised within a pre-existing discourse. This is also a further 
expansion of recognition beyond that of Anerkennung as posited by Hegel. 
For Cavell’s initial rendering of “acknowledgment” see: Stanley Cavell, 
“Knowing and Acknowledging” in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of 
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 238-266. 
Patchen Markell further writes of Cavellian acknowledgment: “For Cavell, 
acknowledgment is different from, but not opposed to knowledge, for it 
involves acting on and responding to what we know. And that intersection 
between the order of knowledge and the order of practice is exactly what 
political theorists have captured by treating “recognition” as at once a kind of 
cognition and a kind of respect: Axel Honneth’s recent argument that 
recognition involves something “added to the perception of the person”—
namely an “affirmation” makes this point clearly. But Cavell’s move from 
knowledge to acknowledgment involves more than this. It is not just a move 
of supplementation, in which something belonging to a different order—that 
of normativity—is added to, and articulated onto, knowledge. It is also a 
move that aims to change our understanding of the relevant “knowledge” 
itself: of what it means to know, and of what kind of knowledge we need to 
have in order to take the further step of acknowledging others.” Patchen 
Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2003), pp. 34-35. It is in this sense that Wordsworth adds to existing 
experience of the natural world, not in the sense of acknowledgment between 
two agents. Wordsworth “acts on” and responds to his experience of the 
natural world and in so doing formulates further knowledge of the world, 
whereas Coleridge remains, in a sense, estranged from acknowledgment, or 
put another way, avoids this acknowledgment and thus retains a spiritual 
void with regards to the natural world.  
     Acknowledgment for Cavell is acceptance of our sceptical limitations; a 
form of knowledge originally postulated as a way of tackling the problem of 
other minds. Moreover, it can be applied to our knowing of our own mind. It 
is further contrasted with avoidance. In terms of Wordsworth and Coleridge, 
acknowledgment vacillates between in Wordsworth a recognition of nature 
as laying an organic claim upon his whole sense of being—whereas for 
Coleridge this is avoided. It can be argued however, that in this respect 
Coleridge, in choosing to avoid this organic connection to nature actually 
possesses the knowledge in the first place. He enters however a spiritual void 
with regard to this knowledge. Further, Cavell claims that our sense of 
acknowledgment is also down to our recognition of the sceptical limits of our 
everyday existence—a replacement of philosophical certainty. Whilst in this 
sense Coleridge could therefore be seen to simply fail to acknowledge the 
sceptical limits of the everyday in his Romanticism, Wordsworth I argue in 
this thesis at least believes he has transcended these sceptical limitations.   
2. G.W.F Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 110-11. 
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3. H.G. Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P.C. 
Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 57. 
4. The concrete universal is the term used by Hegel to outline the universal that 
precedes or makes its parts possible, in contrast to the abstract universal 
which is made possible by the formation of its parts. It corresponds to the 
scholastic principles of compositum and totum. For Hegel the concrete 
universal is the universal that contains all within its scope and something 
only becomes complete when it is recognised as being part of the concrete 
universal. I argue in my thesis for example that Coleridge remains within a 
divided consciousness that partakes in a conceptualisation of the universal as 
a compositum or abstract universal. Therefore his ideal of a universal is 
something that remains abstract, or outside the elements of his 
consciousness, or to put it another way is never fully concretised.  
5. Hegel’s use of Aristotle’s formal-final cause is interpreted as the Concept 
(Begriff). The formal (or natural cause) is the reason for something’s 
development. The final cause is the telos or the realisation of something’s 
inner essence, or its final purpose. These things are linked together in the 
Concept, which has its telos within its formal structure, which necessarily 
embodies the self-realisation of itself. Hence, the Concept is an instance of 
the concrete universal because it is internally related to the essence of the 
object, and not external to it, in which case it would be an example of an 
abstract universal. Alfredo Ferrain writes: “Immanent form is for Hegel an 
archê or cause that is not definable in abstraction and isolation; the cause 
does not also happen to be subject to change, in addition to and 
independently of its essence. Its very being consists in the process of its own 
actualization. If the essence of the living being does not exist independently 
of it, it must then be the form understood as end – Hegel calls this the 
concept –that moves the living being in the process of attaining to its end or 
telos. Differently stated, in the living being the concept becomes concrete. 
Energeia is what Hegel means by subjectivity, the concept as a cause of its 
being and movement, or self-actualizing form.” In, Alfredo Ferrain, Hegel 
and Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 10.  
6. In Fichte we start with the idea of a self-conscious being, but his argument is 
transcendental, and runs backwards. We need Anerkennung, in order for self-
consciousness. Hegel guarantees self-consciousness and then moves the 
subject forward to another Gestalt, which guarantees awareness of Spirit 
through an inter-subjective relationship. This then guarantees our mediated 
autonomy-through identity-in-difference.   
7. Pippin and Pinkard have recently expressed their “deflationary” readings of 
Hegel in works such as: Robert Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), The Persistence of Subjectivity: On the 
Kantian Aftermath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and 
Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). Also, Terry Pinkard, Hegel’s Dialectic 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988). For a recent historicist 
critique of these tendencies see Frederick Beiser, “Dark Days: Anglophile 
Scholarship Since the 1960s”, Espen Hammer (ed.) German Idealism: 
Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 70-90. 
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8. Robert Pippin, “What is the Question for which Hegel’s Theory of 
Recognition is the Answer?” European Journal of Philosophy, 8:2, (August, 
2000), p. 156. 
9. Robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (London: University of 
California Press, 1997), p. 48. 
10. Axel Honneth, for example, has discussed at length the communitarian 
aspects of recognition in Hegel expressed in early writings such as the 
System of Ethical Life (1802) that in his view are superseded by more 
metaphysical questions on consciousness and Spirit by the time of his early 
work on Realphilosophie (1803/04).  Accordingly, Honneth claims “In this 
sense, the new (and methodologically speaking, certainly superior) 
conception found in The Phenomenology of Spirit represents, in effect, a 
fundamental turning-point in the course of Hegel’s thought. As a result, the 
possibility of returning to the most compelling of his earlier intuitions, the 
still incomplete model of ‘the struggle for recognition’, is blocked. 
Accordingly, in the large works that were to follow, one finds only traces of 
the programme pursued in Jena. But neither the intersubjectivist concept of 
human identity, nor the distinction of various media of recognition (with the 
accompanying differentiation of recognition relations), nor, certainly, the 
idea of a historically productive role for moral struggle—none of these ever 
again acquires a systematic function within Hegel’s political philosophy.” 
Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The moral Grammar of Social 
Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995), p. 63. On 
my model, I have attempted an expansion of recognition into other areas of 
Hegel’s philosophy, whereas on Honneth’s reading Hegel is guilty of 
removing recognition as a central impetus in his work as the price for 
methodological clarity. Honneth examines the political dimension of 
recognition by using some of the work of G.H. Meade to expand upon 
Hegel’s earlier, more Aristotelian conception of recognition. 
11. Robert Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1992), p. 77.    
12. Besides the work of Robert Williams and Robert Pippin discussed here, for a 
further discussion of Anerkennung in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
see also: Jurgen Lawrenz, ‘Hegel, Recognition and Rights: ‘Anerkennung’ as 
a Gridline of the Philosophy of Rights”, Cosmos and History: the Journal of 
Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol. 3, no.s 2-3, 2007: pp. 153-169. 
13. G.W.F Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood (ed.), 
trans. H.B. Nisbett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 366-
67. Hegel refers to recognition at other points in The Philosophy of Right, 
expanding it into the ethical sphere of Sittlichkeit as the substance of the 
modern state. For example, with regards to education he writes: “It is part of 
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Chapter Two 
 
Philosophy, Theology and Intellectual Intuition in Coleridge’s Poetics 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I use the explanatory framework I developed in Chapter 1 to examine 
the vacillation between receptivity and autonomy as experienced in the work of 
Coleridge. This vacillation manifests itself in Coleridge’s work in an inherent 
tension between receptivity to the external world and an aesthetic autonomy—an 
aesthesis whereby the subject formulates a work of art, which provides an 
independent intellectual intuition of the infinite and in so doing produces a self-
sustaining, balanced and organic work of art—or a ‘deworlded’ work. This tension 
between a contingent ‘deworlded subjectivity’ and an associationist psychophysical 
parallelism, whereby the subject is of necessity bound to the sensible world, is never 
really resolved during his lifetime. In terms of his philosophical response to the post-
Kantian philosophical landscape, Coleridge famously attempted (and failed) to 
formulate an epistemological foundationalism in chapter thirteen of the Biographia 
Literaria (1817). His aim there was to argue for an intuitive status for the 
imagination, which would transcend the dualism of the noumenal and the 
phenomenal world. However unsustainable Coleridge’s foundationalist hopes for the 
romantic imagination, these ideas provide us with an interesting perspective from 
which we can approach his poetry; that is, in terms of a generative tension between 
an absolute idealism and an empirical-realism, or between imaginative autonomy 
and receptivity to the external world. This tension is also partially characterised in 
Coleridge’s poetry by the tension between symbol and allegory.  
     I begin by assessing Coleridge’s metaphysics, and his philosophical attempt to 
transcend the dualistic ontology of Kant in order to cognise a pure intuition to act as 
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a basis for his theosophy.1 I will then discuss four of Coleridge’s canonical poems, 
“Kubla Khan” (1797), “Frost at Midnight” (1798/1834), the third version of 
“Dejection; An Ode” (1817) and “Constancy to an Ideal Object” (an early poem of 
uncertain date of composition), (1828). These poems illustrate firstly Coleridge’s 
philosophical dialectic at different stages of development and secondly the poet’s 
struggle for a unifying state of recognition between his mind and the external 
world—aesthetic recognition. I argue that paradoxically the strength of the poetry is 
derived from the aporia inherent in his metaphysical position; what I term the 
unavoidable and symbiotic alterity of receptivity and autonomy. The rationale for 
commencing with a reading of “Kubla Khan” is not only to do with dates (it is 
conjectured to have been originally composed in October 1797); I also feel that 
Coleridge’s philosophical optimism is at its strongest at this early stage in his poetic 
career and he feels closest to the intellectual intuition he seeks through the medium 
of poesy. Moreover, by the time he composes “Frost at Midnight” in 1798 his 
consciousness has vacillated towards a more receptive position—a position given 
over to his earlier associationism. By the time of the composition of “Constancy” 
Coleridge has lost all faith in a pure, intellectual intuition. I further outline 
throughout the chapter how this philosophical reading of Coleridge’s work offers a 
stronger and more cohesive one than that of other critical readings.   
 
2. Coleridge’s philosophical dichotomy 
Coleridge was inherently troubled by a philosophical divide between receptivity to 
the world in terms of an associationist compositum on the one hand, and an organic 
aesthesis of a totum that arises from the subject’s creative imagination, permitting 
the subject to partake in the infinite. He acknowledges that philosophical unity is an 
ideal, whilst constantly searching for access to this absolute, which throughout his 
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philosophical career remained something he never fully realised. As he states in an 
early notebook entry: 
How the one can be many!...It seems as if it were impossible; yet it is 
- & it is every where! – It is indeed a contradiction in Terms: and 
only in Terms! – It is the co-presence of Feeling & Life, limitless by 
their very essence, with Form, by its very essence limited – 
determinate – definite.2 
Coleridge is clearly faced with a divide between what may be called on the one 
hand, his imaginative experience of the world, and on the other his cognitive 
experience of the empirical world. His philosophical position had already been 
heading in a metaphysical direction during his time at Cambridge, and this was 
further cemented by his experiences and the texts he collected during his trip to 
Germany with the Wordsworths in 1798/9.3 The influence of German metaphysics 
contrasted with the earlier influence of the associationism of David Hartley, which 
was grounded on a psycho-physical parallelism whereby the mind correlates to the 
workings of the nervous system.  Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the tension in 
Coleridge’s work. On the one hand he never completely gave up the psychological 
associationism of Hartley, which is arguably manifested in his conception of the 
mechanical fancy as opposed to the organic imagination; on the other he was 
influenced by the organicist German metaphysics that eventually dominated his 
intellectual life. The atomistic nature of associationism would be superseded, (albeit 
never completely) by the organicism of Schelling’s philosophy and the romantic 
reception of Kant’s regulative organicism4. This would lead to Coleridge’s 
conception of the universe becoming much more holistic than that of Hartley. In a 
letter Coleridge wrote: 
Those who have been led to the same truths [of knowledge] step by 
step through the constant testimony of their senses, seem to me to 
want a sense which I possess—They contemplate nothing but parts—
and all parts are necessarily little—and the universe to them is but a 
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mass of little things… I have known some who have been rationally 
educated, as it is styled. They were marked by a microscopic 
acuteness; but when they looked at great things, all became blank and 
they saw nothing—and denied (very illogically) that anything could 
be seen.5 
 
And in Aids To Reflection he writes: 
 
In the world we see every where evidences of a Unity, which the 
component parts are so far from explaining, that they necessarily pre-
suppose it as the cause and condition of their existing as those parts; 
or even of their existing at all…That the root, stem, leaves, petals, 
&c. [of this crocus] cohere to one plant, is owing to an antecedent 
Power or Principle in the seed, which existed before a single particle 
of the matters that constitute the size and visibility of the crocus, had 
been attracted from the surrounding soil, air, and moisture”.6 
 
Interestingly, one can see a totalising conception here similar to that of Hegel’s 
concrete universal and formal-final cause, where the conceptual whole precedes its 
parts;7 an imaginative conception that would however continually falter in the space 
of Coleridge’s poetry and philosophy due to the remaining influence of 
psychological associationism, which seemed continually to play a philosophically 
active role in his work. Meyer Abrams describes Coleridge’s own organic system 
thus: 
The dynamic conflict of opposites, and their reconciliation into a 
higher third, is not limited to the process of individual consciousness. 
The same concept serves Coleridge as the root-principle of his 
cosmogony, his epistemology, and his theory of poetic creation alike. 
This is the point that Coleridge tries to make in his cryptic and oft-
ridiculed comment: “The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the 
living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a 
repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the 
former…” All genuine creation—everything that is not a mimicking 
of given models, or a mere reassembly of given elements into a 
whole which is novel in its pattern but not in its parts—derives from 
the generative tension of opponent forces, which are synthesized, 
without exclusion, in a new whole. The imagination, in creating 
poetry, therefore echoes the creative principle underlying the 
universe. In this totalising metaphysical system, the imagination, at 
work in poetry, reflects the production of the ‘infinite I AM.’8  
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Coleridge’s theological concerns with Christianity9 and his theosophical cosmology 
here combine with the early Schellingian influence at work in his philosophy, which 
I discuss below, whereby the aesthetic act of creation reproduces the creative drive 
within nature, and ultimately of Yahweh—thus giving the human mind an 
ontological portal into the otherwise noumenal world. This is Coleridge’s use of the 
modified doctrine of natura naturans which Schelling himself had appropriated 
from Spinoza and which forms the basis of his famous Naturphilosophie. Andrew 
Bowie claims of Schelling’s use of this scholastic principle: 
     The essential idea of Schelling’s Naturphilospohie is that, in the 
same way as the I of self-consciousness is both active and yet can try 
to reflect upon itself as an object, nature is both actively ‘productive’ 
(in the sense of Spinoza’a natura naturans) and is made up of 
objective ‘products’ (natura naturata). The understanding deals with 
transient ‘products’ and is consequently confined within the limits of 
determinate cognition; Naturphilosophie tries to theorise nature’s 
‘productivity’, without which there would be no products, and thus 
goes beyond what science can know, which is always particular and 
finite, to what is ‘infinite’.10 
 
In Schellingian terms, access is granted to the natura naturans through the process 
of identification with unconscious natural processes through the conscious 
productivity of our mind. For Coleridge the theologian, the modified ‘infinite I AM’ 
is reproduced in the imagination and gives the thinking subject (in the guise of the 
poet/philosopher) access to the infinite. In fact, Coleridge uses the concept of natura 
naturans in a much closer way to the original scholastic use of the term, whereby we 
have intellectual access to God through the natura naturans.   
     Schelling himself originally viewed art as supplying man with the means for an 
intellectual intuition of the infinite productivity of nature, because art is both 
conscious in the production of the artist and unconscious as an expression of the 
infinite unconscious driving force of nature. The early Schelling attempts to allocate 
a pure autonomy or aesthesis in art, because it organically exemplifies the workings 
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of the natura naturans within the process of aesthetic production itself, (a position 
which was ultimately destabilised and shifted throughout his own career). Later in 
his career Schelling himself explicitly acknowledged his inability to justify his 
notion of intellectual intuition, whether in aesthetics or in simple Naturphilosophie:  
…our self-consciousness is not at all the consciousness of that nature 
which has passed through everything, it is precisely just our 
consciousness […] for the consciousness of man is not the 
consciousness of nature[…] Far from man and his activity making the 
world comprehensible, man himself is that which is most 
incomprehensible.11   
 
The importance of this inherent tension in Schelling’s idealism is based upon the 
apprehension of an intellectual intuition, a stance firstly of philosophical autonomy, 
whereby the thinking subject gains pure access to the infinite, and secondly, a 
fortiori in terms of aesthetics through an experience of pure aesthesis, whereby the 
subject experiences the infinite in and through the productive work of art. This 
dialectical tension between an unmediated experience of the infinite and a mediated 
and receptive aesthetic experience is a tension not only inherited by Coleridge but 
also a rupture openly countenanced by Coleridge in his work and letters after the 
Biographia. Coleridge’s disenchantment with Schelling’s idealism, in particular the 
“identity-philosophy” first introduced in the 1803 revision of the Philosophy of 
Nature, was something that haunted his own attempts at translating speculative 
metaphysics into his own theosophical system. The aporetic nature of Schelling’s 
system was due to the system’s latent Spinozism and failure to establish a 
transcendental intellectual intuition. According to Tim Milnes: 
This was one of the principal causes behind Coleridge’s later 
disenchantment: Schelling’s self-identical absolute threatened to 
revert back into an unwelcome Spinozism with its static universe and 
impersonal God. Consequently, Coleridge was left momentarily 
stranded, unable to follow Schelling into the dark identity of his later 
work, but having accepted (against Kant’s advice) that philosophy 
must find the unconditioned and (against Fichte’s) that this 
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unconditioned lay in the union of the self with an ontological other 
that was not just a reflex “I,” a postulation of the self. In this light, 
Coleridge’s metaphysics of absolute will can be seen as an attempt to 
reconcile Fichtean voluntarism with a Schellingian absolute idealism 
in order to produce a total theosophy of purposeful freedom.12 
 
This failure of reconciliation between an absolute conception of the autonomous self 
and a static, deterministic-Spinozist universe, was the metaphysical dilemma that 
buffered Coleridge. Therefore a tension resided between a Hartleyan receptivity to 
the external universe, resulting in a dualistic and receptive psycho-physical 
parallelism and the need for an absolute autonomy of “purposeful freedom.”  
     Coleridge shared Hegel’s conceptualisation of art’s inferior position to 
philosophy and religion and in later writings openly shared Hegel’s misgivings of 
Schelling’s intellectual intuition. The central problem for Coleridge was that as a 
Christian philosopher he ultimately could not take the next step of placing 
philosophy in a higher relation to religion, something which enabled Hegel (even as 
a Christian philosopher) to place dialectical reason in the position of Ousia. In The 
Letter to Green, Coleridge adumbrates the reasons for his final break from 
Schelling, and his own detachment from the position he had unsuccessfully 
attempted to outline in the Biographia. In the letter Coleridge explicitly outlines his 
objections to Schelling’s intuition, which he argues derives from experience and is at 
the same time responsible for experience, as Coleridge has it: 
 …If his position, that a Principle of Natur-philosophie, belonging to 
Physics, and yet notwithstanding this a Principle strictly a priori, nay, 
an absolute principle, can involve it’s [sic] own necessity and be 
properly self-evident—if (I say) this Position were true, we should 
have a right to infer, dass die Natur-wissenschaft musse der 
Erfahrung . . . ganz und gar entbehren konnen [that natural science 
can do without experience altogether]: and the following sentence, all 
in Italics, is but a paltry evasion grounded on a mere equivoque of the 
word, Experience. . . . But the Position is false, false in it’s [sic] first 
grounds—and being a fundamental Position, it weakens the whole 
Superstructure. Our second point therefore is eineVoraussetzung 
relativ der sinnlichen Natur, oder der Natur in der Welt, kann nicht 
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ihre Nothwendigkeit in sich selbst tragen—kann gar keine absolute 
Nothwendigkeit haben [a presupposition relative to sensible nature, 
or nature in the world, cannot carry its necessity within it- self—can 
have absolutely no absolute necessity]. It is an Anticipation that 
acquires necessity by becoming an IDEA. . . . I need not point out to 
you, my dear Green! the practical Importance of this Correction. For 
as it stood in Schelling, the necessity of resorting to Experience is a 
mere assertion in contradiction to the assertion preceding—and so 
annulled by it …13 
 
Coleridge shares Schelling’s later misgivings with his total system and with the 
ontic status given to the intellectual intuition. However, also in line with Schelling, 
Coleridge retains the residual tension between an experiential receptivity and a 
complete autonomy by clinging to Schelling’s programme, if not the actual results 
of the programme. Ayon Roy has argued that in his inability to ultimately free 
himself of the idea of an intellectual intuition and a conceptualization of absolute 
autonomy, Coleridge finds his main difference from Hegel, who rejects the 
intellectual intuition outright.14 As Hegel himself said of Schelling: “The deficit in 
Schelling’s philosophy is that he places the point of indifference of subjective and 
objective at the beginning; this identity is set up absolutely, without it being proven 
that this is the truth.”15 For Hegel this needs to be worked out in the form of reason, 
through his teleological dialecticism, and is not something to be postulated as an 
intellectual intuition.  
     According to Roy, implicit in Coleridge’s criticism of Schelling is a proto-
Hegelian position, which is only not fully worked out because of his own 
requirement for foundationalism, or an intellectual intuition: 
Coleridge suggests that in the unfolding of the principle itself, it 
(absolute knowledge) can thereby ‘‘acquire’’ necessity. This is 
nothing other than Hegel’s ‘‘phenomenology of spirit’’ as described 
earlier, in which the Absolute is earned only at the end of spirit’s 
journey through the various imperfect stages of knowledge. 
Crucially, in the final turn of Coleridge’s criticism of Schelling, he 
suggests that construing the ‘‘Voraussetzung’’ as ‘‘an Anticipation 
that acquires necessity’’ is precisely the dialectic of actual 
 73 
‘‘Experience’’ (as opposed to Schelling’s ‘‘mere assertion’’ of 
‘‘Experience’’). […] In his marginalia to Schelling’s Introduction to 
the Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, written at about 
the same time that he wrote the letter to Green, Coleridge 
emphasizes, ‘‘It is not the doctrine itself that I am here blaming but 
the method.’’ I would suggest that this remark can be fruitfully 
applied to Coleridge’s stance toward Schelling’s foundationalist 
intuitionism: Coleridge shares Hegel’s skepticism about Schelling’s 
foundationalist methodology but he sides with Schelling against the 
mature Hegel in retaining the category of intuition itself.16 
 
Coleridge’s desire to retain the intellectual intuition, his desire to place imagination 
in the noumenal sphere, is what severs his ability (or intent) to subscribe to the 
project of Hegelian dialecticism. I believe this is mainly due to Coleridge’s position 
as a Unitarian minister, in consequence of which Coleridge could not allow reason 
to subvert his Christian topography. Hegel’s conceptualisation of reason and 
philosophy allows his stratification of art-religion-philosophy; this in turn enables 
Hegel to dispense with any foundationalist metaphysics, because reason (or Spirit) 
itself as the monistic Ousia displaces religion as a mere stage within the overall 
system.  
 
3. Coleridge’s theological escape from aporia 
In a possible reaction to the philosophical impasse at which he found himself, the 
later Coleridge switched his Christian position. He moved from a Unitarian position 
to a Trinitarian position; this I feel stemmed from his dissatisfaction with his own 
failed attempt to formulate an intellectual intuition, which would have given the 
subject self-legislation and an ontological union with a Christian deity. Coleridge’s 
earlier Unitarian theosophical position had been underpinned by a combination of 
Spinoza’s monism and Leibniz’ monadology, supplying him with an entelechy in an 
otherwise dead universe, and redressing the position of ‘deworlded subjectivity’ 
outlined in the previous chapter. Indeed, Coleridge had further been influenced by 
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the Neoplatonism of the British philosopher Cudworth. According to Jonathan 
Wordsworth: 
Coleridge’s own source in 1796 had been not Leibnitz but Cudworth, 
the slightly earlier English neo-Platonist under whose influence he 
had written the Lectures on Revealed Religion in the previous year. 
Cudworth’s immense, and immensely learned book, The True 
Intellectual System of the Universe, is an attack on ‘hylozoic 
atheism’—the belief that matter has life. Like Leibnitz he had dealt in 
terms of separate plastic powers; as a Unitarian, however, Coleridge 
had joined them up, turned them into component parts of the mind of 
God. It is this kind of thinking that lies behind the Biographia 
definitions.17  
 
Coleridge delineated his various philosophical influences and subsumed them under 
his own theological position, which was originally Unitarian, in order to elaborate 
his theosophy. However, after the failure of his philosophical foundationalism he 
actually reoriented his overall schema of art-philosophy-religion and changed his 
theological position (based upon his philosophical aporia) to one of Trinitarianism. 
This affected Coleridge’s philosophical (or theosophical) position, post Biographia. 
However, if we use the telos inherent in Coleridge’s own organic argument, it can be 
argued that the germ for this schism was always alive in Coleridge’s imagination, 
and also informed the symbiotic alterity in his strongest poetry even between 1798-
1802. Jonathan Wordsworth also suggests that Coleridge had gone through stages of 
adopting aspects of Jakob Boehme’s mysticism and Schellingian pantheism before 
rejecting these positions outright after the failure of the Biographia to establish a 
secure foundationalism for his metaphysics: 
Boehme had enabled Coleridge to go on believing that the 
experiences of spiritual transcendence celebrated in his own and 
Wordsworth’s earlier poetry had been a losing and finding of the self 
in God. Such moments are no less important to the Coleridge of 
1818, but he sees them as visitings of the Holy Spirit bestowed by 
God upon his creature man. Deific energy in man himself, variously 
defined as love, joy, the pure reason, the primary imagination is now 
denied. Or, to put it another way, the soul loses its status as a monad 
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of the infinite mind. Aspiration goes, to be replaced by duty. The 
ladder that has offered an Ascent of Being is pulled away.18 
 
By adopting a Trinitarian position, the later Coleridge moves away from the 
Unitarian principles of his earlier faith, and the implied pantheism of his earlier 
Schellingian metaphysics. In one sense therefore, Coleridge adopted a stance which 
in Hegelian terms, (in light of Williams’ reading of Hegel in the last chapter) places 
the human subject back into a passive position in the master-slave relationship with 
a Judaeo-Christian God, and in so doing takes a metaphysical step back, towards a 
form of quietism, and away from speculative metaphysics. This is perhaps reflected 
in Coleridge’s later retirement from public life, during which he allegedly lived an 
almost hermetic existence at Highgate. Coleridge’s theological convictions offered 
him a way out of the impasse that he found his philosophical concerns ensconced 
him within. For Coleridge the ‘infinite I AM’ eventually became a theological 
passkey into an experience of the infinite, partly through the symbolical language of 
the bible—through the linguistic medium of the symbol—something which I shall 
discuss in more detail in analysing Coleridge’s poems below.  
     The divide within Coleridge, always inherent in his work, also appears to 
manifest itself in an almost Cartesian dualism. Coleridge’s spiritual life entailed an 
implicit estrangement from nature.19 This was an estrangement implicit in his work 
due to his struggle for cognitive recognition in and through external nature and his 
alienation from nature; it is also implicit in his move from a Unitarian position to a 
Trinitarian position and his struggle to deliver identity through an ontological 
difference. Indeed, for Coleridge the search for recognition actually becomes deeper 
as his intellectual, philosophical and spiritual life progresses. The “esemplastic” 
imaginative faculty ironically fails Coleridge and there is no ultimate “coadulation” 
in his metaphysical system, and consequently no autonomy or intellectual intuition. 
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Coleridge’s uncertainty about his relationship to the external world can be discerned 
in many passages of his notebooks; in one such famous passage he claims: 
In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, as at yonder 
moon dim-glimmering thro’ the dewey window-pane, I seem rather 
to be seeking, as it were asking, a symbolical language for something 
within me that already and forever exists, than observing anything 
new. Even when that latter is the case, yet still I have always an 
obscure feeling as if that new phaenomenon were the dim Awakening 
of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner Nature.20 
 
Clearly in this passage Coleridge is referring to a notion of intellectual recognition; 
he is seeking recognition in the external world, something that corresponds to his 
inner nature. It is to Coleridge’s poetry as examples of this ongoing and deepening 
recognitive aporia that I now wish to turn.  
 
4. Symbol and allegory in Coleridge 
Coleridge’s most important and most celebrated poetry was arguably written 
between 1797-1806. The poems selected here aptly demonstrate the symbiotic 
alterity of receptivity and autonomy and the generative power of this tension. They 
further demonstrate a proleptic search for recognition in the external world; a 
dialectical search that on the one hand presupposes the possibility of an aesthetic 
representation of autonomy and on the other seeks this aesthesis through a vision of 
the self in the external world, often in the form of allegory. Either way, the 
embodiment of an ideal space is a recurrent leitmotif in all of the poems I will 
examine here. I will commence my discussion with an examination of the famous 
discussion of symbol and allegory, which has been expanded on in recent years in 
romantic criticism.  
     Coleridge’s definition of symbol closely reflected that of Goethe, as did his 
organic aesthetic as a whole.21 The romantic definition of symbol is central to the 
aesthetic ideology of Romanticism, in that it presupposes, at the level of the purely 
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symbolical, an aesthesis or immediate intuition of the infinite, whereas the 
allegorical signifies a divided, fallen, or alienated consciousness where there is a 
specialized and contingent link between one signified and an anterior signifier. In 
Coleridge’s criticism, the allegorical partakes of the mechanical faculty of the fancy, 
which seeks to represent images from empirical data, and as such functions in an 
associative manner.  
     For Coleridge, the Hebraic Bible represents the greatest example of the 
symbolical at work; the Bible synechdochically partakes of the divinity that is 
represented in its pages and therefore is highly symbolic. The Bible is in one sense 
a-temporal and a-historical for Coleridge as it represents eternal truths, which 
become historicised only through representation. Coleridge adumbrated his theory of 
symbol in The Statesman’s Manual in 1816, and said of the Bible: 
…its contents [the Bible] present to us the stream of time continuous 
as life and a symbol of Eternity, inasmuch as the past and the future 
are virtually contained in the present. According therefore to our 
relative position on its banks the Sacred History becomes prophetic, 
the sacred prophecies historical, while the power of and substance of 
both inhere in its laws, its promises and its communications.22 
 
However, the realm of the allegorical and mechanical is the realm of contemporary 
moral knowledge according to the manual, and one for which Coleridge uses the 
Miltonic metaphor of an undernourished flock who are lacking in the taking of 
spiritual fortitude from the truly symbolical well of the Bible.23 Coleridge describes 
at length the present state of spiritual virtue and attributes this to the allegorical 
essence of the moral texts and literature precipitating the spiritual crisis gripping 
Europe: 
A hunger-bitten and idealess philosophy naturally produces a 
starveling and comfortless religion. […] Now an allegory is but a 
translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is itself 
nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses; the principal 
being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike 
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unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a 
symbol is characterized by a translucence of the special in the 
individual, or of the general in the especial, or of the universal in the 
general. Above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in 
the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which it renders 
intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living 
part in that unity, of which it is representative. The other are but 
empty echoes which the fancy arbitrarily associates with apparitions 
of matter, less beautiful but not less shadowy than the sloping orchard 
or hill-side pasture-field seen in the transparent lake below. Alas for 
the flocks that are to be led forth to such pastures!24  
 
Coleridge elevates the Bible above all other forms of literature due to the symbolical 
nature of its narrative, something that Coleridge was constantly trying to ape in his 
literary works. The wellspring “within himself” is the imagination in the individual 
subject that partakes in the divine Ousia, inherent, translucently, in the Bible itself. 
The symbol partakes synecdochically in the One Life.  
     David Dawson has argued for a scriptural reading of Coleridge’s theory of the 
symbol, and argues that this forms a hermeneutical basis for Coleridge’s general 
criticism, within a Christian praxis. The self, both in religious life and in the 
experience of poesy, reflects the infinite divinity of God, or at least epiphenomenally 
partakes in the infinite. Dawson quotes Coleridge’s “Confessions of an Inquiring 
Spirit” when illustrating this point: 
In fact, the self is only a weak echo of that speaking voice that 
constitutes its very personhood. Through scripture, ‘the individual is 
privileged to rise above himself—to leave behind, and lose his 
individual phantom self, in order to find his true Self in that 
Distinctness where no division can be,—in the Eternal I AM, the 
Ever-living WORD, of whom all the elect from the arch-angel before 
the throne to the poor wrestler with the Spirit until the breaking of 
day are but fainter and still fainter echoes’ (VI.54). […]These 
‘principles’ and ‘ideas’ that scripture proclaims are not the regulative 
postulates of Kant’s pure practical reason, but rather realities 
knowable by human ‘conscience’ (reason united with the will and 
emotions). For Coleridge, reason in the form of conscience, as the 
image of God in human beings, apprehends a knowledge higher than 
Kant deemed possible.25   
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The ability to gain access to the “Eternal I AM” gives the subject an access to a 
higher knowledge, within the Christian praxis, which for Kantian epistemology is at 
best only regulatory. In fact, Coleridge in this sense would read Kant in terms of 
allegory—a divided nature that can only have access to an anterior signified ideal 
though a regulatory and allegorical use of practical reason. Whereas Kant would 
have discourse situated in the apriority of history and temporality, Coleridge holds 
symbolical discourse to be a-temporal. Using this logic, the later Coleridge solves 
his epistemological dilemma by subscription to Trinitarian Christian doctrine: 
through a participation in the Christian infinite one attains an intellectual intuition. 
Furthermore, this losing of the temporal self in the One Life or the eternal divinity, 
and the partaking in the “Eternal I AM” succinctly demonstrates Coleridge’s 
hermeneutics, giving us a clearer understanding of his ambiguous pronouncements 
on the primary and the secondary imagination in chapter thirteen of the Biographia. 
The primary imagination of God is thereby echoed in the secondary imagination of 
the romantic poet. As Dawson also claims: 
Because the human imagination as the image of God in human beings 
is at once creative and created, it can generate literature through its 
own imaginative capacity, but that capacity remains ultimately 
subordinate to its grounding in divine creativity. This subordination 
becomes most evident in the self’s religious need to overcome self-
aggrandizement, a need that finds a transformative divine response in 
the human voices of scripture.26 
 
Dawson’s reading of Coleridgean hermeneutics reads in the same fashion as my 
earlier theological juxtaposition with Schellingian aesthetics, and for Dawson the 
Schellingian natura naturans model has been displaced by the theological (or 
theosophical) model, whereby it is the divine imagination of a Trinitarian God that is 
the ultimate Ousia.   
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     Paul de Man famously attacked the symbol/allegory distinction postulated by 
Coleridge (and Goethe) and claimed this distinction was a mystification proclaimed 
by romantic aesthetic ideology, in order to render its dialectic a-temporal and a-
historical.27 For de Man, romantic poetry is truly allegorical in nature, in that one 
cannot have true a-temporal access to an objective world. He writes of the historical 
privileging of symbol over allegory thus: 
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or 
identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to 
its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to 
coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal 
difference. […] We are led, in conclusion, to a historical scheme that 
differs entirely from the customary picture. The dialectical 
relationship between subject and object is no longer the central 
statement of romantic thought, but this dialectic is now located 
entirely in the temporal relationships that exist within a system of 
allegorical signs. It becomes a conflict between a conception of the 
self seen in its authentically temporal predicament and a defensive 
strategy that tries to hide from this negative self-knowledge. On the 
level of language the asserted superiority of the symbol over allegory, 
so frequent during the nineteenth century, is one of the forms taken 
by this tenacious self-mystification.28 
For de Man, the primacy of symbol is replaced by the temporal structure of language 
and sign systems, which hold man in a constant state of différance when it comes to 
any symbolical fusion between the linguistic subject and a noumenal unity. This is 
for de Man the origin of irony and what he terms dedoublement.  
     The ideal of temporal entrapment is something echoed by Cyrus Hamlin who 
claims that the dialectical relationship between subject and object is the central 
characteristic of what he calls romantic metaphor.29 Both de Man and Hamlin 
relegate symbol to a place of ultimate resort, a transcendent goal that cannot be 
achieved within poetry itself. For de Man this results in a negative irony, whereas 
for Hamlin (for whom metaphor replaces allegory) this results in a position of irony 
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or dialecticism, whereby the subject is constantly driven on by the tension or 
discontinuity, within the necessarily temporal structurality of the poem itself.30  
     Ann Mellor argues that Hamlin and de Man have provided critics with a one-
sided deconstruction, and that a correct reading of Schlegelian romantic irony 
demonstrates to us that participation in the Fülle is the driving force behind all 
romantic irony, both through the use of allegory and symbol—this is because neither 
allegory or symbol can actually give us complete aesthetic satisfaction—an aesthesis 
achieved by either would by definition be only temporary as the ironist realizes that 
he can only reflect the Heraclitean flux of the world which is at the root of being.31 
According to Mellor the authentic ironist both celebrates and decries his work, 
hovering between a state of construction and destruction.  
     For the sake of the philosophical debate, we can define symbol as the sign that 
gives us an unhampered, unmediated, intellectual intuition. Schlegel himself claims 
that the language of poetry is a mere copy of the “unformed and unconscious poetry 
which stirs in the plant and shines in the light, smiles in a child, gleams in the flower 
of youth, and glows in the loving bosom of women.”32 A poetry therefore of the 
abundance of the natural world “of which we, too, are part and flower.”33 This 
however still implies a gap between the primordial and unconscious poetry of nature 
and our mimetic copy of this process. Mellor also claims “Even as he 
enthusiastically generates a symbol in a mimetic representation of life-creating 
chaos, the ‘sentimental’ or self-conscious ironist must acknowledge the gap between 
that infinite chaos and his symbol which, being man-made, can only partially render 
that reality intelligible.”34 This “gap” and all its temporal implications seems to 
render part of Hamlin’s and de Man’s temporal polemic still viable. Mellor argues 
that the infinite chaos and flux is represented through poetry, and therefore an 
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intellectual intuition of the infinite, although necessarily ephemeral, is available 
through poesy. Mellor further claims that “the finite can never completely reveal the 
infinite because, if it did so, becoming would no longer be possible and life would 
cease.”35 This is apodictally true, and consequently the infinite, for de Man, Hamlin 
and Mellor is necessarily inaccessible. Further, if the language of poetry mimetically 
represents the dynamism that underlies all being, then how do we distinguish 
between rhetoric that performs as symbol and that which performs as allegory? In 
one sense we have deconstructed the whole initial opposition between the two 
modes of discourse, that is, between symbol and allegory. In short, all language 
renders the flux and dynamism of the universe by its own dynamic nature, and 
further, never gives us access to an intellectual intuition of the infinite, only constant 
‘play.’ This I feel, is the true position that is revealed in the symbol/allegory debate, 
one of blurred boundaries between symbol and allegory (metaphor), and one that is 
enacted in the space of Coleridge’s poetry, especially “Kubla Khan.” 
     Recalling Jason Gaiger’s reading of Hegel’s Aesthetics at this point also helps to 
place the symbol/allegory debate into the context of my overall argument. I cited 
Gaiger in Chapter One as claiming that “we need to turn Hegel on his head and 
declare that the true character of art is best captured by the distances, contradictions, 
gaps, and incompletion of Symbolic and Romantic art. Herein lies not the 
breakdown of art as a form of sensuous expression but the source of its continuing 
strength and vitality.” This argument can further be applied to the symbol and 
allegory debate. The gaps and dissonances are what in part actually define the poetry 
as romantic, the reading we gain in turning Hegel on his head and celebrating the 
gaps between aesthetic signifiers and signified. The romantic age, which gradually 
debunks Christian art with a more secular art, leads into the stage whereby the 
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representation is no longer adequate to the ideal, and therefore a centrifugal distance 
opens up the horizon between the signifier and the signified. On this reading, the 
classical stage of art is the most symbolic in that it displays the anthropomorphic 
form most suited to the idea. The romantic-modern age of art has opened up the 
horizon of meaning to such a degree that self-consciousness, parabasis, 
transcendental buffoonery36 and irony all find an aesthetic space in which to thrive. 
For Coleridge, this “gap” is the source of his greatest poetry, and also the dialectical 
basis of oppositions such as organic/mechanical, imagination/fancy, men of absolute 
genius/men of commanding genius, symbol/allegory etc. His final resource to escape 
this dialectic is the privileged side of the italicised primary hyponyms above, 
however the hypernyms in this hierarchy are autonomy/receptivity, and these terms 
exist in a symbiotic relationship that drive the dynamic essence of Coleridge’s 
poetry. Symbol and allegory on my reading of romantic poetry therefore play out in 
symbiotic alterity and translate as autonomy and receptivity. I have attempted an 
interrogation of the borders between symbol and allegory in my analysis of “Kubla 
Khan,” below, as I find that the borders of symbol and allegory are the poles that 
drive this poem itself, and the blurring of these borders can produce exciting poetry.  
5. The deconstruction of allegory and symbol in “Kubla Khan”   
In this seminal romantic poem Coleridge uses the aesthetic autonomy of the 
romantic imagination as a regulative principle, which however requires a historical 
and natural context in order to function. As in Hegel’s progressive teleology, 
Coleridge constructs autonomy through receptivity between the intelligible and the 
sensible, and due to these binary constraints there is an underlying vacillating 
tension between a presence and absence of full disclosure of aesthetic aesthesis in 
the poem. To begin with, there is an inherent self-consciousness at work in the poem 
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itself. Coleridge added his famous framing device describing the conditions of the 
poem’s composition—the stranger having arrived on business from Porlock after he 
had taken two grains of opium, which denotes the self-consciousness of the work. 
Here, Coleridge is using a framing device that doubles as a kind of parabasis for the 
poem, something often used in self-conscious and ironic works. Mellor argues that 
the self-conscious romantic artist hovers between artistic creation and destruction in 
their work, and one can fruitfully apply this conception to “Kubla Khan”. Mellor 
goes on to outline Schlegel’s concept of Selbstbeschränkung thus: 
In Schlegel’s terms, the ironic artist must constantly balance or 
“hover” between self-creation (Selbstschöpfung) and self-destruction 
(Selbstvernichtung) in a mental state that he calls 
Selbstbeschränkung, a rich term variously translated as self-
determination, self-restraint, or self-restriction. Self-determination 
thus involves the artist in a process in which he simultaneously 
projects his ego or selfhood as a divine creator and also mocks, 
criticizes, or rejects his created fictions as limited and false.37 
 
In one sense therefore the artist’s work deconstructs itself as it unfolds and this limit, 
or transcendental play of freedom and constraint, actually informs the overall trope 
of “Kubla Khan”.  
     Mellor’s reading of the poem, however, suffers from its reliance on romantic 
irony as a principle in romantic criticism. This orients the reader into a more closed 
reading of the text, without allowing for engagement in a philosophical, and more 
open reading of the work. For example, after giving a fruitful analysis of the poem, 
(using romantic irony), Mellor confines the final analysis within the bounds of irony 
as a presumptive principle at work in the poem as a whole: 
By calling the poem “a fragment,” Coleridge guiltily protects himself 
against the charge of blasphemy, of committing himself personally to 
the creation of such a miraculous dome in the air. Hostile readers are 
hereby invited to assume that in the additional lines Coleridge 
himself would have rejected this vision as irrational or even immoral 
and affirmed instead their communally shared values of logic and 
morality.38 
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Whilst acknowledging that the fragmentary nature of the poem hints at Coleridge’s 
sense of ‘limit’ with regard to his poetic powers, or with regards to the sustainability 
of the romantic imagination, at the level of aesthetic aesthesis, this does not imply 
that Coleridge “guiltily protects himself against the charge of blasphemy.” 
Coleridge, through the vehicle of the fragmentary allegory is celebrating the 
fragmentary nature of the romantic imagination in that he at least has partial access 
to an unsustainable aesthesis, whose visions may return. The secondary imagination 
is something that is an epiphenomenon of the primary imagination, and therefore 
can only reflect (as the dome upon the waves) the dynamic energy of the primary, 
and as such is only fragmentary and refractory in nature. Coleridge, rather than 
protecting himself is actually exposing himself as the exponent of the secondary 
romantic imagination; however this disclosure of the secondary romantic 
imagination is self-consciously only fragmentary and fleeting.  
     Within the poem the stately pleasure dome is a self-conscious structure, self-
imposed by the Khan-poet against the forces of history and the natural world, with 
its own laws and architecture. However, the poem is a self-conscious work, and as 
such the poet situates the dome within a pastoral landscape, or hortus conclusus, in 
which the poet senses a type of receptivity to the forces of nature, history and 
tradition; a tradition within which the imagination cannot help but to suffuse its own 
creative powers. Paradoxically, the original symbolic nature of the hortus conclusus 
in the genre of the Dream Vision was a depiction of a garden surrounded by a wall, 
which symbolised the virginal nature of Mary. For the Khan-poet therefore the 
pastoral enclosure implies a sense of limit to the fecundity of his imaginative 
powers. The dome can also be read, in a philosophical sense, as the ultimate symbol, 
a self-referential creation by the Khan-poet; however, the inescapability of the 
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pastoral leads to the allegorical embodiment of the romantic imagination within a 
temporal framing device, whereby the symbol is actuated only in relation to another, 
anterior sign: that of the pastoral. 
     The allegorical Khan poet cannot stand outside the temporality of time and 
history, and due to this limitation the poet cannot stand in a position of transcendent 
percipience. Just as the pleasure dome is set within the bounded grounds of the 
pastoral natura naturans, so the aesthesis is not a ‘pure’ intuition, but only a 
reaction to external forces, and set within the bounds of the pastoral landscape. 
Importantly, in the traditional Dream Vision something within the dream usually 
awakens the dreamer and after the dream there are a few likely interpretations 
available that will encourage debate about cultural issues of the day. This reading 
gives the reader a much stronger indication of Coleridge’s direction in “Kubla 
Khan.” Coleridge himself awakens from the dream, and this is important because of 
the self-conscious structure of the poem; Coleridge is in effect interrogating himself 
and therefore is awoken by something exterior to the dream—the subject cannot 
normally awaken himself from the dream.                 
     The debate for Coleridge is centred on the possibility of intuitive truths, which 
can be realised in and through the romantic, organic, imagination. It gives a hollow 
victory to the literary critic to constrain the poem’s meaning within the confines of a 
single romantic-ironic reading, rather than reading the poem as the opening up of 
meanings and possibilities, which are actuated by the romantic-ironic and 
fragmentary structure of the poem. Coleridge attempts to plunge the reader into a 
state of philosophic uncertainty within the allegoric structure of the poem itself, 
which functions in the final instance as a self-referential instance of the philosophic 
Sehnsucht inherent in the poet’s overall corpus. For Coleridge, the relationship 
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between tradition and the individual talent is allegorised in the generative tension 
between the “decreed” stately pleasure dome and the ubiquitous pastoral landscape.  
6. The antagonists of the imagination in “Kubla Khan” 
Initially, Kubla Khan builds the sunny pleasure dome on a hill that leads “Down to a 
sunless Sea.” (5) and sets up pastoral imagery rife with fecundity. He thus represents 
the creative power of the organic imagination. However, this initial construction of 
the dome is soon overshadowed by other forces, such as “Ancestral Voices 
prophesying War.” (30) These are the voices of history, a nightmare from which the 
poet cannot awake, a nightmare entailing an associative relationship to the river-like 
course of history. The poem cannot fully operate at the level of a heterocosm, which 
is the organic dream of the fully autonomous imagination, and in its own process it 
deconstructs these oppositions of fecund, organic imagery: 
               So twice five miles of fertile ground 
With Walls and Towers were girdled round: 
And here were Gardens bright with sinuous Rills 
Where blossom’d many an incense-bearing Tree,  
And here were Forests ancient as the Hills, 
Enfolding sunny Spots of Greenery.  (6-11) 
                                                         
Here, the ambient tone, along with the regularity of the meter gives a sense of 
harmony and well being, symbolised by the womb-like imagery of a hortus 
conclusus in which the self-conscious poet has found a safe haven in the symbolic 
dome and its gardens. Then Coleridge follows with imagery of a much darker and 
primordial power, representing the Schellingian link, through aesthetics, to the 
unconscious forces of nature. However, the link is less of a settled aesthesis in 
Schelling’s sense, and more of an eruption of a proto-Schopenhaurean will—
creating not harmony or euphony but dissonance and cacophony: 
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But o! that deep romantic Chasm, which slanted 
Down the green Hill athwart a cedarn Cover, 
A savage Place, as holy and inchanted  
As e’er beneath a waning Moon was haunted 
By Woman wailing for her Daemon-Lover:  (12-16) 
                                                                
Thus, the Elysian imagery of the first stanza is displaced by a darker description of 
subterranean activities in a “Chasm” which runs “athwart a cedarn Cover” In this 
sense the primary imagination is something that eludes conscious control and points 
to the aesthetic deconstructing itself between a presence and absence of aesthetic 
autonomy that ultimately cannot sustain itself against the unconscious tide. Thus, the 
primary imagination is conceived as both constructive and destructive.  
     Later in the poem the meter becomes once again more harmonious, as if the 
unconscious forces of nature and history had abated somewhat, giving the poet 
another opportunity of realising aesthetic autonomy, and he addresses the 
Abyssinian maid: 
               Could I revive within me 
  Her Symphony and Song, 
  To such a deep Delight ‘twould win me,    
That with Music loud and long, 
I would build that Dome in air, 
That sunny Dome! those Caves of Ice!  (42-47) 
                                                         
The poet, in a calm moment of recollection, in the subjunctive voice, alludes to the 
autonomous imagination again. The Abyssinian maid stands in one sense a poetic 
muse, and in Coleridge’s symbolic vision as the fertile fountain of the Nile, or the 
cradle of civilisation. This symbol of course presents the poet with the central motif 
of the poem: on the one hand once again a creation, a genesis, representing that of 
“the infinite I AM”, and on the other the narrative of history that haunts the poet and 
sends the poet back to history and the temporal narrative of allegory. The ambiguity 
of the Abyssinian muse stands in feminine contrast to the poet-Khan—but also 
stands out as an infinite symbol—the romantic alterity of the female in the romantic 
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imagination. This fecund symbol is only attainable at certain times, just as is the 
fecundity of the romantic imagination itself, whereas the Khan-poet presents the 
secondary imagination in its temporal form, subject to atrophy, decay and history. 
Further, the images of biblical fecundity and the connection to God are extended 
with the imagery in the final lines (53-54): “For He on Honey-dew hath fed/ And 
drank the Milk of Paradise.-”39 The allusion to the fertile promised-land in Exodus 
links the poet to the great creator, and Moses his prophet. The poet at the end of the 
poem stands as the messenger of the Lord, the poetic vessel of the Lord who 
symbolically echoes the creative spirit of the primary imagination.  
     If the first stanza creates the tension between the decreed stately dome and the 
pastoral landscape, the second illustrates the dark nature of the unconscious and 
primordial forces of temporality and history and their disruption of the stability of 
the dome. The final stanza derives its imagery from more theological sources, and in 
so doing echoes Coleridge’s vacillation between Naturphilosophie and a deeply 
theological biblical symbolism. However, the vision is ultimately lost, the possibility 
of reconstructing the dome is something deferred, yet something that always remains 
a fleeting possibility, or in the state of an infinite Sehnsucht. The poem itself 
therefore “hovers” in a self-conscious state of Selbstbeschränkung, between poles of 
aesthetic autonomy and receptivity to the primordial forces of nature and history.  
     With regards to oppositional imagery within the poem, Coleridge structurally 
unites various discordant images within the poem, which suggest his self-conscious 
attempt at wielding the organic imagination: 
  The Shadow of the Dome of pleasure 
  Floated midway on the waves; 
  Where was heard the mingled Measure 
  From the Fountain and the caves; 
It was a miracle of rare Device, 
A sunny Pleasure-Dome with Caves of Ice!  (31-36) 
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There is a lack of a transcendental signified in the poem, which is discernable not 
only through the constant play of opposition, but in the opaque nature of the dome 
itself. We learn of the “shadow of the dome of pleasure” reflected “midway on the 
waves” of the River Alph. Opposites and tensions are generated through a semiotic 
grid in order to erect a unifying whole. However, the whole creation itself is on the 
site of the dome, which is only glimpsed as a trace in the structure of the language 
and never fully realised— in “shadow” and only reflected on the river. Thus, the 
language of the poem fails to fix a transcendental signified, leaving the autonomous 
imagery to free associate in an almost surrealistic discourse. However, Coleridge 
wishes to raise his poem above the level of the surrealistic and the purely oneric, and 
brings in the forces of temporality and history, which distort the image of the dome. 
This is due mainly to the fact that the poem is attempting to insinuate itself into the 
space of autonomy, a space which attempts to feed upon generative symbols rather 
than direct allegory. Nature, history and time, however, act as the antagonists of the 
imagination, and help to place the trope within the self-conscious and divided sphere 
that generates allegory.   
     In Jerome McGann’s new-historicist reading of the poem, the historical image of 
Kubla Khan is placed in the collection of symbols to illustrate the corporeal decay of 
the lifeless world outside the realm of the poetical imagination, illustrating 
Coleridge’s self-conscious formulation of an aesthetic ideology. As McGann claims: 
Ultimately, then, a poem like “Kubla Khan” operates through 
symbols because both its subject matter and its style are “ideal”. The 
specific idea (historical) of such a poem is that poetry works at the 
level of final ideas. Its concrete symbols deliberately forego any 
immediate social or cultural points of reference in order to engage 
with its audience at a purely conceptual level. […] the work compels 
a non-rational form of assent to a latent structure of ideas; in the end 
it urges the reader to swear allegiance to the idea of non-rational and 
unselfconscious forms of knowing.40 
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On this historicist reading, if the poem had indeed deployed more self-conscious 
forms of knowing, such as in Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey”, then the theme and 
tone would have been allegorical. However, the strength of the philosophical 
perspective, as I argued above, is that both allegory and symbol create a generative 
tension, and both equally lead to an infinite yearning. There is a constant space 
between aesthetic signifier and signified at work in romantic poetry, which is openly 
acknowledged in a self-conscious attempt at replication of the primary imagination, 
such as “Kubla Khan.” McGann in fact himself bears out the self-representation of 
the ‘romantic ideology’ that he criticises in thinkers like Abrams, as he represents 
the poem in terms of symbolical discourse, and in terms of the symbolical discourse 
that punctuates the heart of  ‘romantic ideology’. 41     
     If we take the relationship between allegory and symbol to a standpoint of 
second-order signification, and once again open up the boundaries between the two, 
we gain a stronger insight into the poem. If Coleridge takes the working of 
generative symbols as what we may call in structuralist terms a first order 
signification, and then sets this process into an allegorical framework, and through 
allegoric imagery represents the symbolic process, we in fact have a second-order 
signification (allegory) of the first-order process of (symbolic) generation. The poem 
is, I think, an allegorical representation of the “infinite I AM” or Yahweh in the 
process of the romantic imagination. The binary symbols of the 
conscious/unconscious, light/darkness, the subterranean/the pastoral are created in 
order to signify the Schellingian unconsciously productive natural world (or the 
Coleridgean “infinite I AM”) as opposed to the consciously produced work of art, or 
the imagination-in-progress partaking of the “infinite I AM”. These opposing and 
yet identified forces of the consciously and unconsciously productive are then set to 
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the allegorical tale of the production of Kubla Khan’s dome and the subterranean 
and primordial tensions of the universe, that wash the dome down river to the 
“lifeless Ocean” (28). However, this reading of the poem still leaves one with the 
issue discussed previously with regards to allegory and symbol; both lead the artist 
to an intimation or approximation of a possible infinite by means of a man-made 
inscription which “can only partially render that reality intelligible,” and cannot, 
even translucently, give us a direct intellectual intuition. Or stated differently, the 
process of the autonomous imagination is embodied in an allegorical framework in 
order to recognise the possibility of that freedom. Symbol cannot function unless 
engaged with the process of allegory; and here the boundaries between the two 
become once again dissolved.  
     From another perspective, “Kubla Khan” is more autonomous if it is viewed in 
purely symbolical terms, without reference to the sensual and if we attempt to 
disengage the discursive link of symbol and allegory. Returning to the idea of 
Coleridge’s poem as an assent to poetic creation and as a hetorocosm, (and as such a 
pure symbol) the truth-value of the images never comes into play, as they indicate 
the unified truth of the poetic creation itself, or the self-referential technical structure 
of the work itself. Abrams cites Johann Bodmer and (more particularly) Johann 
Breitinger in his Critische Dichtkunst (1740) as formulating the theory of art-as-
heterocosm, which places the work in the realm of a self-sustaining universe: 
In such passages, poetic probability has been freed from all reference 
to outer reality and made entirely a matter of inner coherence and 
non-contradiction. And by the severance of the poetic universe from 
the empirical universe, we achieve the logical distinction between 
two kinds, or ‘universes’ of truth.42  
 
Of course, for Coleridge the metaphysician, although his poem can be placed in this 
historical context, his philosophical requirement is for a more grounded, 
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foundational attachment to the “infinite I AM.” Bodmer and Breitinger cite the 
philosophy of Leibniz, in which God has infinite choices available when creating, 
and uses the materials to form a unified, well-balanced world. The poet, following 
the same procedure, has only a finite number of choices from the phenomenal world, 
and will look to make the most well balanced work of art. This is the process of 
production explored by Coleridge in “Kubla Khan”; however, the discordant 
tensions that deconstruct themselves and drive the work offer him no foundation for 
his wider philosophical aims. This therefore leads us back to the inherent tension 
and irony that haunts a “fragment” such as “Kubla Khan”. If there are two universes 
of truth, then Coleridge is once again left with an ontological aporia. He is thrown 
once again back into dualism, this time a Leibnizian brand of psychophysical 
parallelism, as opposed to his desired monistic, organic, totality. The perspective of 
psychophysical parallelism paradoxically feeds back into the sense of allegory that 
dominates the poem, the sense of a divided consciousness that can only represent a 
metaphoric, anterior, and parallel universe: the primary imagination as embodied by 
Yahweh. The direct, symbolic, organic, intuitive connection Coleridge seeks is 
unattainable, or at least only functions in a symbiotic relationship with the 
allegorical mode of representation, or is a form of autonomy only attainable through 
receptivity.   
     One final opposition is also discernable in “Kubla Khan”, between that of the 
“man of commanding genius” and the man of “absolute genius.” John Beer43 
discusses the poem in terms of this distinction laid out by Coleridge in the 
Biographia and applies this theme in the context of “Kubla Khan” to Wordsworth. 
In comparison to men of commanding genius, such as Kubla Khan, Beer claims: 
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Men of absolute genius, by contrast, can ‘rest content between 
thought and reality, as it were in an intermundium of which their own 
living spirit supplies the substance, and their imagination the ever-
varying form’ (BL, 1, p. 32). Applying this formula back to Kubla 
Khan, it will be evident that it expresses well the distinction between 
the kind of genius displayed by Kubla Khan in the first two stanzas 
and that of the inspired genius in the last.44 
 
Indeed, if we further read Coleridge’s description of the man of commanding genius 
in the Biographia, we see strong similarities in the imagery used between this 
passage and “Kubla Khan”: 
These [impressed ideas on the world without] in tranquil times are 
formed to exhibit a perfect poem in palace or temple or landscape-
garden; or a tale of romance in canals that join sea with sea, or in 
walls of rock, which shouldering back the billows, imitate the power, 
and supply the benevolence of nature to sheltered navies; or in 
aqueducts that, arching the wide vale from mountain to mountain, 
give a Palmyra to the desert. But alas! In times of tumult they are the 
men destined to come forth as the shaping sprit of ruin, to destroy the 
wisdom of ages in order to substitute the fancies of a day, and to 
change kings and kingdoms, as the wind shifts and shapes the clouds. 
(Italics mine).45 
 
The man (or Khan-poet) of commanding genius clearly figures in the construction of 
the dome in a landscape garden. However, the Khan-poet is also only managing to 
“imitate the power” of nature in the Schellingian sense, or Yahweh, in the 
theological-interpretive mode. These men are subject to the vicissitudes of 
temporality, corporeality, and history. The men who apparently take communion 
with the “well within himself springing up to life everlasting” it appears are men 
who partake in the inner-life. Coleridge also claims: 
But where the ideas are vivid, [in the man of absolute genius] and 
there exists an endless power of combining and modifying them, the 
feelings and affections blend more easily and intimately with these 
ideal creations than with the objects of the senses;46 
 
The question therefore is whether the man of absolute genius (whether or not 
Wordsworth) is the man of absolute autonomy, because of the ability to rest in the 
space between “thought and reality” which translates as the organic (and symbolic) 
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imagination. Khan in the first two stanzas has been used allegorically to explicate 
the tension between unconscious and conscious creative forces in this world, and the 
apparent failure of the self-conscious artist to transcend this opposition. In the final 
stanza however, the man of absolute genius appears in the subjunctive mood, and 
with restrictions. We are informed that the speaker wonders if he could “build that 
Dome in Air” which once again gives a sense of autonomy on the one hand, and the 
unattainable signified on the other. This correlates with the previously lost or opaque 
signified reflected in and floating on the waves in stanza two. And as Kubla Khan’s 
“stately Pleasure-Dome” was “girdled round” with “Walls and Towers” so the 
people at the end of the poem are entreated to imprison or limit the imagination of 
the poet/prophet “Weave a circle round him thrice/ And close your eyes with holy 
Dread:” (51-52).  The sense is of a character that, even if he existed, could not be 
countenanced by humanity. Or we can read this in poststructuralist terms in the 
sense of a transcendental signified, an ideal, something which would/could give us 
the ultimate aesthesis, if only we could conceive of it, outside of our signifying 
systems, with which we would “Weave a circle thrice.” Either way, the concept of 
absolute genius appears inaccessible within the trope of this great poem.  
     Finally, “Kubla Khan” is a powerful attempt at an evocation of ultimate aesthetic 
autonomy and in attempting this feat Coleridge encounters romantic irony; however, 
the irony posits more of an open possibility than the closed reading proposed by 
Mellor. In its dynamics the poem deconstructs itself between on the one hand, 
ultimate aesthetic aesthesis, and on the other a receptivity to language, history and 
the primordial forces of nature, which are ultimately destructive, or at best, 
restrictive. Viewing the poem in terms of the symbolic and allegorical, we see that 
working at the level of symbols does not give the artist any metaphysical certainty, 
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and in the case of “Kubla Khan”, the workings of the symbolic are actually 
explicated through and blended with the allegorical; Coleridge semiotically 
“crosses” the symbolic and the allegoric, thus deconstructing another opposition. As 
we are reading the poem in light of Coleridge’s philosophical project as a whole, 
and through the presence of Schelling (until at least Coleridge’s turn to 
Trinitarianism), we can see no reconcilement of the unconscious forces of nature 
with the conscious production of the artist. Instead we have an ambivalence without 
ultimate subject-object identity, or intellectual intuition (although I believe this 
poem to be the greatest allegorical representation of this Coleridgean/Schellingian 
ideal); in fact, the instability of the poem lies in its direct apprehension of this ideal. 
The possibility of absolute genius at the end of the poem is even cut off from 
humanity, and bound just like the pleasure dome after its original construction; the 
artist remains beached on the unavoidable rubric of the symbiotic alterity of 
receptivity and autonomy. This is ultimately represented in an allegory borrowed 
from history, and as such the aesthesis within the poem is embodied within the 
sensuousness of his receptivity to history, temporality and nature.  
 
7. Coleridge’s ‘unhappy consciousness’ in Frost at Midnight47 
“Frost at Midnight” is a poem of Coleridge’s which relies on receptivity to the 
natural world, and in which Coleridge interrogates his own poetic spiritual 
development in the sense of a Bildung. The personal nature of this poem is 
interesting for the purposes of this thesis as Coleridge here searches for a cognitive-
recognition in the natural world. Moreover, this is the poem in which Coleridge 
comes closest to subscribing to a more associationist aesthetic ideology, in terms of 
the psychological effect of the external world on the poet’s mind. Therefore, this 
poem stands in contrast to the radical imaginative aims of “Kubla Khan.” The poem 
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itself is a cyclical journey of self-discovery, using the trope of crisis autobiography, 
as Wordsworth does in poems such as “Tintern Abbey” and The Prelude. In this 
conversation poem Coleridge identifies with his baby, Hartley, as Wordsworth 
identifies with Dorothy in “Tintern Abbey”. Therefore, there is a search for 
recognition through the medium of the aesthetic product.  
     Jonathan Wordsworth points to the influence on Coleridge’s theory of the 
imagination of Akenside’s Pleasures of Imagination (1744), and in support quotes 
part of Coleridge’s Lectures on the Slave Trade from June 1795: 
To develop the powers of the Creator is our proper employment—and 
to imitate Creativeness by combination our most exalted and self-
satisfying Delight. But we are progressive and must not rest content 
with present blessings. Our Almighty Parent hath therefore given to 
us Imagination…(Lects 1795, p. 253)48 
 
Thus, for the early Unitarian Coleridge, we have the idea of the imagination as 
“given to us” by God.  It is interesting to note how the younger, and more pre-
metaphysical Coleridge relies upon God as giving to us the divine boon of 
imagination. This part of Coleridge, the more theological and pre-metaphysical, is 
much more at home in the universe, and in “Frost at Midnight” is given spiritual 
consolation in the language of God the father through the semiotics of the landscape. 
Coleridge also admired Thomas Burnett’s The Sacred Theory of the Earth (1681-9), 
which he considered “a grand Miltonic romance.”49 This text postulated the idea that 
God’s relationship to fallen man is symbolised by rugged mountains and wild 
natural spaces, and in fact offers an interesting theological conception of the 
sublime. 
     The recognition of God in the external world is a stage of recognition more akin 
to the lordship-bondsman relationship, in that there is no mutuality at this stage for 
Coleridge; there is a proleptic going-out-of self, but no recognition of self in the 
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external, in fact there is a secondary return to self-recognition in the form of his 
progeny (Hartley Coleridge). The dialectical movement here seeks recognition not 
in the self, or in the autonomous imagination, but in the external, pantheistic 
universe, whereby the poet seeks the “infinite I AM” in the landscape. Of course, in 
later years part of Coleridge’s rejection of this initial position would be tied in with 
his rejection of pantheism. As he would claim in his Philosophical Lectures, “For 
pantheism—trick it up as you will—is but a painted atheism.”50 This earlier 
orientation of Coleridge in “Frost at Midnight” however, demonstrates a search for 
recognition, (which he attempts via the Bildung of his aestheticism), and through 
which in turn he hopes to express a recognition of a great being in the theodicy of 
the external world— a proposition which he eventually abandons. The ambiguity 
that haunted Coleridge all of his life is best encapsulated in the quote from his 
notebooks outlined above, “I seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking, a 
symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists”.  
     The poem takes the form of three temporal movements, commencing with 
contemplation, crisis and resolution. It commences with Coleridge addressing his 
poetic imagination and fancy, in varying degrees, which are weak and flickering, 
symbolised by the flames on the fire: 
    …The thin blue flame 
Lies on my low-burnt fire, and quivers not: 
Only that film, which flutter’d on the grate, 
Still flutters there, the sole unquiet thing, 
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature 
Gives it dim sympathies with me, who live, 
Making it a companionable form,   (13-19) 
                                                       
At this point, in the 1798 version of the poem, Coleridge inserts the lines “With 
which I can hold commune. Idle thought!/ But still the living spirit in our frame,/ 
That loves not to behold a lifeless thing,/ Transfuses into all it’s own delights” (20-
 99 
23), hence the “living spirit in our frame” (the imagination or fancy) gives life to the 
external world, not reciprocally however, but in a one-way relationship. In the 1834 
version however, by which time Coleridge had come to rely more heavily upon his 
Trinitarian faith, he was much more sceptical and dismissive of this connection and 
the lines become “Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit/ By its own moods 
interprets, every where/ Echo or mirror seeking of itself,/ And makes a toy of 
Thought.” (20-23). There is at this stage no sense of recognition for the lyric 
speaker; the spirit that was self-reflexive in the vehicle of “Kubla Khan” has now 
become, as fancy, allegorical, self-conscious, divided and analytical. This is a prime 
example of Coleridge in his allegorical form, using a narrative and conversational 
relationship with the external to illustrate the subtleties of the pre-unifying, internal, 
and divided consciousness. As McGann claims of Coleridge’s allegorical work: 
To Coleridge, allegory was a poetical form which he associated with 
a divided or alienated consciousness, and he himself resorted to it—
most memorably, in his prose piece “Allegoric Vision”—to open a 
critical and self-conscious view of ideas and institutions. Allegory 
was not, for Coleridge, a poetic form appropriate to the One life; 
rather, it was peculiarly adapted to expose and explore critically the 
world of illusions, divisions and false consciousness.51   
 
If Coleridge uses allegory in a second-order sense to illustrate the workings of the 
symbolic and purportedly autonomous imagination in “Kubla Khan”, in “Frost at 
Midnight” he uses first order allegory to exemplify the consciousness at a prior and 
pre-symbolic stage—he demonstrates what for Hegel in the Phenomenology would 
be the “unhappy conscience”: a consciousness that is divided and critically self-
conscious. In the line referencing the film of soot on the hearth “that film which 
fluttered on the grate” Coleridge is drawing an allusion to the old English belief that 
this would portend the arrival of a stranger, as Coleridge claimed in his notes to the 
poem in the first 1798 quarto: “Only that film. In all parts of the kingdom these films 
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are called strangers and supposed to portend the arrival of some absent friend.”52 In 
the context of the poem, this is the visitation of the poetic imagination upon the self-
conscious poet’s mind, and also a figure in which Coleridge can seek confirmation, 
or recognition, of his own imaginative autonomy. There is further a sense of rupture 
in these lines because the poet only thinks he has “dim sympathies with me, who 
live”, because Coleridge’s conscience is divided and unhappy, and also dislocated 
from the ideal of the romantic imagination. The imagery of the estranged 
imagination provides the stanza link to the next section of the poem, where 
Coleridge claims he “-gaz’d upon the bars/ To watch that fluttering stranger!” (25-
26), and then dreamt of his childhood in Ottery. Coleridge uses a literal metaphor to 
exemplify the loss he feels with the actual loss of his own childhood, and the image 
of “bars” further gives a sense of imprisonment, both literal and metaphorical, both 
historical and present, to the child and the imagination, which become 
metonymically identical. 
     In the second movement, the poem switches aetiologically in his now divided 
consciousness to his boyhood days after he had left Ottery and was a student at 
Christ’s Hospital public school. Again he refers to the precarious nature of his 
imagination, which even then longed for a return to a state from which it had fallen, 
or recognition of unity in something external—this time a sign from his happier 
childhood in Devon: 
                So gaz’d I, till the soothing things, I dreamt, 
            Lull’d me to sleep, and sleep prolong’d my dreams! 
And so I brooded all the following morn. 
Aw’d by the stern preceptor’s face, mine eye 
Fix’d with mock study on my swimming book: 
Save if the door half open’d, and I snatch’d 
A hasty glance, and still my heart leapt up, 
For still I hop’d to see the stranger’s face, 
Townsman, or aunt, or sister more belov’d, 
My play-mate when we both were cloth’d alike!  (34-43) 
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Coleridge’s “swimming book” is a figure of synecdoche for his school days after he 
lost his family life in Devon, and became a city-dweller. His tears in the classroom 
can also be read as a reference to his imagination, whereby the poet is ever divided 
from the external by the watery, reflective and refracting imagination. The leitmotif 
of the return of something in which Coleridge can recognise “something in myself” 
is played out in the lines 39-43 where he hopes for the return or the recognition of 
something in the external world. Once again however, in the second movement of 
the poem this hope is not fulfilled for Coleridge: still there is no sense of aesthetic 
recognition.      
     In the final movement of the poem, Coleridge searches for recognition by 
projecting his consciousness outward and this time into the future. The symbolic 
landscape becomes acknowledged as sublime, and in the future the 
child/imagination need not suffer the privation experienced by Coleridge the poet or 
prodigy. Coleridge firstly projects his consciousness into Hartley’s future, and 
apparently foresees this in the landscape of the Lake District rather than that of 
Nether Stowey: 
               But thou, my babe! Shalt wander, like a breeze, 
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags  
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds, 
Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores 
And mountain crags: so shalt thou see and hear 
The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible 
Of that eternal language, which thy God 
Utters, who from eternity doth teach 
Himself in all, and all things in himself.  (54-62) 
                                                   
In projecting his consciousness proleptically into the future the poet admits a 
narrative space between himself and the external universe. In so doing he 
allegorically extricates himself from the bonds of having to await the return of lost 
childhood and romantic imagination. Moreover, one can also discern early stirrings 
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of the organic trope at work here: Coleridge himself, through his offspring, will 
partake in the romantic imagination. However, in projecting his hopes onto his son 
he still fails to get any immediate aesthetic intuition or deeper imaginative 
connection with the external universe. His divided consciousness seeks an 
allegorical link to a Unitarian (and pantheistic) conception of the universe through 
the projection both into the future and onto his son’s relationship to the external 
world. This is a temporal-spatial shift in imaginative consciousness that is grounded 
in an allegorical, and divided telos: grounded in all senses on receptivity to the 
external world. There is a reconcilement or recognition between God and man via 
the natura naturans of nature—however in a Spinozist sense as opposed to 
Schellingian, in the form of an intellectual love of God. In one sense, Coleridge’s 
relationship with God itself travels the same cyclical path of “Frost at Midnight”. He 
commences with the symbolical and pantheist landscape of God, before entering 
into his idealist phase whereby the dialectical process is switched back upon his own 
inquiring, philosophical mind, and finally returns to a position whereby God 
“bestows” the Holy Spirit upon his subject: man. Of course, for Hegel this would be 
an incomplete ascent upon the dialectic, one of the “stations along the way.” In fact, 
as stated above, Coleridge returns to the stage of lordship and bondage in his 
relationship with God. Therefore, Coleridge will inevitably seek aesthesis and 
recognition in a deeper imaginative journey into his consciousness, one that through 
an aesthetic recognition will give him ultimate imaginative autonomy; this he 
explores in another famous poem. 
 
8. The aporetic recognition through joy in “Dejection”53 
In “Dejection: an Ode” Coleridge famously questions his fledgling imaginative 
powers, and switches the dialectical struggle back into the realm of his own 
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consciousness. He realises that the aesthesis he seeks is not to be found in 
receptivity to the sensuous world, or to the language of a perfect deity to be found 
within that world, but only within the space of his own consciousness. The 
subjective bent was already in full flow for Coleridge at this point; the poem was 
originally composed as the “Letter to Sara Hutchinson” in April 1802, almost three 
years after his return from Germany. Coleridge had taken the idea of the imagination 
to echo that of the Creator and manoeuvred his consciousness back into the space it 
occupied in the imaginative reverie of “Kubla Khan”; however, Coleridge now has 
awareness of the fact that the fragmentary vision that he sought to “revive” within 
himself is lost. In one of his earlier letters Coleridge compares the faculty of the 
imagination to the faculty of the understanding and claims that the operation of the 
imagination is a truly autonomous faculty, and a reflection of the creative faculty of 
God, in the same vein as he wrote in Lectures on the Slave Trade, nearly seven years 
previously: 
...I believe the Souls of 500 Sir Isaac Newtons would go to the 
making up of a Shakespeare or a Milton…Newton was a mere 
materialist—Mind in his system is always passive—a Lazy Looker-
on on an external World. If the mind be not passive, if it be indeed 
made in God’s Image, & that too in the sublimest sense—the Image 
of the Creator—there is ground for suspicion, that any system built 
on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system.54   
 
Coleridge shifts the dialectic back into the realm of the shaping primary 
imagination, which blatantly castigates empirical receptivity. And in the most 
famous lines from “Dejection” Coleridge writes: 
                    My genial spirits fail. 
     And what can these avail 
To lift the smoth’ring weight from off my Breast? 
      It were a vain Endeavor, 
      Though I should gaze for ever 
On that green Light, that lingers in the West. 
I may not hope from outward Forms to win 
The Passion & the Life, whose Fountains are within.  (39-46) 
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The philosophical rub for Coleridge lies in the fact that without receptivity to the 
external, he can seek no recognition and without proleptic thought gaining 
recognition through a return into itself, Coleridge will remain within a philosophical 
vacuum. Here then we have Coleridge, in the space of his poetry, interrogating the 
lack of an intellectual intuition that would haunt the metaphysics of both himself and 
Schelling. Later in the poem Coleridge seems to identify the faculty of the fancy 
with the discursive understanding, and claims they have displaced the creative 
imagination: 
                  But o! each Visitation 
Suspends what Nature gave me at my Birth, 
    My Shaping Spirit of Imagination! 
For not to think of what I needs must feel, 
    But to be still and patient, all I can; 
And haply by abstruse research to steal 
    From my own Nature all the natural Man; 
    This was my sole Resource, my only Plan— 
Till that which suits a part infects the whole, 
And now is almost grown the habit of my Soul!  (84-93) 
 
There is an autonomy of spirit that Coleridge allegorically represents in “Kubla 
Khan”; whereas in “Dejection” Coleridge claims it has been supplanted by 
“abstruser musings”, which also ironically belong to his own attempted system of 
metaphysics soon to play such a large role in his intellectual life. Moreover, in this 
philosophical action he has lost his former power of imagination to the workings of 
the mechanical fancy.  
     As in “Frost at Midnight” Coleridge has recourse to recognition in another in 
order to partially remedy his imaginative crisis, and in this version of Dejection the 
muse is Sara Hutchinson. Coleridge surreptitiously displaces Sara from the original 
version of the poem, “A Letter to Sara Hutchinson” and replaces the personal with 
the philosophical, and social. However, at the end of the poem, just as in the 
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identification with Hartley, he projects his hopes onto Sara, (and in original 
manuscripts “Edmund” and “Wordsworth”), who is here also presented as the 
imagination itself:  
              Joy lift her spirit, joy attune her voice, 
To her may all things live from pole to Pole, 
Their Life the Eddying of her living Soul! 
   O simple spirit, guided from above, 
Dear Lady! & Friend devoutest of my choice, 
Thus may’st thou ever, ever more rejoice!  (134-39)  
                                                        
Although the lyric speaker has lost his joy and accompanying imagination in the 
performative space of the poem, his hopes are recognised in another who is to be 
suffused in joy, and in so being, releases the poet from his self-imposed conscious 
prison-house. This takes place as with Hartley, through receptivity to the conscious 
state of another subject. Furthermore, this becomes a figurative address to the 
imagination within the poet’s own consciousness—recognition again through the 
self-conscious work of art of a freedom delivered through receptivity to another 
subject. The significance of the subject being a baby in “Frost at Midnight” and a 
female in the final version of “Dejection” gives further evidence of the poet’s 
organic trope; both signify growth, fecundity and future hopes. Crucially however, 
in the first poem the poet seeks recognition in the future hopes of his young son, 
which is an attempt to transcend what I have called an ‘unhappy consciousness.’ In 
the second he seeks an existential displacement of his hopes into the woman, who 
actually becomes an ambiguous female figure in the third version of the poem. 
“Dejection” therefore gives the impression of the poet as a fallen character, someone 
who has lost his sense and opportunity for joy. Whereas in the first poem Coleridge 
projects his hopes onto his son, and therefore instantiates a teleological trope, in the 
second he displaces his hopes. For Coleridge the metaphysician, there is a dialectical 
move from a form of recognition in the landscape, and through the projected 
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influence of this onto his son, towards an inner and alienated self, that can only find 
ideal joy embodied in the alterity of the female.55 In fact, the organic trope is 
actually weakened in this poem as Coleridge is not projecting his hopes for joy on 
his progeny, but displacing them into the ‘other’—an illicit ‘other’ with whom 
Coleridge can never form an organic bond. So in this poem Coleridge has a more 
unhappy consciousness, due to the retreat into his own conscience and the 
displacement of his hopes. However, this is not the whole Hegelian picture of  
“Dejection” and we now need to turn to the similarities between Hegel’s and 
Coleridge’s treatment of love.   
     In an interesting reading of “Dejection”, John Barth, S.J. comments on the 
displacement of love in the second version of the poem. The word “love” or “its 
cognates” appear twenty-one times in the “Letter to Sara” but only once in the final 
version of “Dejection”, “ironically, ‘loveless’ in line 52.”56 For Barth, this is because 
Coleridge is using love in the sense that we need to open ourselves to a receptivity to 
the natural world, whereby we gain a sense of mutuality, or as Barth claims: 
It is perhaps no accident that in stanza IV this voice is contrasted with 
‘the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd’—because we come to see that 
it is the voice of love, of one who has learned that only if he is open 
to receive will he be able to give. Had he not opened himself to the 
voice of nature—first wild but ultimately healing—he would never 
have found his own voice. But he did find it, and in the closing lines 
of blessing it is indeed ‘a sweet and potent voice’, newly potent 
because it now speaks not only out of self-pity but out of loving 
concern for another.57 
    
One can easily discern a reading that supports Barth’s version of love taking the poet 
out of himself. In contrasting the lines “I may not hope from outward forms to win/ 
The passion and the life whose fountains are within” with the next line “O lady! we 
receive but what we give.” (48), one experiences the heart of Coleridge’s 
Romanticism. This line is traditionally read in terms of the shaping lamp of the 
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imagination and its effect upon our world.58 If we read the lines in the sense of love 
however, in the sense of the recognition/acknowledgment that we receive joy only if 
we give joy to the world and forge a consequent recognition of ourselves in the 
world, then we see Coleridge creating a tension in his work. This tension is 
instantiated in order to force him into the next shape of consciousness. This is the 
Gestalt of cognitive-recognition whereby in seeing yourself in nature, in projecting 
your love into nature, you receive an emancipatory sense of joy. Lines 46-48 of the 
poem therefore place the poet in the space between receptivity and autonomy; again, 
the poet accepts the reality of autonomy only through receptivity to the external 
world.  
     This reading is even more informative if we consider Hegel’s own 1797 
Fragments on Love and his later development of these ideas into his eventual theory 
of recognition (Anerkennung). Hegel’s concept of love, on which he based his ideas 
on religion, are interesting in the sense of their own fusion of the objective and 
subjective through a going out of one’s self and return into one’s self, in the process 
of which we both externalise the inner and internalise the outer. As Hegel claims 
when considering love as a basis of true religion: 
The essence of the practical Self consists in the going-out of the ideal 
activity beyond the actual and in the demand that the objective 
activity should be equal to the infinite—practical faith is faith in that 
ideal—now faith is positive if that going-out also exists as the 
demand of equality […]    
   The theoretical syntheses become quite objective, completely 
opposed to the subject—practical activity annihilates the object, and 
is completely subjective—only in love alone is one at one with the 
object, it does not command and is not commanded—This love, made 
by the imagination into an entity, is the divinity; separated man then 
has reverence, respect for it—for love united within itself; his bad 
conscience—consciousness of separation—instils fear of it in him.59 
 
For Hegel in his conceptualisation of God-as-love there is a blending of objective 
and subjective, or the emanation of a “unity in difference,” and the original Spirit. 
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This love can be glimpsed in the form of joy in Coleridge’s ‘Dejection’, and one can 
see the going out of one-self and the return to one-self through the marriage 
metaphor that Coleridge uses in line 49: “Ours’ is her Wedding-garment, ours’ her 
Shroud!” The movement is an almost Wordsworthian reciprocation between mind 
and nature. Hegel’s theory of love and religion was conceptually developed into his 
social philosophy, which included recognition and eventually Sittlichkeit. In like 
fashion, Coleridge develops his personal statement of love for Sara Hutchinson and 
transmutes it into a more social/philosophical theory of love, whereby one finds an 
identical reciprocation with the world through giving love and gaining a sense of 
intellectual recognition through this act.  
     Coleridge explores this recognition of joy through the experience of poetic 
creation, through the aesthetic product. Coleridge himself supplies the adjunct to this 
reading of “Dejection”— in his own words on the purpose of fine art in On Poesy or 
Art: 
[art]…is the mediatress between, and reconciler of, nature and man. 
It is, therefore, the power of humanising nature, of infusing the 
thoughts and passions of man into every thing which is the object of 
his contemplation. […] To make the external internal, the internal 
external, to make nature thought, and thought nature,-this is the 
mystery of genius in the fine arts.60 
 
Coleridge’s dynamic view of art as uniting the internal and external, nature and man, 
is most perfectly exhibited in the movements within ‘Dejection’, movements which 
are seen in terms of an absolute dialectic, which acts as a punctum of Coleridge’s 
Romanticism.61 In light of my philosophical reading, Coleridge is addressing the 
romantic dialectic and arguing for a resolution of the dialectic through the process of 
art itself—art is the vehicle that carries the dissonances of philosophical experience 
and is driven in turn by these contradictions. However, art does not have to 
“humanise nature” so much as it needs to explore the possibility of cognitive-
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recognition in the external world. The poet allegorically embodies his aporias in 
people, in the landscape, and at a meta-level, within the performative space of the 
poem itself. This embodiment gives shape to the otherwise amorphous body of 
Romanticism, and in turn aesthetically visualises the dialectic. Unfortunately for 
Coleridge the philosopher, this fails to supply the foundationalist aesthetic 
intellectual intuition sought for by both himself and Schelling; however, Coleridge 
begins in the midst of the dialectic, follows the thread of the dialectic, and through 
his art brings the dialectic into the Hegelian “daylight of being.” For Hegel art has 
moved through dialectical stages in conjunction with our developing apprehension 
of Spirit, however turning Hegel “on his head” we see the necessary nature of the 
gaps and dissonances between the work of art and its intellectual signified and a 
fortiori the inability to attain an intellectual intuition. (Hegel would further have 
held Coleridge to contention on the function of art to bind man to the natural 
world—this role he reserved for reason). The strength of “Dejection” is a realisation 
of the dialectical nature of our encounter with the universe, dialectical because 
through the medium of art we reach a higher stage of understanding our intellectual 
experience, or recognise ourselves in and through the external world—even if this 
recognition is ultimately philosophically aporetic.  
 
9. Recognitive breakdown in “Constancy to an Ideal Object” 
As the title suggests, “Constancy to an Ideal Object” is a meditation on idealism, an 
idealism that remains for Coleridge transcendental, and therefore in a sense 
estranged from a direct intellectual intuition within the sensuous world. The poem 
once again commences with a state of crisis: 
             Since all that beat about in Nature’s range 
Or veer or vanish, why shouldst thou remain 
The only constant in a world of Change, 
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O yearning Thought, that liv’st but in the brain? 
Call to the HOURS, that in the distance play 
The faery people of the future Day— 
Fond Thought! not one of all that shining swarm 
Will breathe on thee with life-enkindling Breath;  (1-8) 
                                                               
Here one notices a switch in Coleridge’s trope. If we hark back to the lines in 
“Dejection”, “O’ lady! we receive but what we give”, then Coleridge has now 
shifted ontological emphasis onto the ideal thought itself as relying upon a passive 
receptivity to the sensuous world, “…not one of that shining swarm/ Will breathe 
life on thee with life-enkindling Breath.” The adjectival phrase “shining swarm” 
further connotes a sense of the latent fecundity within the external world. This 
ontological inversion is due to the fact that Coleridge has once again manoeuvred 
his dialectical position between receptivity and autonomy, and in this figure the 
ideal thought needs life from the external world. We are returned, therefore, via a 
different path, to the trope of a sense of recognition and an attempt to synthesise the 
intelligible and the sensuous. For Coleridge, this is the leitmotif of “vain hope.” The 
poet demands from “outward forms” something akin to life-enkindling breath, 
however the only respite from the dialectical struggle is with death: “Till when, like 
Strangers sheltering from a Storm/ Hope and Despair meet in the porch of Death!” 
(9-10). In eschatological terms, the only release from the bondage of dialectic is a 
Christian union with the Absolute in death. Unity-in-death would be the space 
wherein the personified hope (of an intellectual intuition) and personified despair (of 
romantic Sehnsucht) finally meet, and in so doing coalesce. (This is an experience or 
romantic eschatology similar to that I discuss in Chapter Four regarding P.B. 
Shelley’s elegy “Adonais.”) 
     Coleridge goes on to claim, “SHE is not Thou, and only Thou art She,” (12). The 
capitalised pronoun “SHE” can be read as a reference to feminised nature, or 
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penetrable “mother nature” and “Thou” can be read as the mind, or more specifically 
the romantic imagination. Coleridge is claiming, in an associationist sense, that the 
corporeal and temporal world of nature gives rise to the ideal, whereas the ideal is 
only an epiphenomenon of the corporeal, and any idealistic conception of the world 
is bound by receptivity to the external world. He is also self-consciously sacrificing 
the idea of aesthetic and philosophical autonomy, and therefore denied access to an 
intellectual intuition. This can also be read as Coleridge sacrificing his concept of 
the organic imagination to the concept of the mechanical fancy, whereby the poet 
can only work within the confines of the empirical, and anterior. Coleridge is at this 
stage acknowledging the philosophical dualism and the aporetic bent in his own 
Romanticism. 
     As the poem progresses, the alterity of mind and nature is displaced into a 
recognitive aporia, a yearning for an intersubjective unity, or Anerkennung. 
Coleridge writes: 
            Yet still thou haunt’st me; and tho’ well I see, 
SHE is not Thou, and only Thou art She, 
Still, still as tho’ some dear embodied Good, 
Some living Love before my eyes there stood, 
With answering look a ready ear to lend;- 
I mourn to thee and say-“Ah! loveliest Friend! 
“That this the meed of all my toils might be, 
“To have a home, an English home, and Thee!’ 
“Vain repetition! Home and Thou are One!  (11-19) 
 
He represents not only an ambiguous and liminal merging of identities in these lines, 
but more importantly the search for an aesthetic recognition by which he can gain an 
intellectual intuition. In this poem ambiguity also haunts the pronominal references 
because Coleridge has placed himself in the ultimate ideal space, without reference 
to his last dialectical anchor: recognition through another person. Even in 
“Dejection” Coleridge retained the boon of recognition by assuming that the “other” 
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would appreciate the joy in the natural world, even if he couldn’t. And more 
significantly, this other would embody this joy and ideality for the poet. In 
“Constancy” there is no Hartley or Sara to embody Coleridge’s idealism, no “dear 
embodied good” and therefore no recognition in another, through the mediation of 
the work of art. Coleridge here, more than in “Kubla Khan” is working at the level 
of ideality, and in this experience is left with nothing but the infinite yearning 
postulated by Novalis; stripped of embodiment and left in the realm of pure poesis. 
Even though Sara and home “are one” and as such embodied, this is an ideal 
embodiment.  
     Coleridge’s yearning “To have a home, an English home, and Thee” can also be 
read in terms of Novalis’ idea that philosophy is “homesickness” as well as in the 
literal sense that Coleridge is emotionally homeless in his relationship with Sarah 
Fricker— again, an interesting displacement through which Coleridge symbolises 
his lack of imaginative power and joy through the allegorical vehicle of his 
emotional narrative—the seeking of the embodiment of an ideal. But the injunction, 
“Vain repetition! Home and Thou are One!” further points to the idea that Sara 
Hutchinson represents home for Coleridge, that she is not dislocated from “Home” 
but is a figure of metonymy for home in the poet. For Novalis, philosophy is an 
infinite striving, with no beginning or end: the philosopher is at home in being away 
from home. Philosophy is “really homesickness, the drive to be at home 
everywhere.”62 As such, Coleridge has the feeling (Gefühl) of home, but in the 
discourse of “Constancy to an Ideal Object” he can only approximate this sense of 
Gefühl through the embodiment of his ideal home, recognised metonymically and 
symbolically in Sara Hutchinson. This ideal home is further something deferred by 
Coleridge—Sara and home “are One” however this ideal symbol is unattainable by 
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Coleridge, because the ideal (and symbolic) vision of his Lakeland home, his “cot” 
and Sara transmigrate into the woodman’s chimera (see below). For Coleridge, the 
experience of home is less a cosmopolitan experience of Gefühl as it is for Novalis, 
and more of a localised, embodied vision of home, however unattainable. 
     In the final metaphor of the woodman we encounter another representation of a 
schema similar to that of Novalis’—the poet or seer creates the very truth they seek 
through the experience of temporal division, and the truth lies within the 
individual’s consciousness.  
        “…Such thou art, as when 
“The Woodman, winding westward up the glen, 
“At wintry dawn, where o’er the sheep-track’s maze 
“The viewless snow-mist weaves a glist-ning haze, 
“Sees full before him, gliding without tread 
“An image with a glory round its head:- 
“Th’ enamour’d rustic worships it’s fair hues, 
“Nor knows he makes the shadow he pursues!  (25-32) 
 
Therefore, the poet has no choice but to reflect back upon himself, and to realise that 
the image is also a self-projection—proleptic thought going forward and catching up 
with itself. However, as de Man claimed in his reading of Hegelian Erkenntnis, the 
consciousness will have to traverse its Gestalten in order to return into itself. This is 
the figure best representative of Coleridge the philosopher poet, who in his own 
ontological quest has indeed traversed the symbiotic alterity of receptivity and 
autonomy through “Kubla Khan” to “Constancy to an Ideal Object”, only to return 
to himself in a new guise, and with a higher awareness that absolute autonomy is not 
conceivable unless glimpsed through a mediative encounter with the external world, 
through the interrogative and allegorical format of his conversational poems.  
     Finally, in analysing the work and philosophy of Hölderlin, Bowie makes a claim 
that I think corresponds to the aesthetic position Coleridge finds himself in by the 
time he has written “Constancy to an Ideal Object”: 
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The object here enables the subject to grasp what it would be like to 
achieve a harmonious existence, and prevents the division in self-
consciousness leading merely to alienation. Because it recognises 
itself in the external world without surrendering itself, which it would 
do if it made itself dependent upon the desire to appropriate the 
object, the I can begin to realise how it need not repress its divided 
nature and can instead regard this nature as a source of ever-renewed 
possibility. The division, it is important to remember, came about by 
a free act, which moved the I beyond the imaginary stage into the 
complex world of self-conscious reflection. Hölderlin then, wishes to 
make the dividedness of self-consciousness part of its own creative 
potential. The I can strive to show in aesthetic production what it 
would be to overcome its dividedness, without regressing into an 
imaginary unity.63 
 
Hölderlin’s aesthetic solution to the Fichtean issue of the absolute ego is one that 
entails receptivity to the objective world, which in turn gives the I the opportunity to 
exercise its “own creative potential” through a form of self-recognition and renewal 
on the site of the aesthetic object. The sense of unity-in-multeity of the aesthetic 
product is a projection, a proleptic action, which prevents a return to a Fichtean 
“imaginary unity.” The dividedness we encounter perpetually in the work of 
Coleridge is exactly this sense of self-division between the empirical and the 
imaginative, which as the symbiotic alterity of autonomy and receptivity is 
dramatised in the aesthetic work. Coleridge divides himself into an allegorical and 
temporal figure, in the self-conscious and reflective mode of his poetry. There is no 
“imaginary unity” for Coleridge; the poetic dissolution of symbol into allegory 
ensures the self is only represented temporally. However, for Coleridge, (as opposed 
to Bowie’s Hölderlin) this results in emotional and philosophical dejection. 
Coleridge therefore sketches this schema, (possibly unconsciously) upon the terrain 
of his poetry, and in so doing creates a dynamic dialecticism that translates into 
some of the finest English romantic poetry, and exposes a punctum of Romanticism.  
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the other hand there can be no true religion without philosophy.…” Kathleen 
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together as in scientific thinking, but instead as animated, manifest, ensouled, 
determining the whole, and yet at the same time expressed in such a way that 
the all-comprising unity, the real animating soul, is made to work only in 
secret from within outwards.”  G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Lectures on Fine Art: 
Volume 2, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford university press, 1975), p. 973. 
8. Abrams, p. 119. 
9. Coleridge, due to his theological background, is likely here to be referencing 
Exodus 3. 14. “God answered, ‘I AM; that is who I am. Tell them that I AM 
has sent you to them.” This adds to the importance of the theological 
influence when reading Coleridge’s philosophical theory of the imagination, 
and in particular his overall reception of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie.  
 116 
10. Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche 2nd ed. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 104. 
11. Bowie, p. 106. 
12. Tim Milnes, “Through the Looking Glass: Coleridge and Post-Kantian 
Philosophy”, Comparative Literature, Fall, 1999, p. 134. 
13. Coleridge, quoted in: Ayon Roy, “The Spectre of Hegel in Coleridge’s 
Biographia Litereria”, Journal of the History of Ideas, April, 2007: p. 292. 
14. See Roy, pp. 290-96. 
15. Hegel, quoted in Bowie, p. 146. 
16. Roy, p. 293. 
17. Jonathan Wordsworth, “The Infinite I AM: Coleridge and the Ascent of 
Being,” in Richard Gravil, Lucy Newlyn and Nicholas Roe (ed.) Coleridge’s 
Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 41. 
18. Jonathan Wordsworth, p. 44. 
19. See Norman Fruman, “Coleridge’s rejection of nature and the natural man,”  
Coleridge’s Imagination, pp. 69-78. 
20. The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: Volume. 2, p. 2546.    
21. There are numerous comparisons to be made between Goethe and Coleridge 
during this period, and Coleridge’s Germany trip would also have greatly 
improved his exposure to Goethe. Goethe himself famously said of the 
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Chapter Three 
 
Wordsworth’s Metaphysical Equipoise 
 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss Wordsworth’s early poetry written between the years 1798-
1805.  This period corresponds to Coleridge’s early work discussed in the last 
chapter, and also with the early stages of the composition of Wordsworth’s planned 
philosophical epic, The Recluse. I want to argue that during this period of creativity 
he attains a metaphysical equipoise1, that is to say, he attains a deep balance between 
the outer world and the inner mind. This equipoise consistently eluded Coleridge in 
his own poetry. The main reason for Wordsworth’s success is his poetic organicism, 
the view that there is a deep connection between the imaginative powers of the poet 
and the natura naturans experienced when the poet communes with the natural 
world. Whilst there is a clear connection with Coleridge’s theoretical dualism of the 
mechanical and the organic,2 for Coleridge this theory is mainly placed in the 
service of his literary criticism rather than in actual poetic creation. By contrast, 
Wordsworth seeks to attain a union between mind and the natural world through 
careful deployment of stylistic devices within his poetry. In this way, Wordsworth’s 
organicism comes very close to the German Naturphilosophie explored by 
Coleridge.  
     I develop my argument by focusing on two features of Wordsworth’s poetry: 
first, his use of embodiment of the visionary mind, primarily within a romanticised 
landscape as perceived by the poet but also within other human subjects; and 
secondly through his own unifying use of symbol and allegory. From the neo-
Hegelian interpretive perspective I have employed so far in which the aesthetic ideal 
translates as a struggle for aesthetic recognition, these stylistic devices and images 
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can be seen as deepening the poet’s metaphysical connection to the universe, 
allowing him to perform within the poetic idiom itself a kind of recognition of 
himself in the external universe, and so attain metaphysical equipoise.  The telling 
difference between the two poets is that whereas in Coleridge’s poetry, the 
experience of the relationship between the mind and nature is represented as self-
consciously fragmentary, for Wordsworth this experience is presented in a unifying 
narrative; a narrative grounded in his own particular notion of organicism.  
     The first section of the present chapter is an analysis of Wordsworth’s own 
treatment of romantic metaphysics, which develops into his organicism and 
metaphysical equipoise. In section two of the chapter I examine examples of his 
poetry to assess not only how these poems express the dialectic of the romantic 
imagination and the natural world, but also how through the operation of this 
dialectic Wordsworth achieves reconciliation between inner and outer. In the third 
section I discuss how previous critical reception of Wordsworth such as that of 
Hartman and Bloom has often become entrenched within unresolved 
poststructuralist dialectics and therefore misses the deeper value of a philosophical-
organicist reading of his poetry. In the following three sections I assess in detail 
aspects of his poetry that support the organicist reading, examining Wordsworth’s 
troping of embodiment within the landscape. I finish with a structuralist analysis of 
his use of symbol and allegory in ‘reading’ the semiotics of the landscape. In so 
doing I argue that he unifies symbol and allegory in order to concretise his 
philosophical organicism. 
2. Wordsworth and romantic metaphysics 
Wordsworth’s actual knowledge of German metaphysics was limited at best. As he 
once told Henry Crabb-Robinson he was happy “Having never read a word of 
German metaphysics, thank heaven!”3 However, Coleridge saw Wordsworth as fit to 
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write the philosophical epic, the never completed Recluse. I would like to propose 
the argument that Wordsworth was a philosophical poet in his own right, without 
recourse to German or Coleridgean metaphysics. Simon Jarvis has recently 
questioned the actual influence of Coleridge’s own burgeoning system in 
Wordsworth’s poetry, arguing instead for the self-legislating philosophical nature of 
Wordsworth’s actual poetry itself: 
The question at issue is whether, as Bromwich suggests, the 
philosophical aspiration in Wordsworth’s writing are adventitious, 
superimposed upon a steady look at the subject which already 
contains all that is of vital interest; or whether that steady look at the 
subject itself developed as it did partly because of, rather than in spite 
of, Wordsworth’s aspiration to become a philosophical poet4 
 
Wordsworth actually turns out under scrutiny to attain metaphysical equipoise 
whereas Coleridge retains an aporetic dualism and this is because Coleridge failed to 
incorporate his organicist literary principle into his poetry at a philosophical level. I 
contend he applied the principle at a literary-critical level, whereas Wordsworth 
actually did not.  
     To begin with, Coleridge expounded on the imagination that “dissolves, diffuses, 
dissipates, in order to recreate” and this is exemplified in his reconcilement of 
“discordant” elements in fragmentary, imaginative works such as “Kubla Khan.” So 
stylistically, Coleridge at times reflected his own idea of the romantic imagination in 
his work. However, his divided and unhappy consciousness was aporetic because he 
failed to fully capture the primary imagination, or ‘Infinite I AM’ within his work.  
    With regards theory, Coleridge’s overall poetics are organic, to the point where 
the whole structure of the poem grows in an organic fashion, and therefore all of its 
parts including meter and rhyme grow and function only as part of the whole—one 
cannot in essence mechanically separate the constituent parts—or the form and 
content of the poem. Wordsworth on the other hand, formulates his poetic theory 
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along lines, which though critical of neoclassic diction, incorporate some of the 
universal concepts of rationalist enlightenment thinking inherent in neoclassicism. 
For example, his theory of composition is classicist in that it is well informed by 
Longinian primitivism. The following extract from the preface to the 1800 Lyrical 
Ballads illustrates this point: 
The principal object, then, which I proposed to myself in these 
poems, was to choose incidents and situations from the common life, 
and to relate or describe them throughout, as far as was possible, in a 
selection of language really used by men, and at the same time to 
throw over them a certain colouring of imagination, whereby 
ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an unusual way. 
And further, and above all, to make these incidents and situations 
interesting by tracing in them (truly, though not ostentatiously) the 
primary laws of our nature, chiefly as far as regards the manner in 
which we associate ideas in a state of excitement.5   
 
The idea of language “really used by men” is Longinian, in its primitivist bent 
towards a more natural sounding language, a more pure sounding cadence and 
prosody, akin to the way people speak in natural situations or environments. 
Moreover, Wordsworth’s ideas on “common life” and “the primary laws of our 
nature” sound distinctly classicist and incorporate the Enlightenment appetite for 
universal laws, or the Golden Mean. In addition, the ideas discussed in this passage 
are far from the organicism of Coleridge. For Wordsworth, the idea of spontaneity is 
countered by metrical considerations—and yet this consideration of form and 
content is itself highly stylised and mechanical. The line “associate ideas in a state 
of excitement” further points to a more mechanical, and associationist criticism, 
rather than organic. Marilyn Butler stresses the inherent enlightenment principles 
and neoclassic foundations of The Lyrical Ballads: 
Wordsworth’s experiments with subjects from among the lower 
orders of society, in metres appropriately taken from popular society, 
follow thirty years of public interest in this matter and this manner, 
and are thus characteristic of the culture of the Enlightenment. […] 
Wordsworth carries over into the new major phase of his writing the 
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characteristics of Neoclassicism—simplicity, gravity, humanity and 
public spirit—which in his hands are at first fortified, not 
undermined, by the counter-revolution’s taste for hearth and home. 6 
 
In Butler’s eyes therefore, Wordsworth is working with Enlightenment principles in 
mind, best exemplified in neoclassic content—although in Wordsworth’s case not 
form. In this sense therefore, Coleridge’s poetic theory is more organic and closer to 
Hegelian ideology, whereas Wordsworth’s is closer to the rationalist French 
ideology of Destutt de Tracy;7 however, Wordsworth produces a more unified vision 
in his poetry.  
    In discussing the ideas of the Frühromantiker, Beiser claims that there is a 
dichotomy in the post-Kantian philosophical world between Fichtean subjectivity 
and Spinozist monism, both ideas that attracted the Jena romantics. He argues that 
by combining Leibnizian entelechy with Spinozean monism the romantics opened 
up a teleological monism that would posit the human mind as the self-conscious 
subject and telos of this organic universe. He claims: 
Like all parts of an organic whole, the subject and object are 
internally related to one another in this manner [part to whole]. The 
subject’s awareness of an object develops and realizes the powers of 
the object, so that its awareness of the object is nothing less than the 
self-realization of the object. Since artistic creativity and 
philosophical contemplation is the highest organization and 
development of all the powers of nature, the artist’s and the 
philosopher’s awareness of nature is nothing less than the self-
awareness of nature through the artist and the philosopher.8   
 
The romantic organicism outlined by Beiser here differs from Hegel’s organicism in 
that Hegel would place the philosopher, who uses reason, higher than the poet on 
this ladder of self-realisation. However, when we read Wordsworth as the 
philosopher-poet aiming at the utterance of universal truths through poesy, we see 
that Wordsworthian organicism more readily fits Beiser’s definition. Wordsworth’s 
“awareness of nature is nothing less then the self-awareness of nature” through his 
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own fully-matured mind; and this is the root of his organicism as a poet. To attain 
this state of awareness, Wordsworth embarks upon a dialectical encounter with the 
natural world in poems such as “Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey” 
and The Prelude, and the telos of the organicist progression is the realisation of the 
poet as the Gnostic spirit-head of nature. This is of course a realisation that only 
comes about by way of the poet’s own fully-developed self-consciousness; for 
example on Snowdon in book thirteen of The Prelude when Wordsworth claims: 
                                     …Nature thus 
Thrusts forth upon the senses, is the express  
Resemblance, in the fullness of its strength 
Made visible, a genuine Counterpart 
And Brother of the glorious faculty  
Which higher minds bear with them as their own; 
This is the very spirit in which they deal 
With all the objects of the universe.      (1805-06, 13, 85-92) 
 
The familial metaphor of nature and the “glorious faculty” of the imagination is key 
here to Wordsworth’s organicism; the imagery of the imagination “Made visible” in 
nature further adds to the emphasis on the deep organic connection between the 
mind and the natural world. This is due to the visualisation of the mind in the natural 
world and the natural world reciprocally representing the imagination as its “genuine 
counterpart.” Thus the poet seeks recognition of his own being and finds this 
recognition in the organic synthesis of the mind and the natural world. Wordsworth 
also alludes to the fact that “higher minds” bear imagination with them as “their 
own” and that they deal with “all the objects of the universe” in this manner. This 
further illustrates the concept that the poet or philosopher can only come to this 
conclusion when they have reached a higher psychological or spiritual state—a state 
whereby their mind is able to recognise its connection with the external universe. 
Wordsworth hereby illustrates his ideal of a teleological link between the universe 
and the active imaginative mind. This is the organic aesthesis of a totum that arises 
 126 
from the subject’s creative imagination, which failed Coleridge due to his 
entrapment within an unresolved philosophical dialectic between the inner and the 
outer worlds of experience.  
     As I claimed in the last chapter, Coleridge could not reconcile his own 
philosophical need for an intellectual intuition within the noumenal sphere, (a space 
of autonomy), with the idea of empirical experience as being essential to the 
construction of any philosophical foundationalism. Wordsworth however has no 
problem at working this issue out within the space of his organic poetics. The reason 
for this is that Wordsworth treats the apparent alterity of the external world in a 
more Hegelian sense than does Coleridge. If we recall, Hegel criticised Schelling for 
his failure to adopt a system of what amounts to a concrete universal when he 
claimed of Schelling’s system “the identity between subject and object is set up 
absolutely, without it being proven that this is the truth.” Hegel comes to his 
absolute Spirit through the interiorisation of experience and any abstraction outside 
of actual experience is doomed to failure. For Hegel, aesthetics, religion and 
ultimately philosophy are the three modes of concrete universal that exhibit varying 
degrees of awareness of an absolute that precedes them. However, this crucially 
depends upon the subject’s own psychological reception of datum; Coleridge in his 
poetic enterprise remains in a state of the abstract universal for two main reasons. 
Firstly, his philosophical need for an intellectual intuition places him in a state of 
near enmity with the external universe. Although his unifying organicism works at 
the level of criticism, it cannot accommodate his overall philosophical requirements. 
This is the reason for his crises in being unable to transcend the external world in 
works such as “Dejection” and “Constancy.” His abstractions, and his failure to 
deduce an aesthetic experience of the infinite, are due to his failure to grasp the 
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concrete whole—this is in fact his failure to interiorise the external world. The 
closest he comes to this, as I have already discussed, is through the mediate 
projection either onto another in the future (Hartley) or synchronically onto an 
existential other (Sara Hutchinson). These encounters are examined in abstractions 
from outside an actual concrete appreciation of the infinite and are in fact displaced 
failures on the part of Coleridge to interiorise his experience of nature.          
     Secondly, his organic enterprise fails to resolve the tension between a need to 
discover an unconditioned condition (again outside of empirical experience) and to 
unite the subjective with an external other. The need for an unconditioned 
experience obviously goes against the grain of the concrete universal; and the 
“identity” philosophy required for the unification of the subject and external other is 
something that can further only be gained through experience and internalization of 
the external world, transforming it into the state of the concrete universal. These 
combined failures on the part of Coleridge lead to a state of the divided and unhappy 
consciousness, which is something that Wordsworth managed to transcend through 
his dialectical synthesis or progress through contradiction—through the organic 
synthesis of the external and the imaginative world.  
     Wordsworth indirectly addresses his implicit rejection of an intellectual intuition 
in book two of the Prelude (1805-06). He wrote this section of the poem as an attack 
on scientism, and perhaps as a reflection of his changing views towards Hartleyan 
associationism.9 By extension, we can trace the argument to a further rejection of an 
intellectual intuition; Wordsworth uses the metaphor of a flowing river to illustrate 
his point:    
Who knows the individual hour in which 
His habits were first sown, even as a seed, 
Who that shall point, as with a wand, and say, 
‘This portion of the river of my mind 
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Came from yon fountain”?...     (1805-06, 2, 211-215) 
                                                   
The repudiation of the speculative source of cognition using the organic imagery of 
“seed” can be read as antithetical to Coleridge’s own epistemological organicism:  
Wordsworth employs the organicist trope but refuses the philosophical implications 
of Coleridge’s particular organicist vision. This is because the Coleridgean organic 
vision is self-contradictory in that it uses an organic analogy for criticism, 
cosmology and epistemology—however it still requires an intuition, or seed, which 
stands independently of the empirical world. In the lines following this repudiation 
of scientism— and by extension philosophical foundationalism— Wordsworth 
addresses Coleridge directly and explicitly embraces his theory of organic unity: 
             ….Thou art no slave 
Of that false secondary power, by which, 
In weakness, we create distinctions, then 
Deem that our puny boundaries are things 
Which we perceive, and not which we have made. 
To thee, unblinded by these outward shows 
The unity of all has been reveal’d 
And thou wilt doubt with me, less aptly skill’d 
Than many are to class the cabinet 
Of their sensations,… 
……………………………………………………………. 
Hard task to analyse a soul, in which, 
Not only general habits and desires, 
But each most obvious and particular thought, 
Not in a mystical and idle sense, 
But in words of reason deeply weigh’d, 
Hath no beginning.                                (1805-06, 2, 220-229, 232-237) 
                                           
In unpacking this section of poetry we find a number of references to Coleridge’s 
growing philosophical concerns. Firstly, he refers to the mechanical fancy as “that 
false secondary power” and the “puny boundaries” that are created by the mind, 
(akin to the transcendental categories of Kant). However, in Wordsworth’s eyes, 
Coleridge has already gone beyond these transcendental categories to the “unity of 
all.” This is a positive reference to Coleridge’s purported organicism, in the form of 
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his romantic primary imagination—the unity of which appears to lie beyond the 
dualistic ontology of Kantianism. This is however, as I claimed above, an 
organicism that only actually functions for Coleridge at the modality of criticism—
and fails him philosophically. Consequently, in Wordsworth’s poetic treatment a 
contradiction emerges, in that Wordsworth on the one hand discerns an 
acknowledgment of an holistic world conception in his friend, however on the other 
it appears Wordsworth cannot discern the possibility of what amounts to any solid 
foundationalism on which to base a philosophical system. In this section of his 
poem, Wordsworth has—through his tribute to Coleridge— countenanced the 
logical gap and the eventual philosophical aporia that will haunt Coleridge 
throughout his career. This further feeds into lines 232-236, because Wordsworth 
realises, (as does Schelling, and later Coleridge) that a foundational intellectual 
intuition in “words of reason deeply weighed,/ Hath no beginning.” Whilst 
Wordsworth’s explicit targets in this section are associationism and scientism, at the 
same time his analysis aptly summarises the aporetic nature of Coleridge’s own 
quest for metaphysical certainty. Jonathan Wordsworth claims that Wordsworth is 
forced into this by his own desire for what he perceives as Coleridge’s philosophical 
unity: 
By the time of the two-part Prelude Wordsworth has been thrown 
back on the Intuition, is envious of Coleridge to whom “the unity of 
all” has been positively revealed, and is himself to be seen looking 
for a new and different means of reconciling the apparent 
disparateness of experience. Both the structure of his poem, and the 
structure of his thought, seem to require a supernatural frame of 
reference.10 
 
Whilst I don’t agree that Wordsworth was “envious” of Coleridge’s philosophical 
position, he is troubled by the need for an intellectual intuition as a metaphysical 
basis for his own burgeoning philosophical project. However, his organicism will 
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actually take the same path as that of Hegel; he will interiorise the externality of the 
universe and in so doing remove the problem of an intellectual intuition. In 
analysing Coleridge’s supposed unity, Wordsworth discovers his own form of 
organicism whilst unintentionally exposing his friend’s lack of philosophical 
substance. The metaphor of the “river of my mind” aptly points the way towards the 
Wordsworthian conception of organicism—one that is fluid, transparent and (as 
water) part of the body and the physical universe, whilst as mind it equally 
permeates the outer and the inner—and no one knows its original source. In a final 
paradoxical twist, his reference to “a mystical and idle sense” as an alternative to the 
route of reason is the route which Wordsworth the romantic poet chooses—his is of 
a more mystical sense of organicism than that of Coleridge and is “idle” in the sense 
that reason actually detracts from this passive organicism; in this sense “idle” is 
paradoxically taken to mean a lighter, more passive organicism. Wordsworth makes 
the leap to romantic metaphysics, but not through actively “weighed’ reason or 
through reading Kant, Spinoza or Hegel; he achieves metaphysical equipoise 
through the balance of the inner and outer in his own passive, organic aesthetic.      
     Wordsworth traces his theory of self-knowledge to the organic connection with 
the natural world, a connection first realised through filial bonds, and comments 
upon this in the next section of the poem: “Bless’d the infant babe,/ (For with my 
best conjectures I would trace/ The progress of our being)…” (1805-06, 238-239). 
He goes on to refer to the blessed “infant babe” who “when his soul/ Claims 
manifest kindred with an earthly soul,/ Doth gather passion from his mother’s eye!” 
(1805-06, 241-43). There is a mutual recognition implied in that the baby gathers 
passion and understanding through recognition in the mother’s eye. However, this 
maternal ‘summons’ is extended into the realm of the larger natural world, and 
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develops into a natural summons that extends infinitely and becomes the 
Wordsworthian form of an organic basis for his poetic philosophy—a unification of 
the inner and outer that only commences with a recognition in the eyes of the 
mother. The further advance of this unifying spirit is elaborated in the following 
lines: 
            Such feelings pass into his torpid life 
Like an awakening breeze, and hence his mind 
Even [                                             ] 
Is prompt and watchful, eager to combine  
In one appearance, all the elements 
And parts of the same object, else detach’d 
And loth to coalesce… 
……………………………………………………… 
Along his infant veins are interfus’d 
The gravitation and the filial bond 
Of nature, that connect him with the world.    (1805-06, 2, 244-250, 262-264) 
                                                               
The mutuality first discerned within the recognition between mother and child 
transforms into the maternal connection of Mother Nature and the developing mind 
of the receptive child, and eventually the whole of nature and the mature poet. 
Therefore, as in Hegel’s theory of recognition, there is a presupposed receptivity to 
the external world that provides the subject with its autonomy. The organic “filial 
bond” established between mother and child opens a receptivity and summons to the 
organic world at large, hence “Such feelings pass into his torpid life/ Like an 
awakening breeze.” The filial bond become further the “bond of nature, that connect 
him with the world.” In Wordsworthian metaphysics, this is the birthplace of the 
poetic imagination, which culminates in a state of mutuality with the external 
universe through which as an agent it “Creates, creator and receiver both,/ Working 
but in alliance with the works/ Which it beholds…” (273-75). Through a receptivity 
that is opened through the process of recognition between mother and child, to an 
extended receptivity to nature of the human subject as it develops, Wordsworth 
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creates a relational autonomy-through-receptivity similar to that Hegel lays down in 
his theory of recognition. The subject eventually internalises the natural world 
through a process of cognitive recognition and becomes both an imaginative 
“creator” and also the “receiver” of nature’s inward entelechy. Or in Beiser’s words: 
If the self is the highest organization and development of all the 
powers of nature, then nature ceases to be some external power 
outside the self, an external cause that compels him into action. 
Rather, nature becomes part of the self because its intrinsic ends are 
achieved only through it. If the self is the highest expression of 
nature, then nature contracts to the limits of the self as the self 
expands to the whole of nature.11 
 
The self, as the “highest expression of nature”, which in Wordsworth’s case is the 
poetic imagination, reflects the inner processes of nature and recognises itself as part 
of nature, in an equipoise gained through a dialectical relationship to nature that I 
shall discuss in the next section. 
3. Wordsworth’s ladder 
A.C. Bradley famously helped shift Wordsworthian criticism into the twentieth 
century when he examined the tensions in Wordsworth’s poetry, and opposed them 
to what he saw as the limitations of Arnold’s humanist reading of Wordsworth.12 
Bradley famously summed up these tensions between the empirical and the 
imaginative thus: 
Everything here is natural, but everything is apocalyptic. And we 
happen to know why. Wordsworth is describing the scene in light of 
memory. […] The visionary feeling has here a peculiar tone; but 
always openly or covertly, it is the intimation of something 
illimitable, over-arching or reaching into the customary reality.13 
 
Bradley points the way to the dialectical nature of experience in Wordsworth, 
dialectical because on the one hand it describes a past scene from a new temporal 
perspective, and is therefore interrogating the past from a present perspective, whilst 
also combining an empirical experience of the natural world with a transcendental, 
or apocalyptic imaginative experience. This dual nature of experience has been 
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explored in Wordsworthian criticism, but the question remains as to how 
Wordsworth forges ahead through this dialectical experience to the sense of 
metaphysical equipoise that I outlined in the previous section. We can answer this 
by examining the dialectical nature of the Wordsworthian experience, before going 
on to examine the structural devices Wordsworth employs in order to unify this 
experience.   
     Abrams claims that the poetic vision as explored in The Prelude is a modern 
allegory of Christian theodicy, of the fall of man and a regaining of unity, or the 
marriage of the lamb and the New Jerusalem. On this reading the romantic 
endeavour is one of a secularised Christian narrative, allegorised into a modern fall 
of man, and the dialectical movement is one spiralling out towards a greater unity.14 
Abrams goes on to cite the philosophy of Hegel as further allegorising Christian 
eschatology, and placing the mind in the space of the Christian soul or deity: 
This retention of traditional Christian concepts and the traditional 
Christian plot but demythologised, conceptualised, and with all-
controlling providence converted into a “logic” or dialectic that 
controls all the interactions of subject and object, gives its distinctive 
character and design to what we call “Romantic philosophy.” In this 
grandiose enterprise, however, it is the subject, mind, or spirit which 
is primary and takes over the initiative and the functions which had 
once been the prerogatives of deity.15  
 
Abrams argues that Wordsworth and Hegel share the dialectical ladder in their 
respective searches for a romantic unity, a ladder that symbolises the secularisation 
of traditional Christian motifs. Critics such as Mellor have bemoaned the lack of 
treatment of romantic irony in Abrams’ work, which was due to the fact that Abrams 
was only treating the aspects of Romanticism that dealt with the essential unity that 
stems from the transformation of the traditional Judaeo-Christian motif.16 However, 
an understanding that Wordsworth’s essential concrete universal conceptualisation 
of nature, read in relation to Coleridge’s failure to internalise nature, helps to 
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illustrate how both Wordsworthian holistic teleology and the irony of Coleridge can 
be read using the rubric of the same dialectical struggle or “climb”.  
     Wordsworth himself, in The Prelude, deals with the central contradictions that 
underlie his poetry, and are worked out in a Bildungsroman, whereby the poet gains 
a firm sense of the archaeology of his creative romantic imagination. The 
autobiographical dialectic between the poet’s imagination and the externality of the 
natural world supply the driving force of this poem. Herbert Lindenberger 
comments: 
One must remember, of course, that The Prelude, unlike the Timaeus 
or a theological work, is not a body of metaphysics which contents 
itself with setting down a clear and self-consistent image of reality. 
Indeed, the very qualities that give it individuality as a poem—the 
struggle toward definition, the constant intensification of language, 
the recurring spots of time—these are above all a record of a search 
and struggle toward goals which remain ultimately dim and which 
are in certain respects contradictory with one another.17 (my italics). 
Lindenberger correctly states that the poem is not a body of metaphysics, although it 
is Wordsworth’s first part of his philosophic epic The Recluse, which was never 
completed. The dialectical “struggle” toward definition is indeed the defining 
character of the poem, and this struggle is apparent in the first part of the two-book 
(1799) Prelude where there is a tension clearly generated between on the one hand 
Wordsworth’s burgeoning pantheism and his associationist tendencies on the other, 
which act as intermediate layers for Wordsworth’s sense of receptivity and 
imaginative autonomy. Coleridge himself had shown concern that Wordsworth’s 
thought still retained elements of Hartleyan associationism when his own thought 
had self-consciously gravitated towards organicism. George McClean-Harper 
claims: 
Coleridge never faltered in his conviction that spirit was independent 
of matter. His unhappy experience deepened his faith in the existence 
of God, and of his own soul as something detachable from his body. 
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[…] Yet he had once been a disciple of David Hartley and had, it 
seems, made a convert of Wordsworth, whose persistence in a semi-
materialistic philosophy now alarmed him.18 
 
This residual attachment to Hartley is indeed one of the reasons for the strong 
materialist connection between the mind and nature retained by Wordsworth; 
however, as I pointed out when analysing his treatment of scientism, Wordsworth 
could not fully subscribe to a purely associationist view of the universe.  
     At the commencement of the poem Wordsworth rhetorically questions the origins 
of his great poem, and again uses the image of a river to illuminate the connection 
between his mind and nature: 
                       Was it for this 
That one, the fairest of all rivers, loved 
To blend his murmurs with my Nurse’s song, 
And from his alder shades, and rocky falls, 
And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice  
That flowed along my dreams?...   (1798-99, 1, 1-6) 
 
Wordsworth recognises the interconnectedness between the poetic mind and nature, 
through the image of his “dreams” and the recurrent image of the river running 
through nature and mind. The image of “my Nurse” can be read both metaphorically 
as nature tending the young poet’s mind, and literally as the poet’s actual nurse—
either reading entails the poet’s interaction with the external world in the form of 
inanimate nature or in the figure of human reciprocation. We also get a sense of 
empirical interaction in that the poet either manages to “blend” the external sounds 
of the natural world with the human sound of his nurse’s song or the poet 
personifies both the inanimate river and the larger natural world, thereby setting the 
groundwork for a recognition akin to Novalis’ I-thou interactive relationship. This is 
important in that it sets the tone for the rubric of Wordsworth’s struggle—
throughout the course of his narrative the poet will constantly interrogate the bounds 
between the inner and the outer, the mental and physical. The poet further 
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strengthens the motif of a connection between his mind and nature-as-teacher as the 
poem progresses through the different seasons and correspondingly focuses on an 
enhancement of sensations: 
                And afterwards, ‘twas in a later day 
Though early, when upon the mountain-slope  
The frost and breath of frosty wind had snapped 
The last autumnal crocus […] 
When scudding on from snare to snare I plied 
My anxious visitation, hurrying on, 
Still hurrying hurrying onward, how my heart 
Panted; among the scattered yew trees, and the crags 
That looked upon me, how my bosom beat  
With expectation…                     (1798-99, 1, 27-30, 37-42)       
                                                       
The poet describes the sensations of a youth experiencing the natural world at its 
most sensationalist, and with an untrained or immature mind. Here Wordsworth is 
“anxious” “hurrying onward” his “heart panted” with “expectations,” because he is a 
mere receiver of nature’s gifts, and passively subject to sensations. This 
sensationalist tone is further examined in “Lines written a few miles above Tintern 
Abbey” (1798) in lines such as “Flying from something that he dreads, than one/ 
Who sought the thing he loved. For nature then/ (The coarser pleasures of my boyish 
days,/ and their glad animal movements all gone by)/ To me was all in all” (72-75). 
The natural sensations the poet then experienced “had no need of a remoter charm,/ 
By thought supplied, or any interest/ Unborrowed from the eye.—That time is past,” 
(82-84). Wordsworth recognises that in his younger days nature was something that 
he only partially understood, or at least something that was important for its own 
sake, without further imaginative aid “By thought supplied”. The fully mature poet 
now brings imagination to the scene, through the medium of his memory, and 
therefore uses “a remoter charm” in order to more fully appreciate the poignancy of 
nature.  In fact Wordsworth refers to his younger days with the phrase “glad animal 
movements” which again suggests a subject who is not yet at the higher and more 
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spiritual stage of development. Even at this early stage in his poetic career, 
Wordsworth is outlining a formative development in the relationship between his 
romantic imagination and the external world.  
     As the poem “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” develops we 
find that the imagination is moreover “In nature and the language of the sense,/ The 
anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse/ The guide, the guardian of my heart, and 
soul”  (108-111). The prepositional phrase “in nature and the language of the sense” 
indicates the sense of embodiment of the imagination in the external world. He also 
uses appositions for nature such as “anchor,” “nurse,” “the guide” and “guardian.” 
All of these give us the sense of nature as in control of human agency, or at least 
something anterior to our agency. The use once again of “nurse” points to the idea of 
the mind as infant requiring edification through a self-determining receptivity to the 
natural world; self-determining because through our interaction with the natural 
world we discover our true organic self and therefore determine our sense of self. 
     At the end of Book One of The Prelude (1798-99) Wordsworth returns to a 
grounding associationism, especially between lines 410-440. For example he speaks 
of “fits of vulgar joy” (413) referring again to the sensationalist pleasures of his 
younger days, and after detailed analytic exposition of these experiences he speaks 
in plainly associationist terms: 
                   -And if the vulgar joy by its own weight 
Wearied itself out of the memory, 
The scenes which were a witness of that joy 
Remained, in their substantial lineaments 
Depicted on the brain, and to the eye 
Were visible, a daily sight: […] 
……………………………………………………. 
[These scenes] did at length 
Become habitually dear, and all 
Their hues and forms were by invisible links  
Allied to the affections.          (1798-99, 1, 427-432, 439-442) 
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The materialistic imagery not only points to an associationist psychology, but also to 
an associationist explanation for Wordsworth’s burgeoning sense of imaginative 
development through memory and recollection in spots of time. However, the 
“invisible links” that ally them to the affections produce a further, organic twist. 
Although he uses biological discursive words such as “lineaments,” “brain” and 
“eye”, Wordsworth creates tension by using the words “hues” “forms” and 
“invisible links” indicating a more organic and idealist discursive connection 
between elements. Thus, the reader is suspended between two discursive poles—one 
more materialistic and one more idealist and organic. The “invisible links” point to 
the idea that Wordsworth is absorbing nature as a part of the absolute, and in so 
doing forging his organic connection to the universe at large, a connection 
previously made in only “vulgar joy” and through sensationalism.    
     Even at the climactic scene on Snowdon in The Prelude (1805-06), Wordsworth 
exclaims ‘…but in that breach/ Through which the homeless voice of waters rose,/ 
That dark deep thoroughfare had Nature lodg’d/ The soul, the imagination of the 
whole.’ (13, 62-65) (My italics). The spirit that has sought imaginative autonomy 
has in fact become embodied within the landscape, and this during the most 
celebrated moments of visionary experience. It appears that every time there is an 
intimation of pure imaginative autonomy, the physicality of nature embodies this 
experience and also provides nourishment for this experience. There are repetitive 
instances of the growing relationship between the imagination and the external 
universe in lines such as at the conclusion of the 1798-99 Prelude: 
                                  …A plastic power 
Abode with me, a forming hand, at times 
Rebellious, acting in a devious mood, 
A local spirit of its own, at war  
With general tendency, but for the most  
Subservient strictly to the external things  
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With which it communed. An auxiliar light 
Came from my mind, which on the setting sun 
Bestowed new splendour;         (1798-99, 2, 411-419) 
                                                 
Here the imagination is formed in dialectical opposition to the external world of 
nature, a plastic power as in the Coleridgean definition of the imaginative faculty in 
the Biographia. This power is “at times rebellious” and contains its own spirit—but 
with the important proviso that it was mostly “subservient” to the “external things 
with which it communed,” this phrase indicating a strong connection between the 
external world and the imagination. There is further the sense of a Hegelian master- 
slave type relationship—as if there is a struggle between the two aspects of the 
dialectic for mastery—the imagination is both “Rebellious” and at times 
“Subservient” to the external world. At this stage Wordsworth wishes to trope the 
relationship between the mind and nature like that of a filial relationship, in that 
there have been fractious and rebellious moments, but overall the relationship is 
incredibly close. Furthermore, in a Hegelian aesthetic sense, the mind (Spirit) brings 
something new to the overall picture by raising the empirical data to the level of 
consciousness and therefore “bestows new splendour.” As the sun gives out light 
and energy, so the mind gives out light and energy to the “setting sun.” (The figure 
of light would be symbolised by the moon in Wordsworth’s later Prelude(s)). 
Wordsworth is illuminating a balanced reciprocity between the mind and nature and 
in so doing pointing to a state of metaphysical equipoise, which has at this stage 
been self-consciously realised by the poet in his Bildungsroman.  
 
4. Dialectical Criticism of Wordsworth 
Geoffrey Hartman distinguishes between the supposed independence of the 
imagination and the equally apparent interdependence between the imagination and 
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nature. Hartman terms the two opposites “akedah” and “apocalypse.” The 
apocalyptic and autonomous imagination is supposed to be the redeemer of poetic 
genius in modernity, through the aforementioned secularisation of the biblical (and 
later Miltonic) myth. Hartman also believes that in the crisis autobiography of 
Wordsworth it is the constant encroachment of “akedah” (the receptive link between 
the mind and nature), which prevents complete autonomy of the imagination. In his 
own criticism Hartman initially privileges the autonomous imagination, he claims: 
The poet is isolated and immobilized by it [the imagination]; it 
obscures rather than reveals nature; the light of the senses goes out. 
Only in its secondary action does it vitalize and animate, and even 
then not nature but a soul that realizes its individual greatness, a 
greatness independent of sense and circumstance. A tertiary effect 
does finally reach nature, when soul assured of inner or independent 
sources goes out and from itself.19 
 
 Hartman’s Hegelian reading of the dialectic clearly privileges the side of the 
apocalyptic imagination, in that it reproduces the external in its own light, as 
claimed by Hegel in the Aesthetics and echoed by Houlgate (see Chapter One). 
However, in Wordsworthian criticism, as in Wordsworthian poetics, it is an error to 
privilege one side of the opposition. As I outlined above, nature as the “anchor” and 
“nurse” will tie the faculty of the imagination to its roots—and Hartman 
subsequently acknowledges this unavoidable receptivity: 
The intent of The Prelude, to review the sources of the poet’s faith in 
himself, is often diverted. The poem reviews instead the sources of 
the poet’s faith in nature, even though the latter is at most “something 
at the base” of his strength as a poet. The confusion cannot be helped. 
For Wordsworth’s childhood experiences work in two conflicting 
ways, they (1) prophesy the independence from nature of his 
imaginative powers, and (2) impress nature ineradicably on them.20 
 
Wordsworth cannot help confusing his faith in selfhood with faith in nature in his 
biographical exegesis, because his developing sense of selfhood is in fact reliant 
upon his interaction with nature. Crucially however, Hartman misses the point that 
 141 
the full development of the self is reliant upon the interiorisation of nature-as-
concept. The weakness in Hartman’s reading lies in the constant repetition of a 
dialectical switch between imagination and nature. Hartman initially privileges the 
autonomy of the imagination before conceding the necessary connection between 
the imagination and experiences of nature. This vacillation is the underlining 
framework that punctuates Hartman’s criticism. Wordsworth remains necessarily 
bound to nature for his sense of poetic self; his “self” in actual fact does have an 
organic relationship with nature, a relationship which, at least for Wordsworth, 
transcends alterity. This is an issue that Hartman doesn’t fully engage with in his 
reading; the importance of this omission is that the actual organic nature of 
Wordsworth’s poetry is never recognised by the critic who reads the poems in terms 
of a poststructuralist search for a never realised transcendental signified. Hartman’s 
apparent Hegelianism therefore transforms into a more Kantian style of dualism. 
     Other critics have also remained entrenched within a style of criticism that whilst 
dialectical, often shows no progress through contradictory forces. Harold Bloom 
claims of Wordsworth’s poetic enterprise: 
In the covenant between Wordsworth and nature, two powers that are 
totally separate from each other, and potentially destructive of the 
other, try to meet in a dialectic of love. “Meet” is too hopeful, and 
“blend” would express Wordsworth’s ideal and not his achievement, 
but the try itself is definitive of Wordsworth’s strangeness and 
continued relevance as a poet.21 
 
This view of Wordsworth’s enterprise also misses the organicism in Wordsworth’s 
thinking, and the application of this in his poetry. Bloom remains himself entrenched 
within his own psychoanalytical reading of Wordsworth’s work, whereby he sees 
the work as an internalised struggle of quest romance, internalised in the sense that 
the ego is attempting to externalise itself in nature, but always comes back to itself, 
intact but without the desired result. Yet Bloom misses the full implications of a 
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complete Hegelian reading of the process. The ego comes back to itself and in 
interiorising the external world, returns to itself in a more developed form. Bloom’s 
criticism remains a form of infinite absolute negativity, without a full realisation of 
the concept as recognised by Wordsworth the more mature poet, after he has 
climbed his aesthetic ladder and recognised himself as part of and therefore within 
the natural world. If one posits a neo-Freudian response to the poetry one is however 
in a position where the ego always remains divided, both from the natural world and 
itself.  
     Building on Bloom’s incomplete treatment of the Wordsworthian dialectic, 
Marlon B. Ross has combined the idea of an internalised quest romance and 
Bloom’s idea of the anxiety of influence22 and produced a feminist reading of 
Wordsworth’s dialectic. Once again the reading is one-sided because the poet 
remains in a state of psychological estrangement from the natural world. Ross’ 
gendered reading does not discern any sort of progress for the poet; in fact the poet 
remains in a state of stasis: 
…the romantic poet moves farther and farther within in an attempt to 
find the source of the self, in an attempt to embrace all that is 
without. Imagination, that capacity which apotheosises individual 
vision, is also a going out of self. It is simultaneously the egotistical 
sublime and negative capability. Imagination is the attempt to 
stabilise the world, for whatever one calls that external expanse that 
delimits selfhood by destabilising the self that seems to block the 
potential for total vision, the potential for totally embracing that outer 
expanse. The poet’s relation to the world, much like his relation to his 
father, is fraught with anxiety, because the apparent externality of 
that world threatens the necessary myth that he fathers vision by 
fathering himself.23  
 
The opening lines summarise Ross’ position in the post-Bloomian critical tradition; 
the poet “moves farther and farther within in an attempt to find the source of the 
self, in an attempt to embrace all that is without.” This is a one-sided reading of 
Wordsworth that, even more so than Bloom, misses the truly dialectical nature of 
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Wordsworth’s enterprise. In actual fact the poet struggles with and eventually 
interiorises the “external expanse” in order to gain a more complete understanding 
of the interior self. Ross however, and somewhat contradictorily, goes on to describe 
how imagination is an attempt to go “out of self.” However, he sees this (again in 
psychoanalytical terms) as a problematic journey because the outer-world “threatens 
the necessary myth that he fathers vision by fathering himself.” Unfortunately Ross 
misses the tenor of Wordsworth’s dialectic. It is certainly the case, as I have 
outlined, that Wordsworth tropes his relationship with nature at times like a 
relationship between two human subjects; and that Wordsworth sometimes (as part 
of the aesthetic struggle) further presents this in terms of a master-slave relationship. 
However, in his poetry Wordsworth constantly embodies this experience, moving 
into a higher plane of awareness, through his own form of concrete universal. He 
“bestows new splendour” by this interiorisation of the outer whereby the inner 
becomes a richer space.  
5. Contingency and embodiment. 
 Ann Mellor also reads Wordsworth dialectically, and also sees his relationship in 
terms of estrangement from the external world, which is equally not a fully 
developed elaboration of Wordsworth’s organicism. Mellor goes as far as to see 
Wordsworth’s relationship with the world in Cartesian terms, thus with no organic 
engagement between res cogitans and res extensa. Mellor claims: 
Despite Wordsworth’s myriad sensory interactions with nature as a 
child and man, his minute and detailed recollections of what he saw 
and heard and felt, his self remains curiously disembodied—we never 
hear whether he is hot or cold, whether he washes himself or 
defecates, whether he has sexual desires or intercourse. The 
Wordsworthian self thus becomes a Kantian transcendental ego, pure 
mind or reason, standing as the spectator ab extra…24  
 
Mellor misses a number of crucial points in Wordsworth here. Wordsworth not only 
interacts with nature, but also finds crucial stages of embodiment of his imaginative 
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vision within the natural world. His relationship to the external world is not one that 
is contingent, but actually entails a necessary connection that aids him in “fathering” 
his vision. Embodiment is a recurring theme in Wordsworth’s poetry and it 
reappears in different guises in his work. Throughout the dialectical movement 
between the imagination and the external world there are examples of embodiment 
of Wordsworth’s imagination in the external world on the one hand and his hopes in 
another human subject (similar to Coleridge in “Dejection” and “Constancy”) on the 
other. I propose that for Wordsworth, embodiment works in that it creates a 
necessary connection between the imagination and the external world, and by 
extension helps to facilitate the interiorisation that leads to his organicism. In 
contrast, Coleridge ends up with the explicitly self-consciously divided and 
disembodied aesthetic of “Constancy,” which results from his philosophically 
contingent connection between the imagination and the external world; a connection 
from which Coleridge ultimately wishes to completely free the imagination, in order 
to gain a pure intellectual intuition.  
     To begin with, there are various instances when Wordsworth alludes to the 
requirement of embodiment in a number of passages in the first book of the 1805-06 
Prelude. For example, when adumbrating his rationale for writing a philosophical 
epic he claims: 
                                                …I had hopes 
Still higher, that with a frame of outward life, 
I might endue, might fix in a visible home 
Some portion of those phantoms of conceit 
That had been floating loose about so long,    (1805-06, 1, 128-132) 
                                                               
The romantic poet requires for his philosophical enterprise a “frame of outward life” 
or an embodiment for his “phantoms of conceit.” At this philosophically 
undeveloped stage there is still a contingent relationship between his mind’s 
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“phantoms of conceit” and the “visible home” in which he would like to “fix” them. 
The implication in these lines is that “conceit” is identified with “floating”, 
“phantoms” and “loose” thoughts; embodiment is a necessary prerequisite for the 
poet to frame these thoughts. Wordsworth develops his argument later in the first 
book by describing his self-justification for the position of poet of the modernised-
Miltonic epic by explicitly addressing his poetic vitalism and his receptivity to 
external datum. 
    When, as becomes a man who would prepare 
For such a glorious work, I through myself 
Make rigorous inquisition, the report 
Is often chearing; For I neither seem  
To lack, that first great gift! the vital soul,  
Nor general truths which are themselves a sort 
Of Elements and Agents, Under-Powers, 
Subordinate helpers of the living mind. 
Nor am I naked in external things, 
Forms, images; nor numerous other aids 
Of less regard, though won perhaps with toil, 
And needful to build up a Poet’s praise.   (1805-06, 1, 158-169) 
                                                             
In these lines Wordsworth seems to stratify his poetic imagination into three layers; 
firstly there is the vital soul, which can be compared to Coleridge’s “esemplastic” 
imagination; then we have general truths which are the truths of the fancy that act in 
a supporting fashion to the higher faculty: “underpowers/ Subordinate helpers.” 
Finally he signals “external things” and “Forms, images”, by which he alludes to 
empirical realism and Platonic forms. This is important in that he is problematising 
the Platonic notion of forms and in effect relegating the external to a tertiary level 
below the romantic imagination and the fancy—however it is still “needful” for the 
full functioning of the poet’s imagination. The superordinate “external things” 
suggests, contrary to Platonic philosophy, that our world is not a copy of an anterior 
and perfect original, but that the mind is in the higher position to any external reality 
or form. In effect the poet’s place is reversed by Wordsworth and now becomes of 
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the utmost importance, contrary to Plato’s original idea of banishing poets from the 
Republic. This stratification of Wordsworth’s is still in the early stage for the 
developing poet’s mind—stratification implies that there is still no metaphysical 
equipoise for the poet because of the implied economy of distinction between the 
poet’s idealism and the external world. However, in order for the poet to proceed 
with his higher task he needs a primary model of stratification in place—a model 
later to be superseded by a more balanced (and organic) relationship between the 
inner and the outer worlds—where both exist in a coalition of both perfect symmetry 
and interaction. On the other hand, for Coleridge there is a need for the visionary 
mind to dig even deeper than this stratified model in order to discover the higher, 
metaphysical truths of the “infinite I AM.” Coleridge in effect alienates himself even 
further from the external world as his philosophy develops towards the aporetic telos 
of an intellectual intuition, wherein the external world becomes evermore 
subordinate to the inner.  
     Other examples of embodiment within Wordsworth’s work include an I-thou 
dialogue with nature in The Prelude (1798-99) as the early version draws to its 
conclusion. Wordsworth requires an embodiment in order to substantiate his 
spiritual faith which he considers could be erroneous—a framework on which to 
build this vision, or a canvas on which to deploy his ‘painterly’ language: 
            If this be error, and another faith 
Find easier access to the pious mind, 
Yet were I grossly destitute of all  
Those human sentiments which make this earth 
So dear, if I should fail with grateful voice 
To speak of you, ye mountains! and ye lakes 
And sounding cataracts! ye mists and winds 
That dwell among the hills where I was born. 
………………………………………………….. 
The blessing of my life, the gift is yours,  
Ye mountains, thine, O nature! Thou hast fed 
My lofty speculations, and in thee 
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For this uneasy heart of ours I find 
A never-failing principle of joy 
And purest passion.        (1798-99,  2, 465-472, 491-496. my italics) 
                                         
For Wordsworth there is a sense of faith that is enforced in the subjunctive address 
to nature whereby the poet questions his initial faith and finds that it stands finally in 
receptivity to the mountains and scenery that has surrounded him in his formative 
years. He manoeuvres his argument towards a direct address “To speak of you, ye 
mountains and ye lakes.” Moreover, Wordsworth concludes his address by claiming 
that in nature he finds joy that acts as a balm for “this uneasy heart of ours”; thereby 
he makes a claim for the moral influence of nature upon humanity. For Wordsworth 
therefore, nature is not only important for the functioning of the romantic 
imagination, but also for our moral health.  
 
6. Doubt and embodiment in “Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey, 
on revisiting the banks of the Wye during a tour, July 13, 1798.”25 
 
One major source of embodiment for Wordsworth that I would like to examine is the 
‘other’ and here we encounter the particularly Hegelian sense of mutuality as a 
source of recognition for the romantic poet’s aesthetic hopes. As I mentioned in the 
last chapter, there is a form of recognition for Coleridge, both teleological and 
existential, found in Sara Hutchinson and Hartley. In effect, Coleridge attempts to 
embody his hopes in other human beings and thus seek a recognition or affirmation 
through the ‘other’ in his work, as he has failed to secure recognition of himself in 
the external world. A poem in which Wordsworth works through his dialectical 
experience of the inner and the outer and in which he finishes with a sense of 
recognition in another is “Lines Composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey”—a 
poem that Wordsworth wrote having read “Frost at Midnight.” Whereas Coleridge 
projects his hopes both onto his son and into the future, Wordsworth projects his 
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hopes onto his sister, Dorothy. In this poem Wordsworth works through his 
dialectical experience, reaching an organic connection to nature through his 
imagination, before finally recognising and reinforcing his own hopes in his sister, 
Dorothy.25  
     Wordsworth commences the poem using devices such as repetition and 
metonymy in order to open the vista before the ‘spectating’ reader, and he also 
connects the mental and the physical landscape: 
-Once again  
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs, 
Which on a wild secluded scene impress 
Thoughts of more deep seclusion; and connect 
The landscape with the quiet of the sky.      (4-8)  
                                                      
The sublime cliffs act as an agent of transference between the physical landscape 
and the poet’s imaginative mind; the cliffs “impress” sensationalist thoughts upon “a 
wild secluded scene” and therefore the thoughts of the poet are impressed not only 
by the lofty cliffs, but also in turn upon the secluded scene. The mental landscape 
also runs deeper than the valley itself with its “thoughts of more deep seclusion”—
however it remains that without the sensationalist psychological ‘jolt’ of the sublime 
the poet would not experience his deeper thoughts. He then proceeds to ‘lead’ the 
reader through the physicality of the landscape, from the sublime, to the beautiful 
and the picturesque—the “orchard-tufts” (11), “woods and copses” (13), “hedge 
rows” (16) and “pastoral farms” (17) to the inner recesses of the mind, before he 
finally lays the “corporeal frame” (44) asleep and sees “into the life of things” (49). 
Therefore, Wordsworth works in an associationist manner in tracing his ideas back 
to an original source and through this arrives at a mystical juncture, (as opposed to 
an intellectual intuition) having moved from the sublime imagery of the first lines to 
more picturesque imagery, to certain aspects of the landscape, to the poet’s own 
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“corporeal frame” and finally to the pantheistic “life of things.” However, 
Wordsworth at this point encounters the first of two major metaphysical doubts 
within the poem—doubts regarding his own pantheist vision. This tension has been 
partially created by Wordsworth through his use of associationist imagery to reach 
his supposedly pantheist station. “…sensations sweet,/ Felt in the blood, and felt 
along the heart,/ And passing even into my purer mind” (28-30). The poem in effect 
moves from embodied towards more disembodied imagery—from the blood and the 
heart to the “purer mind.” This mixture of imagery in tracing the poet’s link to a 
pantheist universe is something that does not quite satisfy his deeper metaphysical 
aspirations, and so he has to tackle his subject from a different angle. He goes on to 
question his belief hitherto with the following lines:                       
                                                   If this               
             Be but a vain belief, yet, oh! how oft, 
In darkness, and amid the many shapes  
Of joyless daylight; when the fretful stir  
Unprofitable, and the fever of the world, 
Have hung upon the beatings of my heart, 
How oft, in spirit, have I turned to thee 
O sylvan Wye!...         (50-57) 
                                              
In this next movement of the poem Wordsworth voices his doubt and calls upon his 
imaginative powers rehearsed in solitude to support his argument. The argument 
however is now situated in a space between the imaginative and the empirical—a 
space where Wordsworth has gained a sense of imaginative autonomy but only due 
to his previous moral encounter with the landscape of Monmouthshire and rehearsal 
of the scene in his memory. In the next lines Wordsworth describes the process by 
which the imagination, in Hartman’s phraseology once again “rises” up against the 
present physical image: 
And now, with gleams of half-extinguish’d thought, 
With many recognitions dim and faint, 
And somewhat of a sad perplexity, 
 150 
The picture of the mind revives again:         (59-62)  
                                                    
Here Wordsworth conveys a sense of specular dedoublement due to the fact that he 
brings into the experiential present “gleams of half-extinguished thought” and 
“recognitions dim and faint.” The thoughts are representations that are “half-
extinguished” because they interfere with the empirical experience of the abbey in 
the experiential present. This leads to a “sad perplexity” for the poet five years after 
his last visit to the abbey, due to the sense of loss the poet has experienced since his 
first visit in 1793. The picture “of the mind” is a reference to the fact that the poet is 
depicting the image of the valley and the abbey as represented in his mind—the 
process is a transformative one, the original imagined scene in fact disappears and 
reappears in a dedoubled sense in the present and thus symbolises Wordsworth’s 
sense of an ongoing and divisive dialectic between the imagination and the natural 
world, which further suggests a dualism that prevents an experience of pure 
aesthesis for the poet. Wordsworth also becomes self-conscious of a temporal gap 
that cannot in any sense be overcome by the poet working in this sense of an 
exegesis of past experience conjoined with present realities; this perplexes a poet 
seeking unification or pure aesthesis in his work. 
     However, this sense of temporality and division works both aetiologically and 
teleologically: Wordsworth actually realises through this experience that there will 
be yet another experience whereby the present becomes a specular reflection, which 
at some point in the experiential future will “revive again.” He goes on to say 
“While here I stand, not only with the sense/ Of present pleasure, but with pleasing 
thoughts/ That in this moment there is life and food/ For future years”. (63-66). He 
finds consolation in the fact that even as there is a dialectic working between past 
memories and present experience, there is also a cataphoric effect wherein the 
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present experience is nourished by past memories. The imagination helps in effect to 
bind experience together in a unity, and this unity is the highest representation (in 
the human mind) of a unified, organically connected universe. Up until this point of 
the poem, Wordsworth has engaged with a dialectical experience of the world that 
has vacillated between the imaginative mind and the external world. Although the 
argument at the end of the first part of the poem ran to a pantheistic conclusion, he 
has entered into a second argument where he concludes that there is a natura 
naturans that runs through all things and binds his imaginative mind to the natural 
world: 
                                     …And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime  
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean, and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man, 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things.          (94-103) 
                                                  
Therefore past and present are fused together by the imagination that, whilst causing 
“sad perplexity” at the apparent dichotomy between the two experiences, also 
paradoxically binds the past present and future together in a narrative unity. From 
this logic Wordsworth deduces the “spirit” that “impels/ All thinking things.” 
Wordsworth has worked through his dialectic and formed his synthesis of inner and 
outer experience, through an organic connection between the mind and the natural 
world, a spirit that also exists “in the mind of man,” with the unifying imagination at 
its head.    
     In the final section of the poem there is a reprise, which is much slower in pace 
and which incorporates more metaphysical doubt for the poet, this time countered by 
the embodiment of his hopes in his sister. The poet continues with the lines “Nor, 
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perchance,/ If I were not thus taught, should I the more/ Suffer my genial spirits to 
decay:/ For thou art with me, here, upon the banks/ Of this fair river;” (112-116), my 
italics. At this point, Wordsworth seeks embodiment within the figure of his sister 
Dorothy, in a movement that counters his own still lingering metaphysical doubts 
about his pantheistic argument. Wordsworth appears to be saying to her you are here 
in this experiential moment and in the future you too shall feel the imaginative 
impulse that I feel. However, Wordsworth differs from Coleridge in that he does not 
displace his own failures, he simply recognises himself and these burgeoning 
impulses in Dorothy. Further, he is dealing, not as in Coleridge, in someone who 
will have what he never had, but with someone (Dorothy was only 20 months 
younger) who has experienced the same natural landscapes and walking tours and in 
whom he recognises this mutuality. Therefore, Dorothy not only presents an 
embodiment of Wordsworth’s hopes, but he also experiences recognition in his 
sister as fellow poet-seer. And in the final lines Wordsworth alludes to the 
importance of both the embodying landscape and sister: “And this green pastoral 
landscape, were to me/ More dear, both for themselves, and for thy sake.” (159-60). 
Wordsworth claims that the landscape holds a restorative function both for himself 
and for his sister, yet this is only from Wordsworth’s own perspective: how can the 
landscape be dear to me for your sake? This is because there is a strong sense of 
mutual recognition between two agents, in which case we read the lines as “I see 
restorative value in this natural scene through your perception of the restorative 
value of this scene.” This is a very Hegelian ending to the poem, whereby the poet, 
by means of immanent recognition through his sister, feels the elation of the scene 
impressed upon them both, and feels a communion between the two agents through 
their mutual experience of the natural landscape. The landscape acts in an 
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intermediate fashion for the two agents—according to Wordsworth’s 
representations, both perceive a unifying force between themselves and the 
landscape, which a fortiori binds them both to each other. Wordsworthian mutual 
recognition does not happen at the level of two subjective consciousnesses alone. 
Wordsworthian recognition works primarily at the level of Naturphilosophie, 
wherein the subjects recognise a sense of themselves as part of the external world. In 
a kind of second-order recognition the poet then recognises a logically common 
experience through the mediative encounter with nature for both himself and a 
second agent. The poet has his imagination released through initial communion with 
the landscape, before returning to the landscape as the “anchor of my purest 
thoughts, the nurse, the guide…” and then returning in a coda to Dorothy, who 
settles his further doubts through a second act of embodiment. He experiences 
recognitive embodiment whereby each is caught in the existential moment and has 
mutual “food” for the future. In this dialectical movement from self to the external 
world to another subject and back to himself, Wordsworth establishes an 
internalisation of both the natural world and his sister as an inter-subjective 
consciousness and counters his own doubts by recognising a mutual experience of 
nature in his sister. Contrastively, Coleridge only manages to project his future 
hopes onto his son, because he firstly fails to secure a primary recognition of his life 
organically within the landscape and he has no existential other with whom he can 
share his present experience of the world, however divided that experience may be.  
 
7.“Home” at Grasmere: Embodiment 
In Home at Grasmere Wordsworth signals his experience of nature in the 
experiential present and solidifies the sense of a pastoral embodiment for the poet’s 
visionary mind—this time in the Vale of Grasmere—represented as an Elysian 
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paradise on earth. In embodying the visionary imagination within the vale, he 
attempts to render a necessary connection between his imagination and the physical 
landscape. By accomplishing this he hopes to bring into fruition a more immediate 
experience for himself and the reader, a more authentic experience—an experience 
that renders all metaphysical knowledge a part of the experiential present. This goal 
is attained by a psychological and physical appropriation of the landscape, which 
leads to an organic connection between the poet’s mind and the external world. This 
poem therefore moves beyond the reticent doubts of previous poems such as 
“Tintern Abbey” and into a more philosophically developed mode of consciousness 
where the poet is no longer a wanderer—physically or metaphysically; the poet 
gains a physical and metaphysical home in Grasmere. This scheme of Wordsworth’s 
is due to the fact that book one of The Recluse was originally designed to be read 
after The Prelude, which was to lay the foundation for the main text. Therefore, The 
Prelude would serve as the “antechamber” which would bring the reader up to date 
with the experiential present—the now authentic experience enshrined within the 
Vale of Grasmere.  
     Wordsworth quickly switches to the present after recalling his visit to the Vale as 
a young boy. After commencing with an anaphoric temporal frame similar to those 
of “Tintern Abbey” and The Prelude, wherein he ruminates upon his memories of 
first visiting the Vale as a boy, he exclaims: 
From that time forward was the place to me  
As beautiful in thought as it had been 
When present to my bodily eyes; a haunt 
Of my affections, oftentimes in joy 
A brighter joy, in sorrow (but of that 
I have known little), in such gloom, at least,  
Such damp of the gay mind as stood to me  
In place of sorrow, 'twas a gleam of light.  
And now 'tis mine for life: dear Vale,         (44-52) 
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The poet extols his delight at his present condition; after having discussed the 
failings of himself as a younger man (and of the human race as a whole) he 
embraces his secularised vision of an Elysian paradise here on earth. This reduces 
the temporal lag and the gap between temporal signifier and signified he experiences 
when discussing spots of time or former experiences recaptured in tranquility. 
Wordsworth is attempting a temporal closure of an experiential gap, which is why 
he alludes to the fact that in the past the Vale was “As beautiful in thought as it had 
been/ When present to my bodily eyes” this line could of course be applied to 
“Tintern Abbey” or to many of the episodes in The Prelude, and summarises the 
dialectical nature of Wordsworth’s poetics up until this new Gestalt in the 
experiential present. This line also demarcates a previously contingent relationship 
between the body and the mind; one however which the poet symbolically closes in 
the necessary embodiment he tropes within the Vale of Grasmere. The line “And 
now ‘tis mine for life: dear Vale” abruptly breaks the rhythm of the meter down to 
iambic tetrameter and brings the reader suddenly into the present. Wordsworth leads 
the reader down into the Vale with him so to speak, having broken the early metrical 
pattern in order to draw our attention to this end-stop; we are in fact the arrested 
traveler, arrested by our poet-guide. The sense of ownership is paramount here; there 
is a physical ownership (his cottage) and a psychological ownership of the Vale 
itself. This ownership symbolises Wordsworth’s interiorisation of the natural world 
as it becomes a part of the poet’s inner consciousness, and in turn embodies his 
visionary hopes in an immanent present. In recent dialectical episodes Wordsworth 
had spoken of nature “rising up” against the poet, however now the fully matured 
(post-apocalyptic Snowdonian vision) poet fully appropriates the externality of 
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nature. Wordsworth then resumes in pentameter the discussion of his now 
contemporary perspective.  
     Wordsworth’s celebration of the experiential present, and his burgeoning sense of 
an earthly embodiment of heavenly bliss, or Deus sive natura are particularly 
pronounced in the following lines:  
            This solitude is mine; the distant thought 
Is fetched out of the heaven in which it was. 
The unappropriated bliss hath found 
An owner, and that owner I am he.  
The Lord of this enjoyment is on Earth 
And in my breast. What wonder if I speak  
With fervour, am exalted with the thought  
Of my possessions, of my genuine wealth  
Inward and outward? What I keep have gained, 
Shall gain, must gain, if sound be my belief  
From past and present rightly understood 
That in my day of childhood I was less  
The mind of Nature, less, take all in all, 
Whatever may be lost, than I am now.        (83-96) 
 
Continuing the theme of ownership, Wordsworth here speaks of the “unappropriated 
bliss” having found an owner in himself. The “bliss” appears to have come from 
“out of heaven” and is a pure bliss. However, contrary to Jonathan Wordsworth’s 
suggestion that Wordsworth requires a “supernatural frame of reference” we find 
that the goodness has become dislocated from a heavenly abode and instead 
embodied within the Vale of Grasmere. He goes on to claim that “the Lord of this 
enjoyment is on earth”—another allusion to a Christianity that is once again 
displaced into the natural surroundings of Grasmere. He further speaks of his gifts 
both “Inward and outward” because the organic wealth of nature both permeates his 
senses and his inner mind, and is a wealth of religious proportions; the satisfaction 
received from nature is further an internal satisfaction.  
     The modal phrases  “Have gained,” “Must gain” and “shall gain” signify a self-
conscious awareness of temporality in Wordsworth’s present speculations, and he 
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further adds that he was previously less “than I am now.” This temporal awareness 
instantiates the idea that Wordsworth is self-consciously situating his experience not 
only in the spatial realm of Grasmere, but also in the temporal realm, further adding 
to the earth-bound implications of his joy. This supports Paul de Man’s argument 
adumbrated in the last chapter, because Wordsworth is in one sense exposing 
himself to the vicissitudes of temporality, and self-consciously recognising an 
almost Humean scepticism in his observations. Once again metaphysical equipoise 
is countered by a metaphysical doubt about the veracity of his earthbound, temporal 
and present speculations. He continues the empiricist line of argument by stating 
that “if sound be my belief/ From past and present rightly understood.” The 
conditional clause points to his own even deeper self-awareness of the implications 
of an organic argument that apodictically places him in the space of the empirically 
realist, due to the embodiment of his metaphysical hopes in the temporal/spatial 
realm.         
     However, Wordsworth goes on to counter these doubts using the telling lines “I 
was less/ The mind of Nature, less, take all in all,/ Whatever may be lost, than I am 
now.” The “mind of nature” that Wordsworth has become reorients the poet in the 
direction of his faith in his teleological organicism; the “mind of nature” implies the 
interiorisation of nature by the poet. Wordsworth himself experiences a sense of 
unity in and through nature, and therefore the mind of nature is one that through a 
powerful receptivity to the natural world actually becomes one with the entelechy or 
the grander creative processes of the natural world. This is a progressive process, in 
that previously the younger Wordsworth was not the mind of nature, whereas he has 
now become, through the vehicle of his philosophical poetry, something higher: he 
is now the mind or Spirit-head of the natural world. He returns to Grasmere (as also 
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to Tintern Abbey), with a feeling of imaginative connection to the external world of 
nature. He has found a home in nature, a home metonymically realized in Grasmere 
Valley. However, where Tintern Abbey was a transient experience for 
Wordsworth—one that helped to demonstrate the spiritual link between the past and 
the present, his “home” in Grasmere has the permanence for which the poet has been 
striving both in his physical journeys and his philosophical journeys. Of course this 
sense of home, a very British sense perhaps, stands in distinction to Novalis’ more 
cosmopolitan notion of Gefühl. Wordsworth and Coleridge in this sense share a 
different conception of “home” from their German counterpart. It is hard to imagine 
Novalis settling for a “home” at Grasmere. This sense of home further sheds light on 
the more settled aesthetic sought by Wordsworth in that home is a figure of 
metonymy for a settled philosophical conception of the universe, as opposed to the 
Fülle celebrated by the Frühromantiker. Wordsworth’s final conception of “home” 
also stands in contrast to Coleridge’s sense of homelessness and dividedness in 
“Constancy to an Ideal Object” in which the poet yearns for his “English home” 
symbolised by his unattainable ideal and his love for the corporeal figure of Sara 
Hutchinson.  
     The poem culminates with the seminal high romantic argument, wherein 
Wordsworth announces the “spousal” relationship between the mind and nature, 
which transpires after Wordsworth’s representation of the experiential situation 
encountered in 1799. The first lines of the argument refer to Wordsworth’s journey 
into a region deeper than heaven and hell—the “mind of Man.” In dark tones he 
claims of his epic journey: 
Jehovah, with his thunder, and the quire 
Of shouting angels and the empyreal throne - 
I pass them unalarmed. The darkest Pit 
Of the profoundest Hell, chaos, night, 
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Nor aught of [blinder] vacancy scooped out 
By help of dreams can breed such fear and awe 
As fall upon us often when we look…        (982-988) 
                                                           
Wordsworth is self-consciously taking on the mantle formerly carried by Milton in 
Paradise Lost and equally self-consciously attempting to go further, to displace the 
biblical myth into a secular myth of modernity.26 This even more perilous journey is: 
Into our minds, into the mind of Man, 
My haunt and the main region of my song.  
Beauty, whose living home is the green earth,  
Surpassing the most fair ideal Forms  
The craft of delicate spirits hath composed  
From earth's materials, waits upon my steps, 
Pitches her tents before me when I move, 
An hourly Neighbour…                                     (989-996) 
                                                               
Wordsworth situates his argument in the mind of man and goes on to embody 
“Beauty” in the “living home” of earth, acknowledging the embodiment of beauty 
that surpasses “the most ideal fair Forms” thereby distancing himself from a Platonic 
position by identifying the highest beauty here in this empirical world, embodied in 
the Vale of Grasmere. The secular and natural beauty of the earth is a beauty which, 
according to Abrams, is a quasi-biblical beauty.27 In fact Abrams claims of this great 
consummation: 
The event [the holy marriage at the end of time] however, is 
transported from the indefinite future to the experiential present, and 
translated from external intervention to an act of unaided vision, in 
which the lamb and the New Jerusalem are replaced by man’s mind 
as the bridegroom and nature as the bride. But this “great 
consummation” will nevertheless suffice to create the restored 
paradise predicted in the apocalypse.28 
 
Time is once again a major factor as Wordsworth removes Christian eschatology 
from the “great consummation” and in so doing sets it in the “experiential present.” 
Of course this also implies a deeper spousal connection between the poet’s mind and 
the natural world, which is a symbolic representation of the organicism as the tenor 
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of this marriage metaphor. The argument concludes with Wordsworth’s explicit 
proclamation of his high romantic argument: 
How exquisitely the individual Mind 
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less  
Of the whole species) to the external world 
Is fitted; and how exquisitely too - 
Theme this but little heard of among men -  
The external world is fitted to the mind; 
And the creation (by no lower name 
Can it be called) which they with blended might 
Accomplish: this is my great argument.                  (1006-1014) 
                                                       
He finalises the argument by explicitly discussing the nature of the mind’s fitting to 
the external world. He uses the phrase “progressive powers no less of the whole 
species” and places it in parenthesis as an aside—this aside however is key for it 
alludes to the progressive nature of his encounters with the natural world, “powers” 
that can be applied teleologically to the whole human species. What is implicit here 
is that any progressive powers that we are predisposed to are, to use the ergative 
form “fitted” to the external world and don’t require external determination, by any 
“supernatural” agency. Any teleology is reliant upon interaction with the natural 
world, with the telos of this interaction being the “marriage” of these entities. He 
then reverses the nouns and speaks of how “The external world is fitted to the 
mind.” This is for Wordsworth a two-way process, where the mind is fitted to the 
external world and the external world is symmetrically fitted to the mind. Their 
“blended might” forge  “the creation” and this blending is only possible through a 
completely gnostic understanding of nature which is expressed through the persona 
of the lyric speaker. The creation here is removed from the need for any 
“supernatural frame of reference” and this creation further does not require any 
intellectual intuition, just the progressive moments of Wordsworth’s narrative. In 
this organic state nature reaches its highest point in the mind of the poet and the 
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poet’s mind reaches its largest area of expansion through embodiment in the external 
world.  
     When Coleridge tellingly uses the marriage metaphor (combined with death) in 
“Dejection” we can discern a more one-sided representation of the figure “Ours is 
her wedding-garment, ours her shroud!” Coleridge is depicting a relationship from 
the perspective of an unhappy consciousness, which in failing to interiorise the 
external world remains beached upon its own incumbent subjectivism. He also 
remains alienated from the external world, projecting the possibility of a going-out-
of-oneself on to the joy embodied by the “other” Sara Hutchinson. Coleridge’s other 
possible avenue of escape (from his dialectical aporia) is through the possibility of 
love in the Hegelian sense. However, this is something never firmly established in 
his poem—Coleridge seems to acknowledge the need for receptivity in order to gain 
a higher mode of being—but through an act of avoidance seems unable to interiorise 
the outer-world into a fully concrete universal conception of the universe.      
 
8. The unifying nature of the Wordsworthian Symbol 
Simon Jarvis has recently commented upon the philosophical nature of 
Wordsworth’s language, or one may say the perfomative function of poetic language 
in Wordsworth. For Jarvis, this language has a cognitive function, and is not fitted to 
a pre-existing philosophical discursive model but functions itself philosophically: 
It might mean, not that philosophy get fitted into a song—where all 
the thinking is done by philosophy and only the handiwork by 
verse—but that the song itself, as song, is philosophic. It might mean 
that a different kind of thinking happens in verse—that instead of 
being a sort of thoughtless ornament or reliquary for thinking, verse 
is itself a kind of cognition, with its own resources and difficulties.29 
 
This analysis is I feel correct in that it points to the philosophically performative 
nature of the figures used by Wordsworth, and I feel that his trope often attempts, as 
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cognition, to introduce a monistic ontology to the forefront of our thinking. Central 
to this philosophically perfomative nature of the language is Wordsworth’s use of 
the symbol, which acts in a unifying fashion to which I now turn.         
     Wordsworth’s use of language in The Prelude has been discussed in terms of the 
use of romantic metaphor by, amongst others, Lindenberger and de Man. In this 
section I would like to build on their discussion and demonstrate how Wordsworth 
defines a romantic use of symbol through a use of signifiers that point on the one 
hand to a signified such as stream, river, moon and on the other at their own status-
as-object in partaking in the Fülle of the metaphysical universe. Using Jakobson’s 
famous distinction between metaphor and metonymy,30 I believe that 
Wordsworthian symbols actually work on both a metonymic or syntagmatic axis 
(where they need a context, such as features of the landscape for their function) and 
a metaphoric one, through which they function paradigmatically and metaphysically,  
partaking directly in the infinite Fülle. This is because using the metaphoric axis 
does not require contiguity in time and space, but similarity between two things that 
are otherwise different. Thus the moon can symbolically represent the imagination 
because it lights up the world, as does the romantic imagination. And more 
importantly, symbol for Wordsworth, as for Coleridge, is more than just a rhetorical 
figure, but functions in a metaphysical sense, partaking synechdochically in the 
infinite. Wordsworthian symbols thus also function both allegorically (in time and in 
a contiguous context) and symbolically or a-temporally on the paradigmatic scale, 
where they signify an aspect of the infinite universe. Consequently, because of this 
structural function of symbol in Wordsworth, there is no symbolic autonomy 
without receptivity to context at the syntagmatic level.  This is in effect 
Wordsworth’s attempt at a rhetorical unity, in order to further deepen his overall 
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organic sense of unity, by which he correlates the natural world with the 
metaphysical world.  
     De Man claims of Wordsworth’s use of romantic symbol the inherent desire to 
collapse the distinction between language as figuration and language as an object 
partaking in the universe, or language as simple signifier to an anterior signified and 
language as a self-sufficient entity partaking in the universal Fülle. De Man writes: 
Poetic language seems to originate in the desire to draw closer and 
closer to the ontological status of the object, and its growth and 
development are determined by this inclination. […] At times, 
romantic thought and romantic poetry seem to come so close to 
giving in completely to the nostalgia for the object that it becomes 
difficult to distinguish between object and image, between 
imagination and perception, between an expressive or constitutive 
and a mimetic or literal language. This may well be the case in some 
passages of Wordsworth and Goethe, of Baudelaire and Rimbaud, 
where the vision almost seems to become a real landscape.31 
 
This closed space between object and image or imagination and perception is the 
space where Wordsworth attempts to operate his rhetoric in order to transform the 
ontological status of his signifiers and provide them with a self-sufficient 
metaphysical presence, at least with regards to his use of symbol. However, as I 
argued in the last chapter, total closure of the gap between signifiers and signifieds 
is an impossible object for poetry, and the signifier is always dependent upon its i) 
relationship to other signifiers within the syntagmatic plane and ii) its sense of 
inscription upon a reality which is always anterior in order to represent the world 
mediatively. De Man goes on to claim of the search for reification in the self-
sufficient linguistic figure that, “The nostalgia [in the poetic figure] for the object 
has become a nostalgia for an entity that could never, by its very nature, become a 
particularised presence.”32 Wordsworth is attempting to mystify his trope and in so 
doing collapse the rhetorical—or temporal—gap between the signifiers and 
signified.   
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     Lindenberger makes a similar claim for what amounts to a collapse of 
distinctions between the tenor and the vehicle in The Prelude, claiming that this 
collapse places Wordsworth in a stylistic space somewhere between symbolism and 
realism. “He [Wordsworth] can reveal it [the past] in all its concrete fullness and he 
can use it as a symbol of still another world behind it. He can be both symbolist and 
realist at once.”33 This construction of his poesy actually places Wordsworth in the 
position I have been arguing for throughout this chapter: the poet seeking to unify 
the philosophical dichotomy opened by romantic philosophy, attempting to ground 
his poetry in an aesthetic aesthesis. This is the unifying romantic framework that lies 
behind part of Wordsworth’s conceptualisation of symbol.  
     Examples of Wordsworth’s use of symbol in this metaphysical sense can be 
found once again in The Prelude, particularly in the section of book six where 
Wordsworth explicitly addresses symbol and the romantic imagination. Wordsworth 
famously commences the scene by couching the appearance of Mont Blanc in a 
language of estrangement: 
                                           That day we first 
Beheld the summit of Mont Blanc, and grieved 
To have a soulless image on the eye, 
Which had usurp’d upon a living thought 
That never more could be: the wondrous Vale 
Of Chamouny did on the following dawn, 
With its dumb cataracts and streams of ice, 
A motionless array of mighty waves, 
Five rivers broad and vast, make rich amends 
And reconcil’d us to realities.      (1805-06, 6, 452-461)  
                                                             
The estrangement between the poet’s imagination and the “soulless image” is 
similar to that encountered in “Tintern Abbey” when the poet feels “sad perplexity” 
at his remembered image and the present image of the Welsh valley, although in the 
former case he is referring to a preconceived idea about the landscape; the next day 
he becomes “reconciled to realities” by the scene below in the Vale of Chamouny. 
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The stark image of the mountaintop as “soulless image” is due to the fact that the 
symbol of the imagination has become soulless after its representation in its literal 
counterpart, the actual mountaintop. The original image or concept of the summit 
was one that remained disembodied and dislocated from its literal counterpart. An 
image only takes on a true, soulful life when represented in concrete figuration. The 
Vale of Chamouny however, represents a vision of the imagination once again 
embedded and embodied within a deepening literal landscape—a landscape that in 
Wordsworth’s imagination had not been preconceived before his actual 
apprehension of it. This is one important type of romantic symbol that can function 
in Wordsworth’s universe: a symbol that remains embodied within the natural 
world, and which in turn is able to reconcile Wordsworth “to realities” whilst 
representing the infinite. Whereas in “Kubla Khan” Coleridge had been looking for 
a pure symbolic representation of the imagination at work—and finally only 
discovered this in an allegorical representation of the symbolic imagination at 
work—Wordsworth from the outset wishes to embody his use of symbol within the 
natural world. The soul becomes embodied and grows into a world soul that relies 
for its embodiment upon the natural world at large.   
     Additionally, the initial sublime symbolism of the “dumb cataracts,” “streams of 
ice,” “mighty waves” and rivers “broad and vast” of the Vale of Chamouny 
functions on a syntagmatic axis because it stands in contextual contrast to other 
aspects of the physical landscape of the vale. These phrases take on a more poignant 
resonance when juxtaposed with the lines directly following, which become more 
pastoral and picturesque, metonymically re-setting the landscape in contrast to the 
more barren preceding figures: 
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There small birds warble from the leafy trees, 
The Eagle soareth in the element; 
There doth the reaper bind the yellow sheaf, 
The Maiden spread the hay-cock in the sun, 
While Winter like a tamed lion walks 
Descending from the mountain to make sport 
Among the cottages by beds of flowers.     (1805-06, 6, 462-468) 
                                                                   
The fecund imagery of harvesting now acts in literal contrast to the preceding 
frigidity of the “soulless image” of the glacial heights of the mountain, and adds an 
organic bent to the sublime imagery of the frozen rivers and waterfalls through 
contextual figures and combinations such as “small birds,” “eagle soareth.” “reapers 
bind the yellow sheath” and “The maiden spread the haycock in the sun.” This axis 
of signification binds the original figure of the summit of Mont Blanc to the 
contextual features of the valley below and this is the structural aesthetic that gives 
Wordsworthian symbols their dual-referentiality: the linguistic figure partakes in the 
infinite as a self-sufficient entity on the one hand, but correspondingly functions 
within the contextual structure of the landscape. This in turn binds the symbol to the 
physical and the metaphysical, and is the source of what for Lindenberger is the 
collapse of the distinction between the tenor and the vehicle of the metaphor. The 
trope of “Winter like a tamed lion” further acts to domesticate the sublime imagery, 
a glacial image/lion, to the more pedestrian and harvested landscape of the valley 
below, performing the further function of wedding the sublime to the more 
picturesque imagery of the vale. All of these reductions in distance between 
imagery, figures and tropes, serve the grand Wordsworthian project of “marital” 
unification and synthetic progression.  
     Wordsworth furthermore goes on to trope nature as a book, which once again 
points to the idea of a mediated encounter that ultimately promotes our reception of 
the natural world as perhaps deictically indicating higher truths. David Perkins 
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claims that Wordsworth, in apprehending these higher truths also emblemises the 
marriage trope central to his romantic philosophy: 
…they [ultimate truths] reveal themselves in the processes of the 
imagination by which the human mind weds itself to nature. They are 
expressed in the visible scene from two sources at the same time, 
from the human mind and from the divine consciousness in and 
behind all things, the Nature in nature, so to speak. And in turn these 
truths are reflected back to us in the landscape as we perceive it, thus 
becoming objects of cognition. (My italics)34  
 
Wordsworth in effect interprets the “semiotics” of the landscape. This serves to 
demonstrate the process of cognitive recognition that the poet experiences in 
cognizing truths symbolically apparent within the external landscape, when the 
experience is lifted to the higher awareness of the imaginative plane. This process is 
however a process of reading and therefore of mediation, which is in no way a direct 
apprehension of truth(s). Moreover, Wordsworth delineates a natural hermeneutics 
only graspable through our own higher faculty of reason facilitating our reading of 
these symbols in the landscape. He writes of this experience in the vale of 
Chamouny:  
                                      …With such a book 
Before our eyes we could not chuse but read 
A frequent lesson of sound tenderness, 
The universal reason of mankind,     (1805-06, 6, 473-476) 
                                                          
The statement “we could not chuse but read” sums up the poet’s epistemic position 
as one which uses apodictic logic in order to facilitate his codex-trope. This 
statement also points towards a kind of Hegelianism in some of Wordsworth’s 
work—the idea that the ultimate truths are derived from reason—and this reason 
unfolds itself in features of the universe. He attempts to find unity in a “spousal” 
relationship between the mind and nature, however in contrast to Hegel, 
Wordsworth attempts to signify this synthesis through the medium of the aesthetic 
symbol rather than through the use of philosophical reason. 
 168 
     In a further dialectical movement, Wordsworth goes on to describe the 
imagination rising up against his empirical experience of Mont Blanc. In so doing he 
uses the image of usurpation, once again problematising the relationship between 
imagination and empirical experience. He writes of the secondary imaginative 
experience, which builds paradigmatically and symbolically on the primary 
empirical experience of Mont Blanc appearing in the traveller’s vision: 
            Imagination! lifting up itself 
Before the eye and progress of my Song 
Like an unfather’d vapour;… 
……………………………………………….. 
And now recovering to my Soul I say 
I recognise thy glory; in such strength 
Of usurpation, in such visitings  
Of awful promise, when the light of sense  
Goes out in flashes that have shewn to us 
The invisible world,…      (1805-06, 6, 525-527, 531-536) 
                                                       
Wordsworth makes it explicit that the uncontrollable and sublime in nature is 
paradigmatically “usurped” by the imagination. Even the metaphor of imagination 
“lifting itself up,” adds to the sense of an ascent of image upon image, of the 
specular image once again usurping the primary image. The “soulless image that 
usurped upon a living thought” is thus further usurped by the poet saying in dialogue 
with his soul “I recognise thy glory;” creating supersession of the empirical image 
upon the eye. The apocalyptic imagination reincarnates itself, superseding the 
sensory image that had originally negated its presence. In a dialectical movement it 
has interiorised the empirical and in a new synthesis progressed to a higher level 
where the “light of sense goes out” and the poet glimpses the “invisible world” 
where the imaginative and the empirical are in fact conjoined in a metaphysical 
unity. Of course, the “light of sense” only goes “out in flashes” (as opposed to in its 
entirety) because the poet needs sensory and contextual data in order for his 
imaginative faculty to function at all. Thus the visitings “of awful promise” are so 
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described, because at these moments it appears the imaginative can in some way 
transcend the empirical world.             
     In the climactic Snowdonian vision of the apocalyptic imagination we see 
Wordsworth fusing the paradigmatic and syntagmatic poles in order to set the figure 
of the symbol in the temporal whilst partaking in the eternal and metaphysical. He 
commences the section with gloomy imagery in order to foreshadow the apocalyptic 
experience that is to follow, and the imagery functions metonymically and 
contextually, almost like a realist narrative. “It was a summer’s night, a close warm 
night,/ Wan, dull and glaring, with a dripping mist/ Low-hung and thick that cover’d 
all the sky,” (1805-06, 13, 10-12). These contextual figures further function to 
signify the eternal and the unknown that Wordsworth is about to partake in. The 
moon appears and sheds its light upon the whole of the scene, thus symbolising the 
romantic imagination lighting up the world, whilst also literally lighting the physical 
landscape for the travellers. Moreover, Wordsworth switches to paradigmatic 
figuration as he informs us that the moonlight falls “like a flash” (38) and then the 
“real sea” (49) is “Usurp’d upon as far as sight could reach.” (51). Therefore, 
through crossing the syntagmatic presentation of the landscape with a paradigmatic 
shift, Wordsworth presents a usurpation of the literal by the specular-imaginative 
partaking in the infinite. The imagination rises from lower depths, again 
paradigmatically acting in a protean fashion, moving through the moon, to the sea, 
to the mist to “…a blue chasm, a fracture in the vapour,/ A deep and gloomy 
breathing-place, thro’ which/ Mounted the roar of waters, torrents, streams/ 
Innumerable, roaring with one voice.” (56-59).  The images are the usual 
Wordsworthian representatives of the imaginative faculty, water, streams, clouds—
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and they culminate in the unifying and organic image of “The soul, the Imagination 
of the whole.” (65). 
     Wordsworth attempts to blend or “marry” the temporal and literal with the 
infinite or metaphysical. However, as with Coleridge’s use of symbol, the same 
issues of mediation between the signifier and signified are still present, even if 
Wordsworth attempts to reduce this distance with his use of unifying symbol. 
Wordsworth openly embodies his imaginative vision within an allegorical narrative, 
which in turn requires metonymic context. He works within the allegorical scope of 
the quest narrative, and we only see the whole allegorical picture by placing all of 
the contextual clues together; within this context we read various elements as 
symbolic because of their place within an overall allegorical framework. When 
ascending a mountain such as Snowdon or Mont Blanc, Wordsworth leads up to an 
encounter with the “apocalyptic” imagination in his quest allegory. The authentic 
symbols of the imagination also interestingly emerge from below the poet, who 
stands at a great height—having achieved what he feels is imaginative percipience. 
Wordsworth however ends up symbolising an embodied imagination that rises from 
the vapours below, or the frozen rivers of Chamouny, whereby it is frozen in the 
earth. The vision, as in the vale of Grasmere, is taken out of heaven and embodied in 
the earth. This is similar to what Hartman has called the “Abyssal vision” and is 
something that is rooted in metaphysical literature of the past.35 This type of vision 
suits the Wordsworthian notion of a symbol that works within a physical, 
syntagmatic and allegorical context in order to also function at a metaphysical level. 
Once again, as with Coleridge’s use of symbol in “Kubla Khan,” there is a necessary 
connection between allegory and symbol—and symbol cannot function in a semiotic 
vacuum. As the imagination is tied to the natural world, itself the highest 
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representation of the natural world, so the poetic representation of this process is tied 
to the contextual figures of the metonymic axis, which in actual fact best represents 
the embodiment of the imagination in the natural world.     
 
9. Conclusion 
In rereading Wordsworth in the Hegelian vein we manage to gain many insights into 
his progress as a poet. Of course there are numerous biographical elements at work 
here, historical influences such as the French Revolution, and poetical and literary 
influences from poets such as Cowper and the vogue of travel writing. However, one 
major area of criticism has brought up the dialectical nature of Wordsworth’s poetry 
and I have attempted here to further the Hegelian reading of his poetry. I have 
flagged the crucial organicism that on my account results from Wordsworth’s 
dialectical oscillation between the natural world and the self. His interiorisation of 
the external world through structural devices such as his use of symbol and allegory, 
and his use of embodiment are all crucial factors that not only play a part in 
formulating Wordsworth’s overall organic conceptualisation of the universe, but 
also help delineate the crucial differences between himself and Coleridge. These 
differences stem in part from Coleridge’s overall philosophical outlook and the 
fragmentary expression of this in his poetry, and Wordsworth’s ability to recognise 
himself in the natural world, and foster his own form of Naturphilosophie.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 172 
Notes 
1. I use the phrase “metaphysical equipoise” because the equipoise I argue for 
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Chapter Four 
Dialectical Collapse and Post-Romantic Recognition in Shelley 
1. Introduction 
Shelley’s poetry reflects various philosophical ideas that shaped his thought from his 
years at Oxford through to his years on the Continent. An early influence, for 
example, was William Godwin, in particular his teleology of perfectibility that 
encourages a rationalistic approach to history and helped Shelley formulate his 
youthful political hopes and aspirations in a clearly defined political discourse. 
Godwin’s gradualism—his commitment to slow realisation of progressive ideals 
over time—was unattractive to Shelley, who thought the model inimical to the hopes 
of imminent change and political practice in England in the immediate aftermath of 
the French revolution1. Furthermore, Shelley’s early infatuation with the materialism 
of Baron d’ Holbach2 complicated his engagement with Godwin’s rationalism. D’ 
Holbach placed human agency in a naturalistic and deterministic context—whereas 
Godwin viewed agency as fundamentally rational and free (i.e. as capable of 
rationally determined choices). A further influence on Shelley was the British 
empirical tradition, culminating in Humean scepticism, which further called 
Shelley’s faith in metaphysical systems into question. These very different and 
seemingly irreconcilable philosophical influences led Shelley to develop a position 
that has been called sceptical idealism, whereby Shelley’s view of the world is 
sceptical in the sense of what one can know, and ideal in the sense that this 
knowledge is premised on a Platonic understanding of the universe.3   
     This merging of idealism and scepticism is manifested in Shelley’s conception of 
the speculative ideal of The One—a monistic concept akin to Hegelian Absolute 
Spirit, that can only be understood on a transcendental level (idealism), not directly 
available in the limited everyday experience of the world (which is characterised by 
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scepticism).4 For Shelley then, this ideal is not available in the form of 
Wordsworthian pantheism—whereby the universal discloses itself within the poet’s 
meditative experience of the natural world; and not available in the form of an 
intellectual intuition of the kind sought by Coleridge—due to its supersensible 
nature. As a result, Shelley has an uncertain grasp of The One. Interestingly, 
although he lacks a purely intellectual conceptualisation of The One, his scepticism 
with respect to the world of appearances (that appearances deceive and cannot guide 
us securely towards certainty) saves the day because he views appearances as 
possibly representing the supersensible realm of The One. Appearances are uncertain 
but not false, so it is possible through them to attain The One if only a way can be 
found. This almost Platonic faith, though varied in strength at different points in his 
poetic career, characterises his work. This feature orients his work towards the 
search for some unseen or unattainable truth—or as the Demagorgon states in 
Prometheus Unbound (1820) “the deep truth is imageless.”5 In attempting to resolve 
this impasse, Shelley attempted to go beyond the speculative unification of the 
Wordsworthian organic conception of the universe—and work towards an ultimately 
unattainable transcendental signified. This is a signified that exists in a space 
outside of the empirical world—and ultimately outside of our symbolic realm of 
signification. 
     In what follows I seek to show that by the time of Shelley’s final and unfinished 
poem “The Triumph of Life,” (1822) he comes to realise the failure of his attempt to 
secure a visionary recognition of The Absolute, or The One, as he calls his ideal. I 
will start by examining the poem “Mont Blanc” (1816). I argue that the tensions 
within the poem are manifested by Shelley’s inability to create a metaphysical 
equipoise—whereas Wordsworth achieves an organic sense of equipoise—
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reconciling his mind with the apparent alterity of the external world. Where 
Wordsworth finds an “adequation suitable to the idea” in the landscape, Shelley’s 
poetry becomes gradually more disembodied. This is due to Shelley’s centrifugal 
will-to-transcend the world of materialism—to go beyond Wordsworth’s organic 
aesthesis and to find a space of spiritual and autonomous vision. I will also consider 
two other poems that exemplify the tensions in Shelley’s idealism, “Alastor” (1816) 
and “Adonais.” (1821). The first poem expresses Shelley’s acknowledgement of the 
profound impossibility of his visionary search for The One. Shelley realises early in 
his poetic career that the visionary poet’s romantic ideal of a transcendent aesthetic 
aesthesis is impossible within the horizon of the empirical world.  The second 
explores an eschatological solution to this aporia. I will finish with an analysis of 
“The Triumph of Life,” (1822) where I argue he has finally reached a stage where 
his dialectical struggle collapses and he realises that the visionary ideal of The One 
is unattainable whilst we dwell within the sublunary sphere.  
 
2. Shelley’s quest for the imagination upon Mont Blanc 
Shelley most clearly demonstrates the divided nature of his early state of mind in the 
poem “Mont Blanc.” By “state of mind” I mean the tension Shelley felt between his 
former necessarian ideas and his sceptical idealism on the one hand and his (now 
strained) Godwinian ideal of an infinitely perfectible human intellect and 
imagination on the other; the Platonic writings that Shelley was also reading and 
translating at this time compounded the difficulties he found in finding a secure 
footing in which to situate his philosophical beliefs. The experience of Mont Blanc 
acts in an allegorical sense for Shelley’s quest for a pure aesthetic aesthesis. In fact, 
upon reading the poem one cannot fail to notice the similarities between Shelley’s 
poem and the treatment of the problematical autonomous imagination adumbrated 
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by Coleridge in “Kubla Khan.” Where Coleridge wrote of subterranean “caverns 
measureless to man” (4) Shelley writes: “caverns echoing to the Arves’s 
commotion,” (30) and “the still cave of the witch Poesy,” (44). He also strikingly 
writes: “…vast caves/ Shine in the rushing torrents’ restless gleam,/ Which from 
those secret chasms in tumult welling” (120-122); Coleridge writes: “And from this 
chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething” (17). The river which runs down to a 
“sunless sea” (5) in “Kubla Khan” is echoed in Shelley as the central trope of “Mont 
Blanc”: the streams of human thought which are the receivers of the main source of 
hidden “Power” crashing through the ravine, symbolised by the Arve: 
                                  …where from secret springs 
The source of human thought its tribute brings 
Of waters,—with a sound but half its own, 
Such as a feeble brook will oft assume            (4-7) (my italics). 
                                                            
The mysterious and illusive nature of the source of the imagination is further 
symbolised by the troping of unseen powerful heights upon the mountain itself, 
through the use of imagery such as ice and the sun. These imagistic devices which 
for Coleridge act as textual reconciling opposites that represent the workings of the 
primary imagination, in contrast act for Shelley as antagonists towards the realm of 
mortal power and illustrate a marked indifference to human thought: 
Power dwells apart in its tranquillity 
Remote, serene, and inaccessible: 
And this, the naked countenance of earth, 
On which I gaze, even these primeval mountains  
Teach the adverting mind… 
………………………………………………….. 
Frost and the Sun in scorn of mortal power 
Have piled: dome, pyramid, and pinnacle, 
A city of death, distinct with many a tower  
And wall impregnable of beaming ice. 
Yet not a city, but a flood of ruin 
Is there, that from the boundaries of the sky  
Rolls its perpetual stream;…       (96-100, 103-109) 
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The comparison with “Kubla Khan” is striking; more striking perhaps is the idea 
that in Shelley these images, which allegorically represented the workings of the 
primary romantic imagination in Coleridge, have been transposed, or drained 
completely of their original imaginative essence. The immutable power “dwells 
apart”; and is “inaccessible” and this is part of the Shelleyan experience of the 
sublime. Moreover, the images of “Frost and the Sun” are “in scorn of mortal 
power” because of the physical detritus resulting from their geographical processes 
and the immutability of this process.    
     Another major difference in uses of imagery between the two poets is that the 
“city” itself is created not by the imagination but by the natural elements, and 
though Coleridge’s garden was a hortus conclusus, Shelley’s is a bleak and barren 
landscape, seemingly devoid of any imaginative hope. In Coleridge’s poem the 
narrator sets the “Stately pleasure dome” against the forces of history and creates a 
tension between the autonomous imagination and the natura naturans; in Shelley 
the power of the natura naturans is ubiquitous and yet it appears to work in an 
antagonistic fashion towards “mortal power.” For Harold Bloom, this un-
Wordsworthian conception of nature is at the heart of Shelley’s creativity in “Mont 
Blanc”: 
The head, in “Mont Blanc,” learns, like Blake, that there is no natural 
religion. There is a Power, a secret strength of things, but it hides its 
true shape or its shapelessness behind or beneath a dread mountain, 
and it shows itself only as an indifference, or even pragmatically a 
malevolence, towards the well-being of men.6 
 
This is a sublime encounter, but unlike the Kantian experience of the sublime, which 
acts to inspire the creative imagination by recognising its own limits, or “cannot be 
contained in any sensuous form, but rather concerns ideas of reason, which, 
although no adequate presentation of them is possible, may be aroused and called to 
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mind by that very inadequacy itself which does admit of sensuous presentation,”7 the 
sublime experience is here clearly presented in a self-contained, sensuous form. This 
Shelleyan experience is one that promotes the immutability of the natural world in 
relation to the romantic imagination. Shelley’s conceptualisation of the sublime 
therefore lies closer to an empirical conception such as Burke’s than to Kant’s 
transcendental conception. The power lies not in the workings of reason but in the 
empirical world itself.  
     The reason for Shelley’s empirical conception of the sublime is likely to lie in the 
influence of French materialism and necessarian doctrines which, though Shelley 
himself proclaimed to have dispelled them in his essay “On Life” (1815),8 clearly 
still influenced his overall philosophical and poetical framework. However, in the 
poem Shelley also hints at the potential power of the imagination as an 
epiphenomenon of the power of the Arve. Shelley apostrophises: 
             Dizzy Ravine! And when I gaze on thee 
I seem as in a trance sublime and strange 
To muse on my own separate phantasy, 
My own, my human mind, which passively  
Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
Holding an unremitting interchange  
With the clear universe of things around;     (34-40) 
                                                     
Shelley admits an influence “seems” to act upon his mind, akin to that as upon 
Wordsworth in “Tintern Abbey” and it sends the poet into a kind of “trance 
sublime.” The repetition of “my own,” “My own, my human mind” sets the tone in 
an almost equally antagonistic stance towards the external world. The repetition of 
the possessive pronoun emphasises Shelley’s own agency in this dramatisation of 
the dialectic between the intelligible and the sensuous realms. This perhaps points to 
the fact that Shelley at certain junctures in the poem does actually entertain the 
possibility of a more Kantian experience of the sublime, centred in his own 
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awakened imagination. The reality is that Shelley is expressing the experience of a 
dialectical aporia, which remains unresolved, or more precisely non-progressive, 
within the space of the poem. The injunction “I seem” further adds to the ambiguity 
of Shelley’s actual experience within the valley, whereas Wordsworth is of course 
much more affirmative about the transcendental nature of these experiences. The 
phrase “unremitting interchange” however points towards a more Wordsworthian 
sense of a positive dialectic between the mind and nature. Shelley further references 
the powers of the imagination in the next lines of the poem:    
One legion of wild thoughts, whose wandering wings 
Now float above thy darkness, and now rest 
Where that or thou art no unbidden guest, 
In the still cave of the witch Poesy, 
Seeking among the shadows that pass by, 
Ghosts of all things that are, some shade of thee, 
Some phantom, some faint image; till the breast 
From which they fled recalls them, thou art there!      (41-47) 
                                                              
These lines most clearly exhibit the uncertainty raging in Shelley’s rubric of 
Romanticism at this point in his career. The “cave of the witch Poesy” we can read 
on the one hand as alluding to Plato’s metaphor of the cave.9 The “legion of wild 
thoughts” are given an autonomous gloss in that they “float above” the darkness of 
the ravine, but the thoughts themselves rest within the Platonic cave. This illustrates 
the confusion in Shelley’s epistemology between, on the one hand the sense that the 
thoughts of the imagination govern all perception, precede and transcend the 
“darkness” of the exterior world and that on the other, they inhabit the space of the 
Platonic cave and therefore remain in a secondary state of being in a dualistic Ousia. 
Furthermore, the indication that these “thoughts” seek “among the shadows that pass 
by” some “shade of thee” (the darkness and the valley itself), illustrates a reversal of 
the first figure in which they “floated above” the darkness of the ravine: now they 
seek amongst dark interior shadows  “some shade of thee” the true nature of the 
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Arve. Additionally, the sensuous sound patterns of the ravine itself that echo “the 
Arve’s commotion” (30) are superseded by the intelligible pattern of the mind 
receiving reflections of shadows of the Arve, as symbol of a transcendent power. In 
short, Shelley moves from physical description, analogically, to a description of the 
interior mind, as does Wordsworth in “Tintern Abbey.” The difference for Shelley is 
that where Wordsworth gains a sense of equipoise through problematising the 
boundaries between the inner and the outer, Shelley switches his ontology between a 
transcendental idealism and a psychophysical parallelism whereby the mind is an 
“echo” or epiphenomenon of the exterior universe. The lines “till the breast/ from 
which they fled recalls them, thou art there!” adds to the ambiguity of Shelley’s 
ontology, because these lines seem to imply an absolute idealism in that the valley is 
itself lodged as pure representation in his own imagination. These idealistic lines can 
be read in terms of Shelley using the analogy of the outer landscape—the invisible 
heights of the mountain, which cast the powerful river downwards—to represent his 
own imagination, casting out thoughts.  
      In the third section of the poem Shelley spells out his divided ontological 
position in the clearest terms, after describing the possible geographical processes 
that went into the production of the ravine he claims: 
             The wilderness has a mysterious tongue 
Which teaches awful doubt, or faith so mild, 
So solemn, so serene, that man may be 
But for such faith with nature reconciled.      (76-79) 
 
Thus for Shelley one can either retain a Wordsworthian pantheism that culminates in 
his organicist ontology, or the “awful doubt” which can be attributed to Coleridge’s 
dualistic ontology and the unhappy consciousness as expressed in poems such as 
“Dejection” and “Constancy.” The use of antithesis indicates the starkness of the 
mystery to which the romantic poets commit themselves. Interestingly, whereas 
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Wordsworth in “Tintern Abbey” proceeds from contemplation of the natural scene 
before interiorising the trope and disembodying the imagery, to the point where we 
“become a living soul”(47), Shelley keeps up constant reference to the wilderness, 
and the over-riding power of the external world, signifying the influence of 
necessarian doctrines and materialism. At the commencement of part 5 Shelley 
proclaims: “Mont Blanc yet gleams on high: the Power is there” (127), commencing 
the crescendo of the poem with a positive affirmation of the power of nature. He 
thus appears to have settled on a perspective whereby the “Power” resides in 
empirical nature, and not within the imaginative realm. However his final, famously 
ambiguous lines, conclude with the apostrophe: 
             And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, 
If to the human mind’s imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy?      (142-144) 
                                                     
The question is ambiguous, and can be read in two ways. The lines can firstly be 
read as Shelley’s implication that the power of the Shelleyan sublime is negated by 
virtue of the fact that without the power of the imagination the external world is a 
vacancy. This reading implies that even though there is a power that emanates from 
the external and beauteous forms of nature, this power can only be activated by 
“unremitting interchange” with the human imagination. This is a more 
Wordsworthian reading of the conclusion. In contrast, one may also read the final 
lines as claiming that the silence and solitude of Mont Blanc could be pure vacancy, 
giving a sense once again of materialism, or natura naturata, without any hidden 
power—in other words the idea that the landscape is unresponsive to the poet’s 
imaginative wanderings. This correlates with the sense of  “awful doubt” alluded to 
earlier in the poem. This second reading points to the idea that the poet may have 
hypostatised a false ontology, and therefore removes the possibility of any idealism, 
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whether transcendental or psychological. Shelley cannot resist but plunge the reader 
back into the antithetical tone that has permeated the whole of the poem, whereby 
the poet remains undecided on the two alternatives, without the positive 
metaphysical equipoise achieved by Wordsworth. (Wordsworth further hypostatises 
a state of recognition between himself and his sister, via the medium of the natural 
landscape, something further not available to Shelley).  
     I.J. Kapstein reads the final lines of the poem in the sense of a slave (the poet’s 
imagination) responding to his master (the sublime wilderness), in defiance; a 
reading that further adds to the dialectical, and unresolved, nature of the poem: 
Indeed the tone of the lines gives the only consistency to their 
ambiguity. For in whatever sense they are read Shelley seems to be 
asserting the ironic attitude of a slave towards his master. The slave, 
admitting his master’s power over him, yet resentful that he is a 
slave, consoles himself by saying that if it were not for his existence 
as a slave his master’s power would have no significance. Or again, 
the slave in self-consolation says that his master’s power rises from 
the labor of the slave which converts the raw materials supplied by 
the master into objects of value.10 
 
The Hegelian connotations are clear: the master slave dialectic is displaced into the 
relationship between Shelley’s imagination and the external world and the implicit 
need for a form of recognition, or an I-Thou relationship. The essential importance 
of this reading is that it shows that the poet finds himself in a distinctly un-
Wordsworthian relationship with the natural world. The metre and the subject matter 
of the poem are often Wordsworthian, but the antithetical tone and the inherent 
ambiguities in the poem illustrate the fact that Shelley is enslaved within a non-
progressive dialectic between the imagination and the natural world. At the closure 
of the poem we have a situation far from equipoise, and certainly not of unity. In the 
corpus of British romantic poetry, this was to be the beginning of the end of the 
Wordsworthian conception of the natural world. Shelley had demarcated a state 
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whereby the enquiring imagination, looking beyond the natural world as envisaged 
by Wordsworth, was to attempt a transcendence of Spirit (or imagination). This 
transcendence could not be accommodated through a dialogical interchange between 
the mind and the natural world. Shelley’s slave in effect attempts to overthrow the 
master, and in so doing attempts a revolution of the imagination. Consequently, 
Shelley unconsciously returns the subject to a state of deworlded subjectivity, or 
alienation from the natural world.  
     Shelley’s sense of alienation from nature is further illustrated by his attitude in 
letters written whilst composing “Mont Blanc.” This vacillates between an 
acknowledgment of Buffon’s biogeography as outlined in Histoire naturelle, 
générale et particulière (1749–1788) and a more mystical but nevertheless nihilistic 
dualism of the Indian mythology of Orozmazes and Ahrimanes: the spirit of warmth 
versus the spirit of darkness, cold and death, as symbolized by Mont Blanc itself. 
Shelley wrote in a letter to his friend T.L. Peacock, who had already used the 
esoteric doctrine of Orozmazes and Ahrimanes in his earlier poetry:  
I will not pursue Buffon’s sublime but gloomy theory, that this earth 
which we inhabit will at some future period be changed into a mass 
of frost. Do you who assert the supremacy of Ahriman imagine him 
throned among these desolating snows, among these palaces of death 
and frost, sculptured in this their terrible magnificence by the 
unsparing hand of necessity, & that he casts around him as the first 
essays of his final usurpation avalanches, torrents, rocks & 
thunders—and above all, these deadly glaciers at once the proofs and 
symbols of his reign [sic].11 
 
On two levels therefore Shelley asserts an alienating and nihilistic doctrine of 
nature, one scientific and the other mystical. Shelley’s own atheism it is interesting 
to note, only adds to his sense of alienation. Even for Coleridge, Christianity 
remained something through which he could rescue his faith in nature, and he used 
the doctrine of the theodicy of the landscape not only in “Frost at Midnight” but also 
 187 
in his own poem, which was set (although not written) in the Vale of Chaumony, 
“Chaumony; the Hour Before Sunrise. A Hymn”(1802).12 Coleridge’s Unitarian 
theosophy (at times, not always) helped save him from the form of doubt that 
Shelley, the atheist, was prone to. This is one of the reasons for Shelley’s intellectual 
philosophy and for his ontological aporia, played out in his imaginary envisioning of 
Mont Blanc. Christian thinkers such as Coleridge and Wordsworth ultimately had 
the back up of their religious convictions to bolster a fortiori their metaphysical 
commitments; this was not available to Shelley.    
 
3. Visionary alienation in “Alastor” 
“Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude” (1816) was actually written before “Mont 
Blanc” but dramatises the inner tension that the poet felt between his visionary 
yearnings and the external world. The title itself is riddled with ambiguity: the 
original Greek term means evil genius.13 It would appear therefore that the visionary 
poet, who rejects society and nature in favour of his own visions is pursued by an 
evil spirit, which stems from the spirit of solitude. I believe this points to Shelley’s 
sense of uncertainty with regards to the moral dimension of his visions, and his 
ambiguous epistemic standpoint with regards to the natural world. The title could 
also be ironic, in that many of Wordsworth’s former works often dealt with solitude, 
and that having recently read The Excursion (1814) both Percy and Mary were 
disappointed with Wordsworth’s later work, which they classed as traitorous to his 
earlier radicalism.14 Moreover, the opening quote of the poem is lifted from The 
Excursion, although it has been argued that this is also an ironic reference to 
Wordsworth’s perceived apostasy by Shelley, and that the framing device is a 
pastiche of the original Wordsworthian position. Earl Wasserman claims: 
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The framing structure of the two narratives is the same: in place of 
Wordsworth’s Wanderer, a disciple of nature who tells Margaret’s 
story and laments her early death, there is Shelley’s Narrator, who 
tells of the Visionary and might well subscribe to Wordsworth’s 
claim that the external world and the individual mind are exquisitely 
“fitted” to each other. […] To Shelley, Wordsworth has not set his 
sights high enough and has defined man’s spirit too mundanely, too 
humanly: the truly good who are soonest taken out of life are not 
those with unwavering and devoted hope for, and faith in, an absent 
human love, but those who aspire to a vision that is absent because it 
can have no existence on earth.15 
 
This reading of the framing device is key to the dialectical situation Shelley finds 
himself in. In effect, Shelley is trying to go beyond the Wordsworthian sense of 
metaphysical equipoise to new visionary heights. Therefore, in “Alastor,” he 
displaces the Wordsworthian motif into a visionary character, who attempts to go 
further and attempts to delve beyond the secrets of nature and in so doing to move 
centrifugally beyond the natural world as representation of the infinite. Wasserman 
further claims of the design of the poem: 
…the Visionary seeks an Absolute which will match his mind’s 
perfect conceptions and ideals and, to use the language of “Oh! there 
are spirits,” [a poem supposedly dedicated to Coleridge] alone can 
answer his demands. Unlike the Narrator, who can boast that the 
creations of his nature are his “kindred” (15), the Visionary, moulded 
by his own visions, by nature’s best impulses, and by the true, good, 
and beautiful that philosophers have taught, early left his “alienated 
home” (76), an exile without kindred but filled with an insatiable 
need for some essence with which he can identify himself.16 
 
 The alienated home, upon a Hegelian reading, is also a symbol for the “station 
along the way” at which Wordsworth finds himself in his organicist conception. 
Shelley is attempting to manoeuvre to a position beyond this, and in so doing has 
become dialectically alienated from his literal home and his home in the world. For 
Shelley there is no sense of Gefühl, and no sense of discovering a home embodied 
for example in the Vale of Grasmere. Importantly, he has not lost his spiritual and 
literal home as has Coleridge, but has chosen to exile himself. His is a movement 
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through the veil of the natural world. His “insatiable need for some essence with 
which he can identify himself” is the late-romantic urge towards some telos, which 
is not pantheistically experienced through the medium of the natural world. 
Shelley’s poetry as such becomes in a sense disembodied, as he simply will not be 
able to experience the higher visions within the realm of the corporeal. This theme 
of an even higher, or as I have labelled it, centrifugal quest, Bloom correctly claims 
is in the lineage of Wordsworth and Coleridge. Bloom however fails to couch his 
argument in Hegelian terms, which pinpoints the precise nature of the movement 
between the three poets. 
Such a theme [an infinite Sehnsucht in the form of a quest leading to 
the poet’s untimely death] would not have been acceptable to 
Wordsworth or Coleridge, and yet it is the legitimate offspring of 
their own art and imaginative theory. Indeed, Alastor is prompted by 
The Excursion, and echoes both the Intimations Ode and Kubla 
Khan.17 
 
Shelley is trying to attain a transcendence of Wordsworthian organicism, which for 
his metaphysics falls short of The One, or Absolute, and in so doing he attempts to 
supersede the position of his two exemplars.18 
     For Shelley then, there is a divide here between on the one hand the narrator’s 
Wordsworthian reconciliation with nature, and on the other the visionary’s attempt 
to move dialectically beyond this position. This is a dichotomy examined in other 
poems by Shelley, such as the “Song of Pan” and “Song of Apollo” (1820).19 
Shelley then explores a form of the Hegelian unhappy consciousness, where the 
ideal form has returned dialectically into itself, after seeking some form of 
recognition in the experience of the natural world. In centrifugally moving away 
from an embodied representation of itself, (embodied in the natural landscape) it 
seeks a new adequation beyond nature. In Hegel’s words it can no longer “toil itself” 
into the form of a concrete figuration. Rather than attempting to toil itself into the 
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empirical world, the idea is attempting to transcend the world as represented by 
nature in the work of art. For Hegel philosophy takes over; for Shelley, aesthetics is 
the vehicle for this adequation of the Absolute/One.  
     The poem commences with a sense of a yearning in the opening invocation to the 
“Great Parent” (45) by the main narrator, who, in love with nature, has “cherished 
these my kindred…” (15). However, there is an eschatological bent in the gothic 
imagery that the narrator invokes, as he continues: 
            And my heart ever gazes on the depth 
Of thy deep mysteries. I have made my bed 
In charnels and on coffins, where black death 
Keeps record of the trophies won from thee, 
Hoping to still these obstinate questionings      (22-26) 
                                               
Shelley’s narrator, whilst loving the natural world for what existentially is, has still 
questionings that lead beyond the mortal world. Whilst he is projected by Shelley as 
the archetypal Wordsworthian poet of nature, he also provides us with the narrative 
of Shelley’s alter ego: the visionary, who has taken the next dialectical step in 
attempting to realise his ideal vision. Once the framing device is in place with the 
narrative of the visionary wanderer, we find that he visits “The awful ruins of the 
days of old” (108)20 in order to seek timeless truths. Later, the narrator claims that 
“…he saw/ The thrilling secrets of the birth of time.” (127-8) in the temple of 
Denderah in upper Egypt. This encounter suggests that ultimate truths are discerned 
by and exhibited in man’s representation of the universe in his aesthetic products. 
Shelley is self-consciously attempting to go beyond nature as representation of the 
infinite, and finding, in the same way as Hegel, higher truths represented in 
aesthetics rather than in the contemplation of raw nature. These are truths which are 
embodied, and in a Hegelian sense, at the primitive and symbolic stage of 
representation; they are still however higher approximations of the concrete 
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universal than contemplation of nature. In the next lines of the poem the narrator 
moves beyond this concretised representation to his attempt at a higher, more 
spiritual Gestalt. This process is metaphorically figured with the appearance of the 
Arab maiden, who attempts, but fails, to wake the visionary from his reverie and 
enfold him in sensuous, corporeal love. Finally however, she returns to her “cold 
home/ Wildered, and wan, and panting, she returned.” (138-9). At this point the 
visionary has witnessed (what are for him) the highest, and still imperfect 
representations of The One, and has rejected (perhaps unknowingly) the advances of 
the beautiful Arab maiden. This marks the section of the poem after which the 
visionary can find no embodiment for his vision, and the true hamartia of his quest 
begins to take hold. 
     The poet next dreams of the “veiled maid” (151), an idealised vision, which as in 
“Kubla Khan,” is available to the dreamer’s reverie, but once awakened the vision 
has gone. This is an autoerotic vision, and the poet is in fact projecting his own 
ideal-other in the guise of the dream-figure. In some of the most erotic lines in 
Shelley we are informed: 
         …He reared his shuddering limbs and quelled 
His gasping breath, and spread his arms to meet 
Her panting bosom:… she drew back a while, 
Then, yielding to the irresistible joy, 
With frantic gesture and short breathless cry 
Folded his frame in her dissolving arms. 
Now blackness veiled his dizzy eyes, and night 
Involved and swallowed up the vision; sleep, 
Like a dark flood suspended in its course, 
Rolled back its impulse on his vacant brain.      (182-191) 
  
Shelley uses a series of erotically-charged verbs and participles to invoke the erotic 
frenzy of the visionary, “shuddering” “gasping” and “panting,” and describes the 
scene in equally erotic adjectival phrases, “the irresistible joy” and “short breathless 
cry.” However, Shelley depicts an awareness of the overall illusory effect of the 
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imagery by using simple pentameter in uniform with the rest of the poem and 
therefore restraining the passionate content within a regular rhythm. On line 190, 
sleep “Like a dark flood suspended in its course,” once again clears the mind—sleep 
signifies the reality principle, which makes his brain “vacant” once again. This is 
the sad truth for the visionary: his brain will in effect remain “vacant” with regards 
to these illusory visions he pursues. The only true reality seems to be his empirical 
experience. Unfortunately, this does not suffice, and the narrator comments on the 
visionary’s newfound situation a few lines further on: 
                           …His wan eyes 
Gaze on the empty scene as vacantly  
As ocean’s moon looks on the moon in heaven. 
The spirit of sweet human love has sent 
A vision to the sleep of him who spurned  
Her choicest gifts. He eagerly pursues 
Beyond the realms of dream that fleeting shade; 
He overleaps the bounds…        (200-207) 
 
The word “vacantly” is repeated and in this context he gazes vacantly because his 
mind (brain) has become vacant, and as such his empirical experience no longer 
works in an interchange with his mind. This is because the ideal vision of the 
maiden has forced him dialectically into the next shape of consciousness—which for 
Hegel would be disclosure of reason as Ousia. For the poetic aesthete however, the 
mind searches for continued interchange between the mind and the empirical 
world—in a sense his mental sinews continue to work in the way they are 
accustomed. Here, as with Coleridge, we have a punctum of Shelley’s Romanticism; 
the realisation of a space beyond the sensuous, however a noetic praxis for which 
the poet is unable to legislate, due to his continued reliance on aesthetics as the final 
cipher of The One.  
     The only recourse for the poet, at this impasse, is to countenance the 
conceptualisation of death. Therefore, he faces a choice between eschatology and a 
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life–affirming realisation of the concrete universal. Shelley utilises his latent 
Platonism, and pursues a dualistic solution to his aporia. This leads to a rhetorical 
question and ensuing aporetic exclamations: 
                                          …Alas, alas! 
Were limbs, and breath, and being intertwined  
Thus treacherously? Lost, lost, for ever lost 
In the wide pathless desert of dim sleep, 
That beautiful shape! Does the dark gate of death 
Conduct to thy mysterious paradise, 
O sleep? Does the bright arch of rainbow clouds, 
And pendent mountains seen in the calm lake, 
Lead only to a black and watery depth, 
While death’s blue vault, with loathliest vapours hung,      (207-216) 
                                                       
Shelley feels the pull of death and the questioning in his, as in Hamlet’s, mind. He 
ponders whether or not after death we re-enter a lost paradise, a Shelleyan paradise 
stripped of all Christian lore, but holding hope for a return to the ideal visions visited 
upon him in mortal sleep. He cannot embrace death in life and therefore death 
remains an abstract entity for the poet—and this factor functions as an adjunct to his 
overall poetic enterprise. Thus, Shelley remains in the state of the unhappy 
consciousness, and this unhappy consciousness will act antithetically within the 
framework of the poem: the poet will be haunted by the visions for which he once 
sought in vain. This is due to the failure on the part of the visionary to take the next 
dialectical step of absorbing death into the overall Hegelian Idea. Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty sums up the Hegelian movement of recognition of death in the 
conceptualisation of the concrete universal thus: 
Death is the negation of all particular given beings, and 
consciousness of death is a synonym for consciousness of the 
universal, but it is only an empty or abstract universal as long as we 
remain at this point. We cannot in fact conceive nothingness except 
against a background of being (or, as Sartre says, against the world). 
Therefore, any notion of death which claims to hold our attention is 
deceiving us, since it is in fact surreptitiously using our 
consciousness of being. To plumb our awareness of death, we must 
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transmute it into life, “interiorize” it, as Hegel said. The abstract 
universal which starts out opposed to life must be made concrete.21 
 
Shelley misses out on the crucial philosophical point here—that the “abstract 
universal which starts out opposed to life must be made concrete.” Wordsworth in 
effect absorbs the abstract concepts of nature and death into his organic conception 
and therefore formulates a partial conception of the concrete universal through his 
aesthetics. Shelley goes beyond the abstract conceptualisation of nature to a vision 
rooted in the realm of the ideal. However, this movement does not entail the 
absorption of Nature into the overall Idea—it remains an abstract universal to 
Shelley. His only option to move to the next dialectical stage is to embrace death as 
part of the concrete universal—but instead death also remains for Shelley at the 
stage of abstract universal, and therefore he remains dialectically ‘lodged’ and 
unable to move to a new space or Gestalt. Henceforward, Shelley becomes for the 
rest of “Alastor” pursued by his own visions, or his own ironical demon. In fact, 
from a critical perspective, this is possibly the reason why the poem itself becomes 
at times repetitive and at times gratuitous, in the next 500 lines or so. For the 
remainder of the poem Shelley describes the visionary’s unhappy wanderings in 
nature, which eventually lead him to his own death.   
      The source of the imagination is interrogated using the symbol of a river—and 
again, as in Wordsworth and Coleridge, there is no definitive answer for the poet.22 
Indeed, the search turns out to be one for death itself, which though not intellectually 
embraced and subsumed within the Hegelian Idea, can at least be literally embraced:  
The meeting boughs and implicated leaves 
Wove twilight o’er the Poet’s path, as led  
By love, or dream, or god, or mightier Death, 
He sought in Nature’s dearest haunt, some bank, 
Her cradle, and his sepulchre…      (426-430) 
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After originally attempting to transcend nature, Shelley is now led by nature, but at 
the same time alienated by nature. What is nature’s “cradle” is antithetically the 
poet’s “sepulchre.” Wordsworth, in accepting nature as his mother, and the cradle of 
his psychology and imagination, reconciles himself to its otherwise abstract 
presence. In so doing, Wordsworth manages to transcend the romantic deworlded 
subjectivity he finds himself in at points in The Prelude. However, for Shelley, 
nature’s cradle becomes a grave for the alienated consciousness that has failed to 
absorb the ideal of the concrete universal. This image also implies that Shelley 
wishes to return to the source of life itself, but that this source can only be 
apprehended—if at all—in death. The narcissistic archetype that is explored in the 
poem is also reversed later when the poet catches a glimpse of himself in the pool, 
within the cavern:  
    Hither the Poet came. His eyes beheld  
Their own wan light through the reflected lines 
Of his thin hair, distinct in the dark depth 
Of that still fountain; as the human heart,  
Gazing in dreams over the gloomy grave, 
Sees its own treacherous likeness there…      (469-474) 
                                                   
The poet sees an aged and wretched version of his formerly beautiful visage, a 
visage that has now become distorted by its own solitary search for an ideal 
reflection of itself in the natural world. For Shelley, there is no form of recognition 
between the poet and the external world, and additionally no recognition beyond the 
immanent world of reality. The figure of the human heart glimpsing itself in 
“dreams over the gloomy grave” reinforces this point. But more than this, even in 
death, or in visions of death in dreams, the poet has little hope of any kind of 
recognitive knowledge; death’s likeness to the human is “treacherous.”  The poet is 
therefore alienated both in the world of empirical experience and eschatologically, 
as he finds no speculative recompense even in the possibility of a life after death.  
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     Later, the poet actually discovers the source of all thought and conceptualisation 
is indeed rooted within his own unhappy and divided consciousness. This, however, 
means that the poet gains no sense of recognition in anything exterior, and in going 
further into the subterranean cave he has entered he is in fact going further back into 
his own mind. He has discovered a solipsism for which therefore all speculations 
upon the natural world and death are introspective self-reflections, meaning that the 
poet has in fact embarked upon an inward path rather than on an outward spiritual 
search: 
                                         “O stream! 
Whose source is inaccessibly profound, 
Whither do thy mysterious waters tend? 
Thou imagest my life. Thy darksome stillness, 
Thy dazzling waves, thy loud and hollow gulphs, 
Thy searchless fountain and invisible course 
Have each their type in me:…      (502-508) 
                                                           
Shelley uses the symbol of the stream to represent his own mental excursion rather 
than any physical excursion into exterior space. The main reason for this is that 
Shelley has countenanced the physical world, and has been unable to formulate a 
recognitive relationship between his imagination and the alterity of the world. The 
poet’s consciousness turns back into itself, after its dialectical failure in establishing 
a higher Gestalt based upon interaction with the external world. Just as Wordsworth 
cannot determine any epistemological foundation for his poetics and experience in 
The Prelude “Who that shall point as with a wand, and say/ ‘This portion of the river 
of my mind/ Came from yon mountain?’” (1799, II, 247-49), so Shelley finds the 
river runs in an allegorical sense to his own mind. However, this is only due to the 
unhappy consciousness that the poet now falls prey to, and the fact that after 
dialectical breakdown everything becomes negatively interiorised for the poet. This 
allegory functions negatively because the poet has not interiorised nature as part of 
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the overall Idea, but instead has actually abstracted nature as an external allegorical 
correlative for the wanderings of his nous.  
     At the end of the poem, the poet begins to depict nature in a darker tone, more 
akin to the tone of “Mont Blanc.” Whilst one reading could be of the egotistical 
sublime, or the pathetic fallacy, I feel that the main point of this section, as in “Mont 
Blanc,” is concerned with the sublime indifference of nature to the wanderings and 
idealisms of the poet’s mind. After the poet has reached this point of self-imposed 
alienation, he senses, at his actual death, the sublime majesty and immutability of 
the external world. For example Shelley writes: 
…On every side now rose 
Rocks, which, in unimaginable forms, 
Lifted their black and barren pinnacles 
In the light of evening, and its precipice 
Obscuring the ravine, disclosed above, 
Mid toppling stones, black gulphs and yawning caves, 
Whose windings gave ten thousand various tongues 
To the loud stream…      (543-550) 
                                                         
Here the natural world once again exhibits the indifferent characteristics of the 
Shelleyan sublime as outlined in “Mont Blanc.” At the end of “Mont Blanc” Shelley 
posed a question regarding the relationship between the mind and the sublime 
universe; at the end of “Alastor” Shelley does not even need to pose this question—
his intercourse with the natural world has broken down and so he has migrated into 
his own psyche. The visions, which have “their voice in me” are all that remains for 
a poet dislocated from the natural landscape. In interiorising his visions, the poet 
remains eternally at one remove from the sublime world, and the only interaction 
that takes place is between the sublime caves and the loud stream, which has carried 
the poet to his mortal death. This sublime scene indeed teaches the poet  “awful 
doubt” as opposed to a Wordsworthian “faith so mild.” If Shelley loses his last 
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vestige of hope in death in “Alastor”, he regains faith in the afterlife by the final 
year of his own life, by the time he has composed the elegy, “Adonais.” 
 
4. Eschatological projection in “Adonais.” 
In “Adonais” Shelley attempts to formulate an anagogical solution to his dialectical 
impasse and state of unhappy consciousness. Because Shelley’s hopes of 
reconciliation with The One are transcendental, and now remain outside the confines 
of the empirical world, he actually writes a poem whereupon he attempts to 
construct an eschatology based around Keats’ death. This is constructed in order for 
him to formulate a connection to the dead poet Keats in the afterlife, and to give rise 
to his own, transcendental hopes, due to his failure to acquire an aesthetic 
recognition through his abstraction of the natural world in poems such as “Alastor” 
and “Mont Blanc.”  
     The large body of the poem takes the form of the traditional funeral elegy,23 
however when it comes to the traditional reconciliation of the poet with fate, Shelley 
writes an extended section on Keats’ place in the celestial sphere. Shelley’s hopes 
are projected eschatologically onto Keats in a metaphysical space, as Coleridge’s 
were projected teleologically onto Hartley and existentially onto Sara. The 
philosophical implication is that Shelley has also constructed a compositum out of 
available segments of empirical experience (and perhaps his own inner dreams or 
visions) and therefore treats the external universe as an abstract universal. This 
leads in Hegelian terms to a further incomplete recognitive picture of the universe, 
which can only take place by virtue of a conceptualisation of the fully concrete 
universal.   
     Woodman claims that Shelley’s model for “Adonais” is taken from Dante’s 
poetic model as outlined in the second tractate of the Convivio. Dante outlines four 
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hermeneutical spheres of meaning in the Convivio, which are the literal, allegorical, 
moral and anagogical. However, for Dante, correct functionality at the level of the 
literal has important consequences for the other hermeneutical spheres, as Woodman 
claims:  
Drawing an analogy from Aristotle’s Physics, he [Dante] argues that 
the literal level may be considered as the matter, while the other 
levels may be considered as the form. Unless the matter is properly 
set forth, it will be impossible either to impose a form upon it or to 
interpret its meaning.24  
 
This has important consequences when applied to Shelley’s post-Dantean poem. 
Shelley attempts to separate the literal (or material/empirical) from the 
transcendental realm “the white radiance of Eternity” (463). However, in so doing 
he creates a philosophical rupture, or a dualism, whereby the poet can only delve 
into abstract reasoning without an Aristotelian anchor in the material world. In a 
sense, Shelley has unconsciously reversed Dante’s original model, a model that 
would be more applicable to a poet who actually anchors his aesthetic in the material 
world, such as Wordsworth. However, due to his ‘Orphic’ poetic temperament, 
Shelley seeks an imaginative autonomy from the literal world, a world which is 
symbolised by Keats’ destruction by the critics.25 Dante’s Aristotelian schema 
renders his work more unified as an aesthetic whole; it is unified in the sense that the 
literal and anagogical are symbiotically tied together, giving a more unified poetic 
conception of the universe at large. Dante can see in the figure of the earth an 
allegorical connection to God’s heavenly grace and power, as does Wordsworth 
through his organic aesthetic. In contrast, Shelley’s consciousness will remain 
unhappy and divided, projecting all of his hopes into a disembodied eschatological 
sphere. Woodman further claims of Dante: 
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At the end of the Paradiso, therefore, he is not left suspended in an 
“intense inane”; on the contrary, he is able to return to this world, his 
sense purified and sanctified, and see in earthly love the emblem of 
God’s Grace.26 
 
Dante’s gain from this quadruple schema works in opposite fashion to that of 
Shelley, who actually loses (in an attempt to transcend) the literal level of 
signification. This movement in Shelley begins to take place in stanza 26, where 
Urania admits that she is unable to follow Adonais into the transcendental sphere of 
the heavens as she is chained to the natural world “…my Adonais! I would give/ All 
that I am to be as thou now art!/ But I am chained to Time, and cannot thence 
depart!” (232-34). Urania lives on in a dejected state in the sublunary sphere of the 
cyclical natural world, however she remains “chained to Time” and thus not 
ultimately free as is Adonais’ spirit in “the white radiance of eternity.”  
     Shelley further develops his eschatology when he describes Adonais’ 
metaphysical position relative to people living in the natural sphere: 
Peace, peace! He is not dead, he doth not sleep— 
He hath awakened from the dream of life— 
‘Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep 
With phantoms an unprofitable strife, 
And in mad trance, strike with our spirit’s knife 
Invulnerable nothings.—We decay 
Like corpses in a charnel; fear and grief 
Convulse us and consume us day by day, 
   And cold hopes swarm like worms within our living clay.     (343-351)       
                                                               
This paradoxical inversion of life and death perfectly epitomises Shelley’s final 
ontological solution to the aporetic position of his narrator, implicit in “Mont Blanc” 
and explicit in “Alastor.” Shelley attains a kind of infinite absolute negativity but in 
the sense that he has negated the finite and particular in favour of the infinite and 
transcendental, again one aspect of the Idea, but not the whole. This is in fact a 
similarly incomplete conception of the Idea as that of Solger, discussed in Chapter 
One. In fact, this conception is even more negative to that of Solger, who, even if he 
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still clung to infinite absolute negativity, still appreciated a conception of the infinite 
within the finite, as do Dante and Wordsworth. This is also the reason for the fact 
that Shelley resists the romantic irony of either the Frühromantiker or his friend and 
contemporary Byron, who remained in the same sense of Urania, chained to time, 
and chained to infinite absolute negativity. Although we are “lost in stormy visions” 
and “strike at invulnerable nothings” in the sublunary sphere, which points towards 
romantic irony, Shelley develops a binary structure between the transcendental 
sphere and the sublunary and hypostatises a violent hierarchy by privileging the 
“white radiance of Eternity.”    
     Shelley also inverts the Wordsworthian connection to nature, which was 
organically conceived in the living mind of the visionary poet, and switches his 
pantheism so that it is the spirit of the dead Keats that is experienced in the natural 
world. In doing so he self-consciously deflates traditional Christian eschatology, and 
develops a paganistic conception of The One to the point where the poet Keats is 
heard in all of nature’s music: 
He is made one with Nature: there is heard 
His voice in all her music, from the moan 
Of thunder, to the song of night’s sweet bird; 
He is a presence to be felt and known 
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone, 
Spreading itself where’er that Power may move  
Which has withdrawn his being to its own;      (370-76) 
                                                       
In this section Shelley makes a reference to “that Power” which is the power that 
moves Shelley when he experiences the sublime in “Mont Blanc.” Shelley has here 
formulated an anagogical conception of the formerly mysterious power of Mont 
Blanc that “dwells apart in its tranquillity” (96). He has not however embodied this 
“Power” in an earthly aesthetic experience, but has used prosopopeia to figuratively 
present the “Power” as the spirit of Keats. He has in fact disembodied the power in 
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presenting it in the guise of a human spirit and the marriage of mind and nature 
experienced in Wordsworth becomes an estrangement in the trope of Shelley as he 
attempts to move dialectically beyond Wordsworth’s visionary scheme. Shelley 
plays with the fantasy of suicide and disembodiment at the end of the poem when he 
declares of himself: 
            The breath whose might I have invoked in song 
Descends on me; my spirit’s bark is driven, 
Far from the shore, far from the trembling throng 
Whose sails were never to the tempest given; 
The massy earth and sphered skies are riven! 
I am borne darkly, fearfully, afar: 
Whilst burning through the inmost veil of Heaven, 
The soul of Adonais, like a star, 
      Beacons from the abode where the Eternal are.      (487-495) 
 
 Shelley projects a connection to The One by infiltrating the bounds of “the massy 
earth and sphered skies.” His “spirit’s bark is driven,/ Far from the shore,” the shore 
symbolising on one hand the earthly sphere, and on the other the literal level, to 
which there will be no Dantean return. A further reversal of the concrete universal 
conception of the Idea, which is to recognise value in life by interiorising death 
takes place here. Death and its eschatological implications are for Shelley used as an 
anodyne to the vagaries of the earthly sphere, and this alterity is that which 
ultimately keeps Shelley’s aesthetic divided. Life is alienated from death, and death 
as being-opposed-to life becomes even more abstract to Shelley than to any other 
romantic poet. The Orphic tendency of Shelley’s apocalyptic vision reaches its 
apotheosis at the end of “Adonais”, in Woodman’s critique: 
Death is the awakening to life, to that ultimate self-knowledge which 
is the goal of Eros and the purpose of the Orphic purification rites. In 
his moral defence, Shelley could argue that in his apocalyptic vision 
he reveals his own “metaphysical anatomy.” Within the womb of 
Urania, which is the womb of time, it takes shape. He is now ready to 
leave the womb of his “melancholy mother” (20), sever the umbilical 
cord that attaches him to the mythological vision of Necessity, and 
find his proper abode in the kingdom of pure mind. Viewed from 
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within the womb of Urania, the reality of death, which is the 
awakening to life, cannot be perceived.27 
 
Therefore, any self-knowledge for Shelley is gained through death, but not in the 
Hegelian sense of a concrete universal conception of the Idea. As Woodman rightly 
claims, it is only by severing “the umbilical cord” to Urania and the realm of 
necessity that Shelley realises this eschatological vision. The “white radiance of 
eternity” is always just beyond the earthly sphere, and is symbolised by Lucifer, the 
morning star. In a sense this, also in Dantean fashion, is the second circle, something 
available to Shelley once he shatters the “dome of many-coloured glass” (462) that 
keeps us in a prismatic trap. Of course, this apocalyptic vision gives no sense 
whatsoever of an equipoise between the two binary realms of the inner/outer, 
intelligible/sensible. The precariousness of this vision, which remains un-rooted and 
unreceptive to the empirical world would ultimately come back to haunt Shelley in 
his final, unfinished poem, “The Triumph of Life.” 
 
5. Wonder, transfiguration and irony in “The Triumph of Life”  
By the time Shelley was composing his final poem, it appeared that sceptical 
idealism had once again taken a firm hold of his ontological outlook. The “Triumph 
of Life” is a Trionfi influenced by the work of Petrarch and Dante.28 In this poem the 
narrator goes through a series of visionary experiences, prompted by ontological 
questions and a final (at the unfinished stage of the poem) apparent receptivity to the 
overcoming influence of “Life.” On my philosophical reading, Shelley affirms an 
ascent to the knowing of negative knowledge—the only things we can know are 
necessarily restricted by our receptivity to the ‘blinding’ influence of life upon our 
mind. In fact, “The Triumph of Life” as we have it handed down, is Shelley’s most 
powerful assent to romantic irony, and the necessary restrictions placed upon our 
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metaphysical knowledge. As such, it moves away from the positive metaphysical, 
and anagogical presuppositions of “Adonais.”  
     Shelley himself wrote in “On Life” about life’s often antagonistic relationship to 
our understanding as a whole, and certainly its opposition to any holistic or meta-
narratorial form of understanding: 
We are struck with admiration at some of its transient modifications, 
but it is itself the great miracle. What are the changes of empires, the 
wreck of dynasties, with the opinions which supported them; what is 
the birth and the extinction of religious and political systems to 
life?”29 
 
The rhetorical question Shelley poses summarises what is his final position with 
regards to “Life”; life is in opposition to all that happens within it; or it is as a 
dynamic plenum and is filled with events that take place, contingently and 
historically. In the final instance moreover, one cannot take a step back and look at 
life from outside the plenum. It is in this sense that Shelley points the way toward 
negative forms of knowing and the contingent and historical nature of our 
experience. Shelley hereby once again brushes with a form of infinite absolute 
negativity, in that he has restricted any knowledge of the infinite into our knowledge 
of the immanent world. However, again like the critic Solger, he still demonstrates 
only a partial awareness of the fully Hegelian Idea. This poem is the culmination of 
Shelley’s metaphysical speculations, and his dialectical movement back into the 
corporeal world after the eschatological idealism of “Adonais”. Butter comments on 
Shelley’s lineage up until this final poem of his career: 
   There is no discontinuity between The Triumph and Shelley’s 
earlier poems, though there is a change of emphasis. Two things are 
present in him from start to finish—aspiration towards intellectual 
beauty and perception of some shadow of that beauty in people and 
things on earth. Both in his life and in his work he always found it 
difficult to combine the two, but he never wholly renounced either.30 
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This continuity of these two aspirations is dialectical, and the change of emphasis in 
“The Triumph of Life” is to that of the “shadow of intellectual beauty” or a 
representation of The One, within the earthly sphere. Unfortunately, this appears 
unattainable, as Shelley claims in the poem “The world can hear not the sweet notes 
that move/ The sphere whose light is melody to lovers—/A wander worthy of his 
[Dante’s] rhyme.” (479-481). There is a dualism inherent in this narrative, however 
one which is unrecognisable to the masses in the sublunary sphere. In point of fact, 
Shelley has been all but deserted by his anagogical hopes of “Adonais.” The allusion 
to Dante is clear, and in this poem Shelley implicitly acknowledges that Dante, 
through his four-fold system rooted in the literal, had indeed successfully returned 
from metaphysical spheres to represent “Love” to men on earth: 
Behold a wander worthy of the rhyme 
 
“Of him who from the lowest depths of Hell, 
Through every Paradise and through all glory, 
Love led serene, and who returned to tell 
 
“In words of hate and awe the wondrous story 
    How all things are transfigured, except Love;      (471-476)    
                                                        
Dante’s concrete universal experience of the Idea is explicitly recognised by Shelley 
as something unattainable by most mortals, including Shelley himself up to and 
including “Adonais.” This recognition of Dante’s has remained inaccessible to 
Shelley, or has at least been something that Shelley has only been successful at 
rendering symbolically or mythologically, in poems such as Prometheus Unbound.  
     This negative recognition of Shelley’s, whereby he turns to negative forms of 
knowing, is the driving force behind what I feel are the perspectivist dimensions of 
the poem (which function in the same sense as the later Cubism of Braques and 
Picasso)—the inability of the narrator to fix on any steady unchanging, constant 
imagery within the poem itself—something that is echoed by the character of 
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Rousseau in the poem. All that is available as knowledge in the poem are the series 
of ‘transfigurations’ alluded to in the passage above. Transfiguration is indeed the 
central theme of the poem. The first transfiguration takes place after the poet 
watches the sunrise and, having lain awake all night, falls into a visionary trance, 
whereupon a vision on his “brain was rolled” (40) at the onset of day. This 
transfiguration leads the narrator to the experience of the stream of people who are 
moving without any ontological (or truly spiritual knowledge) of the path they are 
on, the path of Life— “All hastening onward, yet none seemed to know/ Whither he 
went, or whence he came, or why/ He made one of the multitude…”(47-49). The 
poem self-consciously poses an aporetic and rhetorical question, within the space of 
a vision, which is the only truth that will be reiterated throughout the poem—the 
negative knowledge of non-knowing, that dissimulates as soon as we open the 
question itself. The equally ambiguous shape that drives the triumphal chariot is 
further described by Shelley in perspectival terms: “A Janus-visaged Shadow did 
assume/ The guidance of that wander-winged team.” (94-95) and is further described 
“All the four faces of that Charioteer/ Had their eyes banded…little profit brings/ 
Speed in the van and blindness in the rear,” (99-101). The grotesque shape has no 
fixed idea of reality, seeing it as it does from four separate angles. Moreover, even 
though it has the possibility of an omniperspectival conception of reality with its 
four faces, they remain blindfolded. “Speed in the van and blindness in the rear.” 
The chariot of life has no fixed conception, rushing blindly on with no sense of 
where it has been or where it will be headed, or in Shelley’s words “Of all that is, 
has been, or will be done.—” (104). The perplexed narrator can only ask, 
correspondingly, ‘“And what is this?/ Whose shape is that within the car? & why”—
’ (177-78).    
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     In the third section of the poem, Rousseau appears and within the framing device, 
(a device that echoes the device used in “Alastor”), describes his own visionary 
experience within the phenomenal world, which ultimately leads to failure as with 
the visionary in “Alastor.” This failure is because Rousseau, the worshipper of 
nature, as is Wordsworth, cannot ultimately find true knowledge within the natural 
world alone. Shelley’s use of Rousseau as the narrator amplifies the anti-
Wordsworthian implications of “Alastor”. Engagement with nature is possible and 
desirable, but will not satiate the intellectual hunger of a figure such as Rousseau (or 
Shelley). Rousseau admits his own defeat by Life, but claims “—I was overcome/ 
By my own heart alone;…” (240-41). As was the visionary in “Alastor,” who also 
could not temper his heart “to its object.” (243). Rousseau took his love of nature to 
a step much further than Wordsworth—to the social philosophy of The Social 
Contract and the sensibility of Julie. For Shelley, the erstwhile social reformer, the 
radical politics and erotic sensibility of Rousseau are concepts that move far beyond 
the simple pantheism of Wordsworth’s conservative poetry, especially that of works 
like The Excursion. The more feminised and seductive elements in nature that were 
perhaps to lead to the further developments in Rousseau were never realised by 
Wordsworth as he developed his poetry of metaphysical equipoise. Hodgson claims 
that the ambiguous “shape all light” (352) that appears in the poem, is symbolic of 
nature’s fecund and erotic draw on Rousseau’s imagination:  
Now, Shelley’s “shape all light” is indeed a glorious nature-figure, as 
lines 343-81 make clear, but she is certainly no homely nurse or 
mother. Dancing like an enamoured dreamer (376ff), arousing 
Rousseau’s desire, evoking comparison with Venus, Eros, and 
Matilda, she is a creature of great beauty and seductiveness, and as 
such represents Shelley’s repudiation of what he took to be 
Wordsworth’s imaginational evasiveness and apostasy.31 
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We can oppose this erotic troping of nature to the more maternal “guide”, “mother” 
and “my nurse” as expressed in The Prelude (and discussed in Chapter Three). 
Rousseau’s philosophical desires and more erotic view of the natural world are 
evoked in the poem, through the ambiguous “Shape all light.” Additionally, the non-
discursive figure of the shape allegorises Rousseau’s own visionary imagination as it 
attempts to penetrate the secrets of nature itself, and from these secrets derive a 
radical social and political philosophy.32 Unfortunately, desire would inevitably run 
Rousseau dry and he would also fall victim to the procession of Life. In fact, trust in 
a simple nature philosophy can lead the poet into error and illusion, as happened 
with Wordsworth. Butter claims: 
The natural beauty all around him tends to make him forget whatever 
experiences he may have had before. On the one hand, natural beauty 
seems in special moments of vision to be a manifestation of 
something beyond itself—and perhaps indeed it is so; on the other 
hand, it is dangerous, it may cause its lover to forget the source from 
which it, perhaps, comes; it may lead down rather than up the 
Platonic ladder.33 
  
The experience of the narrator and Rousseau in “The Triumph of Life” leads “down 
the Platonic ladder” because the ambiguity of experience manifests itself in the 
continuing questions and the blinding light that Shelley adumbrates. In fact, as I 
shall outline below, Shelley even transfigures the “forms” traditionally associated 
with Plato, and they are transfigured into self-referential shadow-forms that ‘play’ 
only in relation to each other.   
     The “Shape all light” indeed gives the narrating Rousseau no recourse to definite 
knowledge of his place in the universe, and in offering him Nepenthe to his question 
“ ‘Into this valley of perpetual dream,/ Shew whence I came, and where I am, and 
why—/Pass not away upon the passing stream.’” (397-99), places him further into a 
realm of forgetfulness, where there is no ultimate answer to questions, only a 
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constant deferral of absolute meaning. Consequently, any transcendental sphere 
(such as The One) remains dislocated from the sublunary sphere. After Rousseau 
takes the cup of Nepenthe to his lips we are informed: 
            And suddenly my brain became as sand 
 
“Where the first wave had more than half erased 
         The track of deer on desert Labrador, 
Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled amazed 
 
“Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore 
    Until the second bursts—so on my sight 
Burst a new Vision never seen before.— 
 
“And the fair shape waned in the coming light 
           As veil by veil the silent splendour drops 
From Lucifer, amid the chrysolite  
 
“Of sunrise ere it tinge the mountain-tops— 
   And as the presence of that fairest planet 
Although unseen is felt by one who hopes 
 
“That his day’s path may end as he began it, 
In that star’s smile, whose light is like the scent 
Of a jonquil when evening breezes fan it,      (405-420) 
 
The loss of Lucifer as the star that remains forever shining, even when blinded by 
the sunlight and the prismatic “dome of many coloured glass” is central to the poem 
here. The faith in this ever-shining morning star existing independently of the 
sublunary realm is key; in fact it functions as an allegory for Shelley’s own faith in 
“the white radiance of eternity” and The One. The transfigurations in the sublunary 
sphere are permanent—the new vision supersedes the old, or inscribes itself over the 
old, as the deer are chased away by the wolf. Rousseau’s Elysian, pre-symbolic 
paradise is erased, and the transfigurations that characterise Life continue. Nature 
and “the Shape all light” have in one sense betrayed the soul who followed them, 
and have returned this soul, through seduction, to the triumph of Life. The 
transcendental realm of eternity, though the visionary keeps faith with it, is itself 
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transfigured and superseded by the original light of life—or the Car with the Janus-
faced driver, blindly careering into nothingness. This third vision further recalls the 
original “waking dream” (42) of the poem’s narrator, who at the beginning of the 
poem entered into a visionary state of mind, or a “trance of wondrous thought.” (41). 
As the vision on his brain “was rolled” so Rousseau’s vision appeared as his “brain 
became as sand.” Both visions taking place as Lucifer is replaced by the Sun further 
symbolises the idea that faith in the higher realm of eternity is something that the 
poet/visionary can retain, but which, unlike in the anagogical transcendence in 
“Adonais”, is perpetually erased by our experience of Life. This is similar also to the 
experience of the visionary in “Alastor” where he awakens after his autoerotic 
encounter with his ideal other and “sleep/ Like a dark flood suspended in its course/ 
Rolled back its impulse on his vacant brain.” The tenor is the same: a visionary 
eroticism that cannot be sustained, and will be replaced by Life, or the reality 
principle. Rousseau actually symbolises the original shape of light as Lucifer in the 
poem and informs the narrator: 
“Through the sick day in which we wake to weep 
          Glimmers, forever sought, for ever lost.— 
So did the shape its obscure tenour keep 
 
“Beside my path, as silent as a ghost; 
    But the new Vision, and its cold bright car, 
With savage music, stunning music, crost  
 
“The forest, and as if from some dread war 
          Triumphantly returning, the loud million 
Fiercely extolled the fortune of her star—. 
 
“A moving arch of victory, the vermillion 
   And green and azure plumes of Iris had  
Built high over her wind-winged pavilion,      (430-441) 
                                                   
The Vision of life, as allegorised by the wolf chasing the deer, dispels the 
undifferentiated, pre-symbolic stage and enters the poet into the symbolic stage of 
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consciousness. This stage is exemplified by shadows, which represent the symbols, 
or simulacra, of other forms; however, these are not the forms of Plato, but forms or 
symbols that act like phantoms and lead mankind into delusion. This is also the self-
reflexive delusion, which has dogged Rousseau and is now to dog the narrator, as he 
finds he himself has fallen into a trance activated by the new day, after he has kept 
an all night vigil under the stars. He finds himself not sheltered by a vision, but 
under the “green and azure plumes of Iris” under her “wind-winged pavilion” or the 
equivalent “dome of many-coloured glass.”  
     This new, third vision of Rousseau’s, has in effect placed the narrator back where 
he was at the commencement of the poem, within the original vision of Life. This is 
a consequence of the cyclical limits of our knowledge of non-knowing; self-
reflexive negativity that leads us back to the starting post in an ever-repeating circle. 
This is further the enunciation of a new, historical inscription, or fall into philosophy 
and metaphysics; a fall to be repeated again and again, as new visionaries project 
new visions onto the well-worn historical-palimpsest that translates as the “dome of 
many-coloured glass,” behind which supposedly lies an absolute presence. This is 
the reason for “the shape all light” behind which we never find any transcendental 
presence, but after experiencing which, we constantly fall back into various 
historical paradigms, bred from new shapes of light and disclosures of being. 
Rousseau informs the narrator: 
I cried— “the world and its mysterious doom 
 
“Is not so much more glorious than it was, 
   That I desire to worship those who drew 
New figures on its false and fragile glass 
 
“As the old faded.”—“Figures ever new 
          Rise on the bubble, paint them how you may; 
We have but thrown, as those before us threw, 
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“Our shadows on it as it past away.      (244-251) 
                                           
Shelley addresses the historicity of Western metaphysics—every time a new Shelley 
or Rousseau appears a new “Shape all light” announces itself out of the pre-
symbolic wilderness and the process of inscription commences again. Shelley also 
reverses the traditional metaphor of light and darkness, as the vehicle for the tenor of 
modern Western philosophy. The light for Shelley is paradoxically a form of 
darkness, because it never gives us definitive knowledge, but precludes final 
interpretation. It is further a self-projection: “We have but thrown, as those before us 
threw” and these projections are “Our shadows.” The “New figures on its false and 
fragile glass” are the new inscriptions which are only to be superseded by further 
inscription. Unfortunately, there is no dialectical progression in this knowledge of 
non-knowing. Every time a new “Shape all light appears” it throws us into a new 
discursive relation with reality and therefore Rousseau refuses to acknowledge or 
follow the new paradigm as the world “and its mysterious doom/ Is not so much 
more glorious than it was.”              
     The theme of light that is so central to the poem, and its further connection to Iris 
as both the rainbow and the goddess who connects heaven and earth, is one that has 
its roots in the epoch of Western metaphysics.34 It further has a strong connection to 
the idea of a formless shape that does not in the final instance provide form suitable 
for a question/answer dialectic, at least not unless we fall into an infinite regress—
which is exactly what happens in “The Triumph of Life.” Emmanuel Levinas 
describes the relationship between light, vision and philosophical illumination thus: 
The contact with light, the act of opening one’s eyes, the lighting up 
of bare sensation, are apparently outside any relationship, and do not 
take form like answers to questions. Light illuminates and is naturally 
understood; it is comprehension itself. But within this natural 
correlation between us and the world, in a sort of doubling back, a 
question arises, a being surprised by the illumination. The wonder 
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which Plato put as the origin of philosophy is an astonishment before 
the natural and the intelligible. It is the very intelligibility of light that 
is astonishing; light is doubled up with a sight. The astonishment 
does not arise out of comparison with some order more natural than 
nature, but simply before intelligibility itself. Its strangeness is, we 
might say, due to its very reality, to the very fact there is existence.35    
 
Light goes hand in hand with intelligibility, but as in the “Triumph of Life” it also 
leads to a certain sense of “wonder” that strikes Rousseau. The “astonishment before 
the natural and the intelligible” is exactly what dogs Rousseau in the poem—it is a 
question of origins—and the fact that beyond the “Shape all light” which creates the 
wonderment, there is no further question; if one falls into this trap one falls into an 
infinite regress of questions, which is the regress and aporia Shelley represents in the 
poem. “The Triumph of Life” on this reading therefore can also be read as a sort of 
philosophic catharsis for Shelley. There is a realisation exorcised in the vehicle of 
the poem that there are indeed limits to his own philosophical speculations, which 
remain phenomenologically grounded within the physical world of light and 
darkness we inhabit, or under the “Dome of many coloured glass.” 
     There is a continual displacement of being-as-light commencing as the narrator 
falls into his early trance at sunrise. The first trance is displaced by the figure of 
light driving the Car, next we encounter the “Shape all light” and finally we read of 
the final encounter with light, in shadows and forms at the end of the poem. The 
appearance of the central “Shape all light” is also both a self-revelation and a self-
concealment—a darkness and a revealing. The light reveals itself as shape, but at the 
same time has no figure and therefore conceals itself and this is an epistemological 
paradox central to the meaning of the poem. The dissimulation of originary presence 
as Rousseau first experiences the “shape all light” is reinforced by the lines “And 
still before her on the dusky grass/ Iris her many-coloured scarf had drawn.—” (356-
57). This is because Iris provides a photological projection onto the dome, outside of 
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which a now paradoxically absent-presence inheres. The prismatic imagery is 
expanded upon by Rousseau, as he describes the specular nature of the light as it 
plays on the stream, moving erotically and entrancingly until he claims: 
“All that was seemed as if it had been not— 
   As if the gazer’s mind was strewn beneath 
Her feet like embers, and she, thought by thought, 
 
“Trampled its fires into the dust of death, 
         As Day upon the threshold of the east 
Treads out the lamps of night, until the breath 
 
“Of darkness reillumines even the least 
   Of heaven’s living eyes—like day she came, 
Making the night a dream;…      (385-393) 
                                                      
Noticeably, Rousseau speaks of himself in the third person and uses the phrase “the 
gazer’s mind,” because in explaining this process, he attempts to dislocate himself 
from this displacement of being in order to frame a narrative reference—in order to 
step outside of the experience of disclosure or announcement of Being. In doing this 
he dedoubles his self and recognises his inability to re-inhabit the originary 
experience associated with wonder; Rousseau enters the realm of the impersonal 
doubling allegory in order to contextualise the experience for the narrator. His mind 
once again suffers from anterograde amnesia as he explains: “All that was, seemed 
as if it had been not.” Thoughts “strewn beneath her feet like embers” are then 
trampled “into the dust of death.” The true thoughts of Rousseau are therefore 
obliterated, like bright embers surrounded by darkness. Or, as Hogle claims of the 
experience: 
Each rising thought now seems a murderous distancing of the “fading 
coal” that its predecessor has become, and the meter (or stepping of 
feet) in the poetic and musical movement of the shape appears to 
encourage a regular, rhythmic disfigurement of each thought by the 
one that follows it only to kill it.36 
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 Rousseau represents the experience primarily by light and specular imagery and 
secondarily through the effacing metrical feet of the poem. This multiple use of 
semiotic codes plays out the effacement of knowledge, demonstrating the ultimate 
knowledge of non-knowing. Shelley refracts his experience the only way he can, in 
the light of day. The shape is described thus: “like day she came,/ Making the night 
a dream;” and this symbolic patterning recalls us to the commencement of the poem 
where the narrator tells us that as the Sun fills the sky he has thoughts from the night 
that “must remain untold” (21). He has already experienced thoughts similar to 
those of Rousseau, but his own thoughts now remain hidden; for the same reason 
that Rousseau’s are trampled into embers by the power of the epochal experience—
so the narrator’s are “trampled” by the morning sun. The sunlight both reveals and 
conceals, and the narrator is left with his faith in Lucifer and the metaphysical 
possibility that “his day’s path may end as he began it.” 
     Dialectical aesthetic progress is truncated by Shelley in his final poem; or one 
could say it is “trampled.” Thoughts are constantly effaced, and experiences 
superseded by new experiences, questions are replaced and answered by new 
questions and the central figures of light constantly “trample” thoughts into new 
transfigurations. In effect, the narrator and Rousseau remain trapped in “wonder” at 
their new experiences of Being, and in one sense can never get beyond this 
experience—or can never find a transcendental solution to their recurring aporia. As 
I discussed in Chapter Two, the Hegelian apprehension of the Idea requires a 
process of being forced out of one sphere of ontological disclosure into another, and 
central to this process is the appreciation of the concrete universal as the whole of 
the Idea. Shelley and (at least in this poem) Rousseau have problems in that they 
firstly only appreciate being in terms of an abstract universal, and therefore only 
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formulate being in terms of a compositum of elements from which it is abstracted. 
This necessarily leads to a philosophical error which is the fact that they (as have 
other thinkers) keep returning to the same ontological point whereby they attempt to 
inscribe a new historicism, or a new grand narrative through which to disclose 
Being. One of the reasons for this is the reliance (at least in Shelley) upon the 
affectivity of aesthetics, a formulation that, in a Hegelian sense, only allows a partial 
and synechdochic disclosure of Being. Another is that their apprehension of the 
initial wonder of Being is by its very nature incomplete. This is because they are 
attempting to formulate a unity at the beginning of the dialectical process, as does 
Schelling in his Identity Philosophy, without going through the dialectical process 
that is responsible for the fully concrete apprehension of Spirit. This anti-dialectical 
form of ontological stasis is the reason for the continuing questions that both the 
narrator and Rousseau are forced into asking. As Paul de Man rightly claims: 
The answer to the question (of both the narrator and Rousseau) is 
another question, asking what and why one asked, and thus receding 
even further from the original query. This movement of effacing and 
of forgetting becomes prominent in the text and dispels any illusion 
of dialectical progress or regress.37  
 
Not only the questions, but also the corresponding visual erasures further add to the 
sense of an ontological Tabula Rasa, where experience constantly re-inscribes itself. 
In “Tintern Abbey” Wordsworth cognised new experiences in relation to old 
experiences; experience acted in the manner of a historical palimpsest, and as such 
there was a dialectical paradox which moved both regressively but also 
progressively. The future for Wordsworth was guaranteed by the past, due to the 
teleology of his aesthetic logic. For Shelley, this dialectical movement is not allowed 
to take place; instead there is a historical rupture, and meaning is poured out as soon 
as the poet’s mind attempts a dialectical progression. This is due to the 
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presupposition that The One is ready-made in a pre-dialectical state. Shelley in 
effect creates a recurring state of ontological angst within the poem.  
     In the final vision reported by Rousseau, after he takes the cup of Nepenthe to his 
lips, (we are not ultimately informed whether he drinks the Nepenthe or not)38 he 
describes a shadow play of signification, of inscriptions and re-inscriptions within 
which the human race remains bound. As I claimed above, the forms are drained of 
their positive Platonic meaning and become shadows of shadows, further 
significations that lead in a regress to no final point of presence. G.M. Matthews 
claims of this shadow-play:  
Those (followers of the Car) not engaged in self-deception 
misinterpret the physical world, pursuing the shadows of other 
objects. The young leading the actual pageant dance “as fleet as 
shadows”, are “like moths”—butterflies of darkness; the old who 
follow it dance with shadows (their constantly interposing remorseful 
memories) as well as with one another. Besides, everyone 
manufactures mental “shadows” or images, thoughts and emotions 
perpetually thrown off as Lucretian simulacra of his own personality; 
each of these quickly surrenders its integrity and is distorted to evil 
by the “creative ray” of the Car.39 
 
The shadows are signifiers within the symbolic realm of consciousness that, in a 
Saussurean sense, lead in a cloudy web of interrelationships from one concept to 
another. However, these forms are not the Platonic forms important to Shelley’s (up 
to this point) ontological principles. This appears to be a return to the realm of 
necessity; but it is a necessity bound within the structural rules of the symbolic 
language used to express that world—and it is an expression that constantly 
transfigures itself. These are further the semiotic chains that the narrator and 
Rousseau remain bound within, without access to a transcendental signified to 
remove the visionary-poet from this cyclical and self-referential realm. Matthews 
further comments that “The symbolic terms in which the poem is conceived are 
inclusive; there is nowhere outside them for potencies to develop that are not already 
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shown as fully exercised.”40 Or, the forms are self-referential and play within their 
own symbolic sphere. The conflicting forces within the poem all clash within a 
semiotic grid that cannot be fully referential—anagogically, allegorically or morally, 
to a transcendental sphere outside its own space. De Man argues that the “shape all 
light” also represents a punctum of all signification, a positing and a beginning, 
beyond which we cannot go; the ultimate figure of all figurality and all forms of 
articulation or semiotics: 
We now understand the shape to be the figure for the figurality of all 
signification. The specular structure of the scene as a visual plot of 
light and water is not the determining factor but merely an illustration 
(hypotyposis) of a plural structure that involves natural entities only 
as principles of articulation amongst others. It follows that the figure 
is not naturally given or produced but that it is posited by an arbitrary 
act of language. The appearance and the waning of the light-shape, in 
spite of the solar analogon, is not a natural event resulting from the 
mediated interaction of several powers, but a single, and therefore 
violent, act of power achieved by the positional power of language 
considered by and in itself: the sun masters the stars because it posits 
forms, just as “life” subsequently masters the sun because it posits, 
by inscription, the “track” of historical events.41 
 
De Man’s poststructuralist reading treats the shape of light as the first inscription, 
upon which historicity is then premised. Moreover, “being” is contingent, with its 
foundation on an arbitrary act of positing or “violence.” This is once again a 
reference to the first visual experience, premised on metaphors of light and darkness, 
which are then reversed by Shelley to symbolise the experience of “Life” as it posits 
itself at the birth of a metaphysical system of inscribed historicity. A system, which 
can then be re-set and repeated infinitely. Life itself triumphs as the car is set in 
motion by an arbitrary act of violence; after both Shelley and Rousseau enter their 
“trance” or “vision” the procession of historicity begins. We then spectate as the list 
of historical personages from Plato to Napoleon follows the car, which is also the 
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narratorial march of arbitrary signification in the final section of the poem, or the 
“Shadows of shadows” (488).  
     In conclusion, Shelley has entered into a dialectical situation in which he has 
attempted to transcend the position taken up by Wordsworth. In problematising the 
relationship between the visionary imagination and the natural world in poems such 
as “Mont Blanc” and “Alastor”, he goes on to formulate an anagogical solution to 
the “intellectual love of beauty” that so haunted his life and metaphysics in 
“Adonais.” Unfortunately, this position itself I have argued was unstable and 
untenable, in part due to his failure to fully take up Dante’s quadruple topography 
and root his work in the literal hermeneutical level. Shelley’s disembodied vision is 
finally “trampled” in his final poem, “The Triumph of Life,” where his treatment of 
visionary experience leads to a final aporia. The vision collapses into a cyclical 
pattern of repetition, and remains subsumed under the transfigurative movement of 
“Life.” Shelley finally sees no way through to “the white radiance of eternity” and 
remains entrapped by Urania and Iris, under the “Dome of many coloured glass.”  
Or as Woodman claims “Iris’ function, like that of Urania in “Adonais”, is to come 
between the poet and the object of his quest, which is reunion with the One.”42 In 
terms of recognition, Shelley remains philosophically isolated, with what appears an 
indifferent world that comes between his aesthetic recognition within the external 
world, and without, in the supersensible realm of The One. 
     In the next chapter, I locate Shelley’s final poem in an alternative hermeneutical 
phenomenological space, one where Shelley is able to conceptualise an ironic 
recognition through a realisation of his own epistemic limits. His knowledge of non-
knowing is a knowledge that actually inspires an acute phenomenological 
awareness—an awareness that postulates one of the new post-romantic aesthetic 
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discourses, and one that can actually be discerned in parts of the work of 
Wordsworth. The triumph of what Shelley terms “Life” is actually an ironic 
recognition of the limits of our subjective experience, and an absorption into 
contingent historical processes. In Shelley’s own words: 
What is life? Thoughts and feelings arise, with or without our will, 
and we employ words to express them. We are born, and our birth is 
unremembered, and our infancy remembered but in fragments; we 
live on, and in living we lose the apprehension of life. How vain is it 
to think that words can penetrate the mystery of our being! Rightly 
used they may make evident our ignorance to ourselves, and this is 
much. For what are we? Whence do we come? And whither do we 
go?43 
 
The question of words being unable to “penetrate the mystery of our being” and the 
questions at the end of this quote aptly summarise what I feel was Shelley’s attitude 
when composing “The Triumph of Life.” One in which a true understanding of life 
would have to be couched in the ironic recognition of our own ontological and 
epistemological limits. This is in turn a post-romantic conception, or at least another 
variant form of Romanticism, to which I will now turn.   
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Notes 
1. Shelley for example was convinced of the idea of political associations in 
order to foment political change, whereas Godwin believed this would lead 
to bloodshed, and was more in favour of an “armchair radicalism.” Having 
read Shelley’s revolutionary pamphlet written whilst in Ireland in 1812, 
Godwin responded by claiming: “…Your views and mine as to the 
development of mankind are decisively at issue. You profess the immediate 
object of your efforts to be ‘the organisation of a society, whose institution 
shall serve as a bond to its members’. If I may be allowed to understand my 
book on Political Justice, its pervading principle is, that association is a most 
ill-chosen and ill-qualified mode of endeavouring to promote the political 
happiness of mankind.” Quoted in Richard Holmes, Shelley: The Pursuit 
(London: Harper Collins, 1974), p. 122.   
2. Baron d’ Holbach was one of the French encyclopaedists, whose most 
famous work was Le Systeme de la Nature (1770). This work was 
particularly pertinent to Shelley due to its atheism. The laws of cause and 
effect were for d’ Holbach adequate for explicating the physical universe and 
the world of human action and agency. He believed there was no need of 
supernatural intervention in our judgement of the world or our actions. This 
has clear influence on Shelley, for example in his ambiguous conception of 
the sublime as outlined in poems such as “Mont Blanc.”   
3. Shelley’s reading of the book Academical Questions (1805), by Sir William 
Drummond, was hugely influential on his mature philosophy, and the 
influence of Berkeley and Hume was primarily extrapolated from his reading 
of this particular text. Hugh Roberts has recently commented on the critical 
reception of Shelley’s somewhat divided philosophical stance: “An earlier 
generation of critics was content to see Shelley as simply confused on this 
issue, [of scepticism and idealism] drawing on “various traditions [that] 
remain imperfectly assimilated, so that one can discriminate two planes of 
thought in Shelley’s aesthetics” (Abrams, Mirror and the Lamp, 126). Since 
C.E. Pulos’ Deep Truth, however, the dominant trend of Shelley criticism 
has been toward establishing the coherence, consistency, and originality of 
Shelley’s thought. Pulos himself suggested that Shelley had forged a 
“skeptical idealism” out of his divided intellectual inheritance, using 
Drummond’s Academical Questions to find “a mode of reconciling the 
empirical and the Platonic traditions” (Pulos, 112). See Hugh Roberts, 
Shelley and the Chaos of History: A New Politics of Poetry (University Park: 
Pennsylvania university Press, 2004), p. 129. 
4. Shelley’s concept of The One is amorphous, and it is a term he uses at 
various points in his prose as well as in poems such as “Adonais.” It seems to 
be Platonic, a universal ideal in the realm of the supersensible. In fact, it is 
arguably neoplatonic and closer to Plotinus’ concept of Emanation. Shelley 
refers to it in his essay On Life, in an almost Hegelian sense of a universal 
mind: “The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference 
subsisting between the assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are 
merely marks employed to denote the different modifications of the one 
mind. Let it not be supposed that this doctrine conducts to the monstrous 
presumption, that I, the person who now write and think, am that one mind. I 
am but a portion of it.” In Percy Bysshe Shelley, “On Life” Shelley’s Poetry 
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and Prose (New York: Norton, 2002), p 508. Shelley also refers to The One 
in the sense of the supersensible beyond in “A Defence of Poetry”: “A poet 
partakes in the eternal, the infinite and the one; as far as relates to his 
conceptions, time and place and number are not.” Shelley’s Poetry and 
Prose, p. 513.   
5. Prometheus Unbound (1820), Act II, Scene IV, (116).  
6. Harold Bloom, “The Unpastured Sea: An Introduction to Shelley,” in Harold 
Bloom, (ed.) Romanticism and Consciousness: Essays in Criticism (New 
York: Norton, 1970), p. 377. 
7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 76. 
8. Shelley’s Poetry and Prose, pp. 505-509. 
9. See also Neville Rogers, Shelley at Work (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 
pp. 147-8. 
10. I.J. Kapstein, “The Meaning of Shelley’s ‘Mont Blanc,’” PMLA, Vol. 62, 
No. 4, December: 1947: p. 1059. 
11. F. L. Jones, (ed.) The Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley, Volume 1 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 499.   
12. Richard Holmes claims in his book (p. 340) that Coleridge had actually been 
to visit Mont Blanc before Shelley, when he had written the poem. This is 
actually incorrect; Coleridge wrote the poem whilst on Scafell Pike in the 
British Lake District. See Duncan Wu (ed.), Romanticism: An Anthology 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 505, n.1. 
13. Earl Wasserman disputes the relationship to the original Greek sense of an 
“evil genius” even though T.L. Peacock had claimed this was the meaning 
behind the title. Wasserman writes “The Visionary, it is felt, ought to be 
thoroughly admirable or totally wrong; he should be praised for his worthy 
quest of an ideal or punished for a sin against humanity, especially if we take 
the title to mean that, since the “Spirit of Solitude” is an alastor, or genius 
that avenges by tormenting, usually for the sin of hubris, the ideal vision 
which the protagonist pursues beyond life is sent him as deserved 
punishment for spurning human love.” Earl Wasserman, Shelley: A Critical 
Reading (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1971), p. 11.   
14. See Wu, p. 820.  
15. Wasserman, p. 20. 
16. Wasserman, p.18.  
17. Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic 
Poetry (New York: Cornell University Press, 1971), p. 278.   
18. Bloom further claims in The Visionary Company that the poem “Oh! There 
are Spirits of the Air” was, according to Mary Shelley, actually addressed to 
Coleridge. (p. 278). He writes that Shelley addresses Coleridge in relation to 
his own metaphysical commitments in “Dejection” and “Constancy” in the 
same poem. Bloom claims of Shelley’s treatment of Coleridgean 
metaphysics: “The composite form of all the poet creates or loves, his 
Emanation, does emanate from him when he is still in possession of the Joy 
of the Imagination. But when it exists as a mere external form, independent 
of him, it is likely to seem mocking and tantalizing. In response to this 
mockery, his sense of self may seek refuge in abstractions, as Coleridge does 
in Dejection, until the self and abstraction merge into the menacing and self-
accusing figure of the Spectre. You are in your Spectre’s power, Shelley’s 
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poem warns Coleridge, and a continued struggling will only intensify that 
power, and aggravate an already darkly settled fate.” (p.280). Or in my 
Hegelian reading, the abstractions result from a compositum or abstract 
universal, formulated from Coleridge’s own experience of the world, which 
leads to a growing alienation as his work progresses. This culminates in his 
pursuit of a never-attainable sense of philosophical unity; never attainable 
because of the divided nature of Coleridge’s conception of universals, or his 
divided compositum. Coleridge finishes up pursuing his ideal in the form of 
the Brocken Spectre, whereas Shelley ends up pursued by his own idealisms. 
For example, in "Alastor" he remains in a sense haunted by the erotic dream 
figure.    
19. For an excellent discussion of Shelley’s dichotomy between the 
transcendental ideal in Apollo and the receptive ideal in Pan, see 
Wasserman, pp. 46-56. 
20. It is interesting to compare this positive treatment of the old ruins of man, 
and the philosophical significance of these ruins, with the more negative 
ideas espoused in Shelley’s later sonnet, “Ozymandias” (1818). 
21. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Hegel’s Existentialism” in Sense and Non-Sense, 
trans. Hubert & Patricia Dreyfuss (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1964), pp. 67-68. Merleau-Ponty goes on to write that the closest we get to 
death is the process of mutual recognition, in which we existentially reduce 
each other to the status of an object. This of course is mutually negated and 
recognition is fully completed, by the very nature of inter-subjective 
consciousness itself.   
22. The section of the poem on the Chorasmain shore begins at line 272, and 
continues right to the point the poet is left upon a mossy precipice on line 
625. Just before the composition of “Alastor” Shelley had been on a boat trip 
on the Thames with Thomas Love Peacock, Charles Clairmont and Mary in 
August-September 1815. We also have the previous experience of Shelley’s 
trip down the Rhine in the summer of 1814. Holmes also claims that, as well 
as being influenced by the river trips, the poem was about Shelley’s own 
recent introspection, and that the river symbol actually represents this deeper 
introspective search into the human mind. He quotes Shelley as saying, “The 
poem entitled Alastor may be considered as allegorical to one of the most 
interesting situations of the human mind.” (p. 300). This indeed does open 
the way to a psychological, or psychoanalytical reading of the poem; 
however I feel that the philosophical reading not only reveals richer insights 
into the poem but also reflects Shelley’s own psychology at the time anyway. 
23. For, what is in my opinion, the most thorough reading of “Adonais” 
available, see Wasserman, pp. 462-502.   
24. Ross Woodman, The Apocalyptic Vision in the Poetry of Shelley (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 160. 
25. Shelley believed that an article in the Quarterly Review (April 1818) was 
responsible for Keats’ ultimate demise from consumption. He also 
erroneously attributed the article to Southey, it was actually written by 
Croker. Stanza 38 reads: 
 
Nor let us weep that our delight has fled 
Far from those carrion kites that scream below— 
He wakes or sleeps with the enduring dead; 
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Thou canst not soar where he is sitting now. 
Dust to the dust! But the pure spirit shall flow 
Back to the burning fountain whence it came, 
A portion of the eternal, which must glow 
Through time and change, unquenchably the same, 
Whilst thy cold embers choke the sordid earth of shame. 
 
26. Woodman, p. 160. 
27. Woodman, p. 173. 
28. The poem more particularly recalls the five-parts of the Petrarchan Capitoli. 
Some commentators have argued that Shelley may have been intending to 
write a series of Trionfi which would gradually develop a more positive 
stance by covering more areas of Shelley’s metaphysical speculations. 
Miriam Allot claims that Shelley may have been attempting a pastiche of the 
six poems written by Petrarch between 1338 and his death in 1374. She 
writes: “The thought is seductive that he might have planned a sequel, or 
even a series of ‘Trionfi’, in order to celebrate Life’s defeat by the values 
which preserved his ‘sacred few’ from destruction and which kept awake 
even in so damaged a spirit as his Rousseau some degree of redeeming self-
knowledge.” See Miriam Allot, “The Reworking of a Literary Genre: 
Shelley’s ‘The Triumph of Life’”, in Miriam Allot (ed.) Essays on Shelley 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1982), p. 253. It seems to me 
however, in light of Shelley’s overall philosophical dialectics, the struggle 
Shelley recorded in his poetry, and the ideal  “white radiance of eternity,” 
that he had reached as an apotheosis in “Adonais” that Shelley was recording 
the final sceptical collapse of his precarious poetic vision.  
29. “On Life,” p. 505. 
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Chapter Five 
  The Contingent Limits of Romantic Myth-Making 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I claimed that by the time of the “Triumph of Life” Shelley 
had come to a post-romantic recognition that there is no position of pure aesthetic 
autonomy and of world—transcendence, acquiescing to the historicity and 
contingency of human experience. Following Shelley’s logic, I sought to describe 
this new position in terms the knowledge of non-knowing. In this chapter I gather 
together the different strands of discussion and conclude with a two-part argument 
about English romantic discourse. In the first two sections, I argue that Wordsworth 
and Coleridge set up a distinct romantic discourse that we can read in retrospect as 
illuminating some of the inherent tensions in romantic metaphysics. This particular 
discourse, as I have argued throughout, is inherent in the struggle towards an 
aesthetic recognition as understood as part of the personal and critical conversation 
between Wordsworth and Coleridge. I also use a phenomenological perspective to 
postulate that the work of both poets is based upon their relative sense of 
embodiment. In the next section, I argue that the literalisation of this discourse—a 
process in part due to its gaining common acceptance and currency as a recognisable 
romantic discourse—enables Shelley to produce a second-order discourse that 
affirms non-knowing. Shelley is able to usher in a new shape of romantic experience 
that acknowledges the ironic, embodied, historicist, perspectival and contingent 
nature of experience. In this paradigm shift, English Romanticism leaves behind the 
metaphysical aspirations of one of its old discourses and takes up a new sub-
discourse of ironism. In the final section, I turn to Mary Shelley and argue that in her 
novel Frankenstein, one of the themes she explores is the limits of romantic 
metaphysics and allegorises these limits in a different epistemic realm, that of 
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scientism. She does this through the protagonist Victor Frankenstein, who upon my 
reading not only represents the romantic poet/metaphysician, but also embodies 
these romantic hopes in the creature. Thus, Mary Shelley further elaborates upon a 
particular romantic irony that can be traced back to the discourse of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge. I conclude by arguing that these problematisations facilitate the situating 
of romantic aesthetics in a distinct domain that belongs neither to scientism nor to 
philosophy. One of the things romantic aesthetics can do in actual fact is give us a 
privileged knowledge of the contingent and ironic limits of all of our epistemic 
practices. Therefore, Hegel’s conception of the concrete universal can be reversed if 
we situate aesthetics above, or at least on a par with, discursive forms of knowing 
such as philosophy.  
 
2. The romantic discourse of Wordsworth and Coleridge 
Up until this point I have argued that Wordsworth and Coleridge, as part of their 
poetic programme, were engaged in the attempt to resolve the tensions in a dialectic 
that was constructed around aesthetic autonomy and natural receptivity. Coleridge 
remained at a philosophical impasse, which culminated in poems such as 
“Constancy to an Ideal Object” and “Dejection.” In these poems, he either projects 
his hopes on to another character such as Sara or Hartley, or he allegorises this 
epistemic aporia as the Brocken Spectre in “Constancy” and in the ensuing sense of 
homelessness experienced by the pursuer of the spectre. Wordsworth, on the other 
hand, attains a sense of metaphysical equipoise between the two positions by way of 
his trope of organicism, which posits a transcendental connection to the universe. It 
also functions in the same way as Hegel’s concrete universal, in that it affords 
Wordsworth a Weltanschauung whereby the alienating presence of nature is 
subsumed within the overall organic idea.  
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     Stanley Cavell has characterised the romantic treatment of scepticism in terms of 
our position between “two worlds” in the aftermath of Kantian metaphysics: 
One romantic use for this idea of two worlds lies in its accounting for 
the human being’s dissatisfaction with, as it were, itself. It 
appreciates the ambivalence in Kant’s central idea of limitation, that 
we simultaneously crave its comfort and crave escape from its 
comfort, that we want unappeasably to be lawfully wedded to the 
world and at the same time illicitly intimate with it, as if the one 
stance produced the wish for the other, as if the best proof of human 
existence were its power to yearn, as if for its better, or other, 
existence. Another romantic use for this idea of two worlds is its 
offer of a formulation of our ambivalence towards Kant’s ambivalent 
settlement, or a further insight into whatever that settlement was a 
settlement of—an insight that the human being now lives in neither 
world, that we are, as it is said, between worlds.1 
  
There is a romantic acknowledgment of our relationship between these “two worlds” 
which is being formulated in the romantic discourse, and its tensions, which are 
acknowledged in some of the poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth. However, 
whereas Coleridge remains in an uncertain space between these two worlds, in the 
state of an infinite Sehnsucht, Wordsworth at times attains metaphysical equipoise 
and manages to balance the two worlds in his aesthetic response to the world. In 
fact, Wordsworth manages to attain more than a mere balance, by subsuming the 
worlds into the balanced universe of his organic-concrete universal. Wordsworth’s 
aesthetic recognition of his embodied (in his trope “wedded”) place in the world 
provides a poetic rendering of Hegel’s triadic movement—one that works itself out 
in an aesthetic response to the world as opposed to a philosophical one. On the other 
hand, Coleridge remains in a state of the abstract universal, and remains in this 
sense alienated from the natural world. 
     Cavell further alludes to this difference in final outlook between Coleridge and 
Wordsworth when he discusses the Platonic implications of Wordsworth’s 
“Intimations of Immortality Ode” (1815). The poem is an acknowledgment of the 
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Platonic conception of the immortal soul, and in Cavell’s argument the Platonic 
conception of partaking in the forms of the ideal world. On Cavell’s reading 
Wordsworth, in acknowledging the immortality of the soul and the breaking or loss 
engendered in birth and participated in during adulthood (in the mature poet who in 
effect participates in this loss by re-enacting it in adulthood) recognises (or 
acknowledges) his place in the “dream of human life.” This is both an 
epistemological and a psychological response to scepticism by the poet-as therapist. 
(Cavell compares this process to Freudian psychoanalytical processes of recovery, 
remembering and repression). 
   What we are instructed to recollect, to call back and to gather 
together, is a sleep and a forgetting. “Sleep” is characterized earlier 
as the region of fields from which the winds come, which I take as 
pretty straight romantic code for creative inspiration. And later the 
child’s play is described as constituting “some fragment from his 
dream of human life.” Hence in this respect to participate in the 
child’s work, in his inspiration towards life, is to recollect the dream 
of life, as from fragments, as if the whole vocation of becoming 
human, of suffering birth, were endless participation in such a dream, 
that human life will come to pass. Only so can we recollect that we 
are not yet the fulfillment of this dream.2 
 
The visionary poet partakes in eternal processes and acknowledges them only by 
communing with nature, and then recognising the deeper implications of this 
communing, by further re-enacting and remembering these experiences from 
childhood. These childhood experiences in turn entailed a further repression or 
forgetting.  Coleridge however glosses Wordsworth’s treatment of interaction with 
the external world in this poem by in fact avoiding (or repressing) the deeper 
animistic implications of Wordsworth’s ideal of “communicating with objects”3 or 
in effect holistically communicating with the external world of nature. For 
Coleridge, this romanticisation of the external world, this sense of communing with 
objects, is unavailable to his divided consciousness towards which the external 
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world of nature remains forever abstract. His criticism of Wordsworth in Biographia 
Literaria therefore ignores the full implications of Wordsworth’s idea of 
communing mystically with objects of the external world. In fact, Coleridge glosses 
it as Wordsworth’s adoption of the speech of common rustics in discoursing about 
the natural world as opposed to with the natural world; this is a gloss that comes 
about due to Coleridge’s own alienated consciousness, and his refusal to 
acknowledge a concrete universal absorption of the external world. Cavell claims: 
When in his [Coleridge’s] tremendous chapter twenty two he lists the 
“characteristic excellences” of Wordsworth’s work, he cites “Fourth; 
the perfect truth of nature, as taken immediately from nature, and 
proving long and genial intimacy with the very spirit which gives the 
physionomic expression to all the works of nature.” Here he has 
roughly glossed what Wordsworth, so far as I can judge, does mean 
by “communicating with objects,” but instead of acknowledging this 
he persists in a view which takes Wordsworth, while having been 
granted by God an angel’s capacity for singing, to have been allowed 
for theorizing the capacity of, let us say, a rustic. Coleridge thus 
romanticizes his own friend.4 
        
This duality in Coleridge’s criticism of Wordsworth once again reflects his own 
divided consciousness and attitude towards the external world. Further to this, 
Coleridge endorses the holistic Romanticism of Wordsworth, but in point of fact 
surmises in his friend’s work a device of ventriloquism for reflective rustic 
discourse. Coleridge cannot fully endorse (even if he does in principle in chapter 
twenty two) the animism inherent in Wordsworth’s idea outlined in The Lyrical 
Ballads of “communicating with objects.” This encapsulates the Coleridgean 
romantic response to philosophical scepticism, as opposed to the Wordsworthian 
response. This is one of the keys to the tensions within the romantic discourse of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, tensions that can be further clarified with the adoption 
of a phenomenological perspective. 
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      This discourse of Wordsworth and Coleridge, and the changing dynamics and 
aporias it raises, can be read as reactions to the world, which are also unconsciously 
based upon the phenomenological being-in-the-world of both poets. Their romantic 
discourse can be interpreted as based upon an attitude in the world which is not fully 
completed—an attitude which is in process and which has yet to be fully self-
determined because it is still establishing its own parameters. This is the movement 
of the struggle for aesthetic recognition of both poets, which culminates for 
Wordsworth in his organic aesthesis and for Coleridge in a sceptical aporia. These 
philosophical positions are centred on a varying relationship to the external world 
between the concrete and the abstract—or embodiment within the world and 
projection onto the world. This is the deeper reason for the philosophical vacillation 
between Wordsworth and Coleridge.  According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in 
exploring our being-in-the-world we vacillate between concrete and abstract 
movements of consciousness, centred on our body and our relationship to our body.   
The abstract movement carves out within that plenum of the world in 
which concrete movement took place a zone of reflection and 
subjectivity; it superimposes upon physical space a virtual or human 
space. Concrete movement is therefore centripetal whereas abstract 
movement is centrifugal. The former occurs in the realm of being or 
of the actual, the latter on the other hand in that of the virtual or the 
non-existent; the first adheres to a given background, the second 
throws out its own background. The normal function which makes 
abstract movement possible is one of ‘projection’ whereby the 
subject of movement keeps in front of him an area of free space in 
which what does not naturally exist may take on a semblance of 
existence.5  
This is an embodiment that acts in correlation with the poet’s creative activity. In 
Wordsworth there is a tension between these two poles worked out on the site of 
some of his poetry and this is most obvious in poems such as “Tintern Abbey.” In 
Chapter Three I pointed to the fact that Wordsworth moves from the phenomenality 
of the general landscape towards the corporeality of his body—in fact to the point 
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where “the motion of our human blood/ Almost suspended, we are laid asleep.” This 
movement is grounded centripetally in the realm of the actual, and spreads to the 
inner-self of the poet. Additionally, in the vale of Grasmere the relationship of his 
body to the surrounding environs is paramount; and as he recognises in the physical 
landscape a form of Deus sive natura, the landscape becomes a physical home for 
the poet and his sister who have been somewhat rootless since their return from 
Goslar. However, if Wordsworth’s ideology of organic embodiment moves 
centripetally from a concrete conceptualisation of the world based upon our being-
in-the-world, Coleridge’s work lies more heavily in the abstract realm whereby the 
poet “superimposes upon the physical space a virtual or human space.” Thus in 
“Dejection” we have the famous lines discussed in Chapter Two, where the poet 
“cannot from outward forms” satisfy the imaginative realm of the inner, subjective 
and projected aesthetic. Coleridge’s poetics operate within the same epoche as 
Wordsworth, however he remains ensconced within the abstract projection of 
subjectivity. Wordsworthian organicism however exhibits a more keenly felt 
awareness of the role of the body in this developing discourse, and of the need for 
receptivity to the external world in order to free up his imaginative autonomy. 
Wordsworth’s attitude dialectically swings between centrifugal abstract movement 
(where he does indeed project his own subjectivity) and centripetal concrete 
movement where he accepts the natural world as the organic concretisation of his 
own nascent creative imagination.  
     This bi-polar movement between the centripetal and centrifugal is that which I 
also glossed as being the movement towards a concrete representation of Spirit (in 
the classical age) and then away from this representation in the realm of 
romantic/modern art in Chapter Two. From a phenomenological perspective, this 
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same movement is always however unconsciously centred on the body and its being-
in-the-world. We can once again extrapolate from Hegel’s theory and argue that the 
central point of reference is the displaced corporeal body; the symbolic phase of art 
operates deictically in relation to this region of understanding, the classical 
incorporates this self awareness perfectly in sculpture and the romantic centrifugally 
moves away from the central point of reference into a disembodied, abstract realm—
of what is glossed by Hegel as Spirit.  
     The connection between Hegelian idealism and the romantic discourse of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge has been further noted by Tilottama Rajan. Rajan reads 
this connection in terms of disembodiment, which for Hegel leads to Absolute Spirit 
and for Coleridge (and to a much lesser extent Wordsworth due to his organic 
aesthesis) leads to aporia and scepticism. The point is however, as I have argued 
throughout, that all of these thinkers are tracing the same romantic narrative 
mythology, culminating in differing denouements. Rajan claims that Paul de Man’s 
phenomenological emphasis on language-as-consciousness, and his deconstructing 
of texts such as those of Wordsworth and Coleridge within this context, places 
Wordsworth and Coleridge in the same transcendent space as Hegel, even if they are 
coming from a different direction. In the romantic discourse we have an almost 
Mallarmean Parole, a proto-symbolist discourse that exists autonomously from the 
external world: 
  We are told [by de Man in The Rhetoric of Romanticism] that in the 
new linguistic dispensation consciousness will “exist entirely by and 
for itself, independently of all relationship with the outside world, 
without being moved by an intent aimed at part of this world” (RR, p. 
16). In deconstructing Coleridge we seem, curiously, to have arrived 
at Hegel’s resolution of the subject-object dialectic, exchanging one 
romantic idealist for another.6 
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Whilst I agree that Hegel is indeed a romantic idealist, indeed the romantic idealist 
par excellence, there is a problem here with Rajan’s argument vis-à-vis de Man. 
Firstly, on my reading, neither Hegel nor the Romantics ever fully succeed in 
transcending the subject-object distinction. Hegel’s attempt at autonomy necessarily 
requires receptivity to the empirical world, even in his attempt at intersubjectively 
transcending the two, which is accomplished for example through mutual 
recognition (Anerkennung). The attempt at transcendence is the driving force and 
the heuristic utility of Hegel’s theory; we learn that there is no autonomy without 
receptivity to the world of external phenomena, or without the experience of other 
human bodies. Terry Eagleton has recently also read mutual recognition in terms of 
corporeality, combining Marxist materialism with Aristotelian ethics of flourishing. 
This embodiment actually serves an ethical purpose in that, for Eagleton, it gives 
one a sense of socialist empathy with others. Wordsworth for example, seeks 
through his attempts at recognition in others such as Dorothy, or in the more ironic 
recognition in characters such as the Leech Gatherer a certain biological mutual 
recognition. This recognition in High Romanticism is extended, proleptically, to the 
hylozoic world; and this gives rise to the moral response to the theodicy of 
landscape adumbrated in much of Wordsworth’s work. Eagleton claims: 
Rather [than realising your nature through the exercise of impulses 
you recognise as your own], you realise your nature in a way which 
allows the other to do so too. And that means that you realize your 
nature at its best—since if the other’s self-fulfilment is the medium 
through which you flourish yourself, you are not at liberty to be 
violent, dominative or self-seeking.  
     The political equivalent of this situation, as we have seen, is 
known as socialism. When Aristotle’s ethics of flourishing are set in 
a more interactive context, one comes up with something like the 
political ethics of Marx. The socialist society is one in which each 
attains his or her freedom and autonomy in and through the self-
realization of others.7 
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On this view, through a biological recognition with others one secures a real (and 
political) autonomy. Moreover, in extending the romantic response to the physical 
world at large, (identified through nature), Wordsworth secures his own freedom 
(and flourishes) as a poet and a human being by the aesthetic recognition of himself 
within the natural world. The romantics do indeed share the Hegelian dialectical 
enterprise and transcendent telos, but even when they feel a certain imaginative 
autonomy they, as Hegel, are bound to, and embodied within, the empirical world. 
This is the reason for the Wordsworthian organic aesthesis, an aesthesis that 
embodies the poet within an organic concrete universal, and provides the backdrop 
for the moral element in his poetry.   
     Rajan goes on to outline de Man’s treatment of these inherent undecidabilities and 
tensions within romantic texts themselves; in addition, she rightly claims that de 
Man, in his criticism, replaces the subject-object distinction for a rhetorical/sensuous 
distinction. Moreover, she also intimates that the poets use certain romantic tropes to 
explore this tension, tropes that also signify once again the intentional and 
consciousness-bound structure of their poetics: 
To this we may add the use of realistic deictics, specific details about 
the time, place, and circumstance of composition, and references to 
real people like Lamb and Dorothy Wordsworth, which refigure 
fiction as life. Also of importance (in the conversation poems) is the 
address to an auditor, which transforms writing into speech, solitary 
musing into communal vision. These reality effects, in de Man’s 
view, are constantly disrupted in the poems themselves by an 
awareness of the radical difference between linguistic and organic 
structures.8 
Again, whilst I agree with the first observation about realistic deictics, I do not agree 
that “the reality effects…are constantly disrupted by an awareness of the radical 
difference between linguistic and organic structures.” The “reality effects” are 
utilised by a poet such as Wordsworth in order to phenomenologically ground his 
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attempted autonomous vision. The intentional consciousness of the poet, through the 
medium of language, reaches out to the external world in order to embody and give 
content to its otherwise empty form. The assurance of a character such as Dorothy, 
and the attempt at recognition by Wordsworth in “Tintern Abbey”, or the 
embodiment of spiritual hopes within the homely Vale of Grasmere, or the address 
to Coleridge at the end of The Prelude, are all part of this process of the attempt at 
aesthetic recognition. Indeed, Wordsworth instantiates an organic aesthesis that does 
not entail any tension between organic and linguistic structures. In actual fact, the 
linguistic structures actually provide a semiotic medium through which 
Wordsworth’s intentionality operates and connects with the organic world, as 
exemplified in the unifying nature of the Wordsworthian symbol discussed in 
Chapter Three. The whole sense of a purely empty consciousness is dispelled in 
phenomenology by the concept of Fundierung. Merleau-Ponty writes of this 
concept: 
Visual contents are taken up, utilised and sublimated to the level of 
thought by a symbolical power which transcends them, but it is on 
the basis of sight that this power can be constituted. The relationship 
between matter and form is called in phenomenological terminology 
a relationship of Fundierung: the symbolic function rests on the 
visual as on a ground; not that vision is its cause, but because it is that 
gift of nature which Mind was called upon to make use of beyond all 
hope, to which it was to give a fundamentally new meaning, yet 
which was needed, not only to be incarnate, but in order to be at all.9 
So for the realistic deictics of the romantics as Rajan terms it, their functionality 
works at the symbolical level and this is the necessary relationship of Fundierung.  
The romantics may in some cases attempt to completely collapse the distinction 
between vehicle and tenor in the metaphoricity of their discourse, and this acts for 
Wordsworth as a kind of unifying move in which he tries to ground his poetry in an 
aesthetic aesthesis. This is Wordsworth’s intentionality-as-language, and as such his 
 237 
attempt to grasp the world around him and in so doing forge a link between his 
consciousness and the external world. The aesthesis however cannot entail a purely 
autonomous consciousness, and remains intentionally bound to the external world, 
and to the corporeality of the body. 
     Consequently, Wordsworth explicitly acknowledged the poetic vacillation 
between receptivity to the external world and imaginative autonomy in some of his 
work. One example can be found in the series known as the Lucy Poems. In these 
poems Wordsworth explores an alternative relationship to the external world and the 
universe at large. Spencer Hall has commented on the “tragic humanism”10 in these 
poems and argues: 
The speaker comes to the deepest awareness of his own, and of 
Lucy’s, threatened humanness precisely because he is forced beyond 
the interior landscape of his own mind, his own memory, to a more 
complete and more objective view of things. “A Slumber Did My 
Spirit Seal” reflects one of the major tensions in Wordsworth’s 
poetry: the never satisfactorily concluded attempts to move beyond 
self to an objectivity which would be both sufficient and necessary.11  
 
Whilst in poems such as The Prelude Wordsworth seeks solace in a philosophical 
organicism, poems such as “A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal” (1798) actually bring 
Wordsworth back to an almost Coleridgean alienation from the external world, or at 
least an indication of this in the ontological insecurity which is exhibited within 
these poems.12 Whilst I strongly disagree with Hall’s analysis that Wordsworth 
never successfully manages “to move beyond self to an objectivity which would be 
both sufficient and necessary,” I would agree that in poems such as the Lucy series, 
where Wordsworth faces up to worldly fears of death and the possibility of the 
failure of Christian eschatology, his organicism and metaphysical equipoise is 
problematised. In these poems Wordsworth projects his self centrifugally onto the 
world, and this leads to an almost Coleridgean subjectivity. This is because his 
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discoursing “with objects” fails to achieve the animistic (and pantheistic) sense of 
aesthetic recognition discovered elsewhere in works such as The Prelude and 
“Tintern Abbey.” This sense for Wordsworth is one that indicates an anti-
metaphysical impulse within some of his poetry—a phenomenological awareness of 
the possible hermeneutical limitations of his sense of being-in-the-world. This 
romantic awareness becomes a full disclosure of being for Shelley in “The Triumph 
of Life” and leads to his own particular form of aesthetic recognition of negative 
forms of knowing and his final ironism—a concept I explore more fully in the 
following section. This implicit metaphysical doubt is also the reason for the strange 
mediated recognition I discussed in Chapter Three, initiated at the end of “Tintern 
Abbey” with Dorothy, whereby he seeks an experience of intersubjectivity in which 
to a fortiori ground his organic-metaphysical trope. Wordsworth seeks a new epoche 
or space in which to operate his consciousness, but this turns out to be one in which 
he is constantly reminded of his own subjectivity as it is brought into focus as part of 
the poetic procedure. Thus, although he establishes an organic aesthesis through 
which he feels he connects himself to the hylozoic life of the natural world, he 
encounters persistent doubt in works such as the Lucy poems or his elegiac “Peele 
Castle.” 
      
3. Shelley’s second-order discourse 
This recognition in Wordsworth of an alternative state of being-in-the-world based 
upon his corporeality and varying attitudes towards his original organic parole 
would inevitably lead Romanticism, in some of its latter formations, to a self-
conscious awareness of contingency and historicity. The metaphysical attitude taken 
up by Wordsworth and Coleridge actually deconstructs itself as a consequence of the 
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strong dialectical energy within the discourse developed by the two poets. Although 
Wordsworth posits an architectonic structure, hypostatising his metaphysical 
equipoise, he still falls victim to metaphysical doubts in poems such as “A Slumber 
Did my Spirit Seal,” where a sense of contingency and historicity seeps back into his 
work. The instability of this particular romantic discourse of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge is one of the reasons for the fact that this discourse of Romanticism has 
been so prone to deconstructive criticism such as that of de Man, Harold Bloom and 
Geoffrey Hartman. A new code in the process of construction is more open to the 
process of deconstruction, due to its inherent dialectical instability at this stage of its 
genesis.  
     Wordsworth and Coleridge were in the process of developing the tools that were 
finally to be used by Shelley more fully, and which would eventually be superseded 
by the second-order discourse of contingency and historicity in the hands of Shelley.  
The original romantic discourse can be seen as a metaphorical language that 
becomes literalised later on in the hands of other writers such as Mary and Percy 
Shelley who adhere to the same system or vocabulary. Through this process a 
second-order discourse emerges that allows Shelley to create a new vocabulary, or 
borrowing Richard Rorty’s description, to develop a new metaphoric system of 
‘reading’ or ‘disclosing’ the world.13 Applying this analogy to Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, and the dialectical situations they explored within their own poetry, one 
sees how they were formulating the tools of a romantic discourse of poetry, 
formulating the parameters for the new game, without bringing the game to a fully 
completed, and self-conscious, conclusion. Once the discourse was literalised, and 
taken up by writers and poets such as Byron, Shelley, Keats, and in North America, 
Whitman and Emerson, it became possible to use it as a tool handed down and 
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formulated by Wordsworth and Coleridge. Shelley does this in poems such as “Mont 
Blanc” and “Alastor,” in which he is clearly utilising the on-hand tools bequeathed 
to him by Wordsworth and Coleridge. Eventually however, just as Byron in 
exploring these tools would turn to irony, Shelley discovers contingency, historicity 
and the complete dialectical breakdown of “The Triumph of Life” and the negative 
forms of knowing revealed by this poem. In Rorty’s terminology, Shelley realises 
the value of a “poeticised culture” which is self-conscious of its inherent 
contingency and the continual possibilities of new vocabularies to reinvent ourselves 
as we please: 
A poeticised culture would be one which would not insist we find the 
real wall behind the painted ones, the real touchstones of truth as 
opposed to touchstones which are merely cultural artifacts. It would 
be a culture which, precisely by appreciating that all touchstones are 
such artifacts, would take as its goal the creation of ever more various 
and multicoloured artifacts.14 
Hence for Shelley, in realising this praxis of a “poeticised culture” there is a sense 
that there is no “real wall behind the painted ones” and there is a perpetual 
awareness of the “New figures on its false and fragile glass,” or in Rorty’s language 
of philosophical romanticism: “various and multicolored artifacts.” This leads us to 
an understanding of the clash between ironism and metaphysics that underlies the 
discourse of Wordsworth and Coleridge and is finally resolved in Shelley’s later 
work. 
     In Rorty’s eyes the liberal can be subdivided into the liberal ironist and the liberal 
metaphysician who searches for “final vocabularies,” an “ur Language” or the real 
wall as opposed to the “painted ones.” Therefore, romantic philosophers such as 
Hegel and poets such as Wordsworth and Coleridge are engaged in the metaphysical 
pursuit of a final vocabulary that can explain modernity and/or our place in the 
universe. Rorty claims that Hegel’s dialectical method actually illustrated the way 
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this process of progressing through different final vocabularies operates, and as such 
itself contains incipient ironism. Hegel goes wrong, in Rorty’s reading, on trying to 
define his own method in terms of a final vocabulary-in-itself. The method is correct 
but the narratorial outcome, which reaches an absolute denouement, is mistaken. He 
claims: 
What Hegel describes as the process of spirit gradually becoming 
self-conscious of its intrinsic nature is better described as the process 
of European linguistic practices changing at a faster and faster rate. 
The phenomenon Hegel describes is that of more people offering 
more radical redescriptions of more things than ever before, of young 
people going through half a dozen spiritual gestalt-switches before 
reaching adulthood. What the Romantics expressed as the claim that 
imagination, rather than reason, is the central human faculty was the 
realisation that a talent for speaking differently, rather than for 
arguing well, is the chief instrument of cultural change.15 
A series of discourses that led to a more polysemous view of the world, post-
Enlightenment and post-religious, culminated in Romanticism and the myriad 
interpretations of man’s imaginative place in the universe, and his imaginative 
sovereignty. The shared discourse of Wordsworth and Coleridge was one among 
many, closely related discourses, attempting to hermeneutically determine a 
metaphysical basis for the universe. This preoccupation is represented equally in 
Hegel’s dialectic, except, as I have argued, Hegel reaches his telos of Absolute Spirit 
by envisioning reason as the Ousia, thereby relegating aesthetics to secondary 
importance in relation to philosophy. In Shelley, the discourse of Wordsworth and 
Coleridge becomes a literalised discourse, and Shelley formulates a second-order 
chain of signification based upon this discourse he inherits from his predecessors. 
Like Hegel, Shelley realises that there is a need to extricate oneself from this 
particularised language game. Hegel extricates himself by utilising the discourse of 
speculative philosophy; Shelley in turn builds a second-order discourse out of the 
newly codified romantic discourse initiated by Wordsworth and Coleridge; or put 
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another way, works within the parameters of the same language game. Within these 
parameters however, there is no possibility of transcendence to a higher third, no 
triadic movement into a higher Gestalt. Shelley therefore decides, after exploring the 
discourse of his predecessors in “Mont Blanc and “Alastor” and after his anagogical 
exposition on Keats’ death in “Adonais”, to submit to the negative forms of non-
knowing, or the dialectical breakdown of “The Triumph of Life.” Shelley’s 
dialectical breakdown is hugely significant in terms of the contingent freedom of 
modern liberalism. This breakthrough signifies the movement away from the 
original metaphysical meta-narratives of English Romanticism (still available in the 
language games of idealist philosophy), and the turn towards alternative forms of 
world disclosure—now conceived as historically contingent, and our human position 
as therefore relative and ironic.  
     To summarise this, we can turn back to Rush’s point cited in Chapter One, that 
Hegel’s dialectic is closed and historical and Schlegel’s is historical and open. 
Schlegel is in fact the halfway house between Hegel and Shelley because he 
privileges aesthetics over philosophy, but whilst so doing remains within the same 
language game as Hegel. However, Shelley turns out to be thoroughly anti-
dialectical in “The Triumph of Life.” His ironist language game is completely of a 
different order to that of Hegel. Shelley’s work acts in a deictic fashion by 
illuminating the fact that aesthetics can give us an alternative conception of reality, 
without the dialectical processes of speculative-idealist philosophy. Rorty defines 
the difference of the liberal ironist (Shelley) and the metaphysician (Hegel) thus:  
For she (the ironist) cannot offer the same sort of social hope as 
metaphysicians offer. She cannot claim that adopting her 
redescription of yourself or your situation makes you better able to 
conquer the forces which are marshalled against you. On her account, 
that ability is a matter of weapons and luck, not a matter of having 
truth on your side, or having detected the “movement of history.”16  
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The metaphysical liberalism of Hegel, Wordsworth and Coleridge is a searching for 
ultimate, transcendental truths, and each of these romantic thinkers reaches different 
conclusions. Shelley on the other hand realises, as a liberal ironist, that there are 
various new vocabularies always either immanently available or potentially 
available, through which we can expand our awareness as a modern liberal culture. 
The hope sought by Rousseau, and anticipated in Shelley-the poet by his experience 
with Rousseau, is something exhausted by the time the narrative of the poem has 
played itself out. The post-romantic awareness of an ironism premised upon 
contingency and historicity is brought to bear upon Shelley’s own metaphysical 
hopes, which he inherited from a discourse initiated by Wordsworth and Coleridge. 
     There has been a lot made of Shelley’s proto-poststructuralism in recent years, 
especially since the work of de Man.17 Ulmer has written of the poststructuralist bent 
in Shelley’s work: 
His poetry envisions an ideal and originary ground of being, and its 
quest for this ontologically higher ground resists recognising it as an 
effect of language, a kind of textual mirage.18 
 
Although poststructuralist analysis is useful in approaching Shelley’s work, I feel it 
is a gross error to reduce his serious engagement with an “originary ground of 
being” to “a kind of textual mirage.” Shelley’s engagement leads to a much more 
tangible recognition of deeper philosophic truths than poststructuralist thinkers like 
Ulmer often give him credit for—truths that certainly run deeper than mere “textual” 
difference. In reading “The Triumph of Life” in hermeneutical-phenomenological 
terms, I would like to argue that Shelley gains a final insight into the nature of 
experience that points towards a post-romantic acceptance of the contingent nature 
of our experience. This in effect means a cognitive-recognition of our historicity, 
and our “ironic” situatedness-in-the-world with regards to the perception of romantic 
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deworlded subjectivity. What appears in terms of Romanticism, as a visionary 
failure, can actually indicate a higher awareness of a coming post-metaphysical age. 
The recognition of the limits of subjectivity, and the ironic opacity of the 
photological experience point the way towards this new phenomenological 
awareness of Being. Malpas speaks of the “doubling” nature of the experience of 
light and wonder as adumbrated (using the work of Levinas) in the previous chapter. 
He claims this seemingly transparent experience, which commences in “wonder” 
leads to a correspondent opacity that teaches us, as it perhaps would have taught 
Shelley, had he completed “The Triumph of Life,” the true nature of our ontological 
situation. Malpas writes: 
Plato’s association of wonder with the rainbow, and Levinas’ 
treatment of wonder as like the experience of light, both suggest a 
conception of wonder as associated with visibility and transparency. 
Yet inasmuch as wonder is also associated with the inexplicable fact 
of our situatedness, so it is bound up, not merely with transparency, 
but also with a certain failure of transparency, with a certain opacity. 
In wonder, our “being there” is suddenly “lit up,” and yet in being 
illuminated, it is also shown as essentially dark—while we can “see 
into” the intricacies of the world and our situation in it, that there is a 
world, and that we are already given over to it, is absolutely 
impenetrable. Our “being there,” our situatedness, on the basis of 
which the transparency of encounter and of appearance is possible, 
cannot itself be made transparent, and thus, inasmuch as light is 
“doubled up” with sight, as that which is “doubled up” with the 
appearing, so also is transparency “doubled up” with opacity.19 
 
From this sense of “doubling up” between light and opacity, which Shelley uses as a 
formative paradox in his poem, we also see the impenetrability of the world in “The 
Triumph of Life.” This is of course the sense of wonder that pervades the poem, and 
the reason for the post-romantic tone in the poem; what we can also loosely term 
“romantic irony”— the sense of an unattainable infinity within the scope of the 
aesthetic product itself. This observation further points towards an actual aesthetic 
recognition for the poet through his experience as represented in his work. The 
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recognition is an ironic recognition—and a particularly un-Hegelian form of 
recognition— however a positive recognition of his place in the universe, through 
his acknowledgement of negative forms of knowing. The poet realises his historically 
contingent place in the universe, and his absorption into this world through an ironic 
sense of recognition of our own ontological and epistemological limits. This is in 
turn a post-romantic conception, or at least another discourse of Romanticism, 
further explored by Shelley’s wife, Mary, in her novel Frankenstein, to which I will 
now finally turn. 
 
4. Embodied Scepticism: Frankenstein 
Up until this point I have outlined and assessed the tensions within the romantic 
discourse developed by Wordsworth and Coleridge and the doubt encountered in the 
construction of this vocabulary, not only by Coleridge but also by Wordsworth. I 
have also assessed Shelley’s response to this literalised vocabulary and his 
development of a second-order vocabulary that eventually led to the ironism of “The 
Triumph of Life.” This was an ironism that stemmed from his sceptical idealism, 
and was the eventual outcome of the collapse of Shelley’s faith in metaphysics. In 
her novel Frankenstein, Mary Shelley explicitly presents a story that functions as a 
didactic cautionary tale about the misuse of science; however, implicitly the novel 
encapsulates the romantic irony captured by P.B. Shelley by allegorising the dreams 
of the romantic poet in the deeds of the romantic scientist, Victor Frankenstein. The 
wider implication of this dual functionality of the novel is that Mary Shelley 
explicitly places aesthetics in a higher position than discursive philosophy, and thus 
reverses Hegel’s topography of aesthetics and philosophy.  
     A recurrent leitmotif throughout the novel is P.B. Shelley’s question in “On Life” 
about penetrating “the mystery of our being.” P.B. Shelley refers to the inability of 
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language (and therefore of romantic codes) to accomplish this task. Mary Shelley 
displaces this into the scientism of Victor Frankenstein, and by extension the 
expeditionary hopes of Captain Walton. The connection to the predicament of 
Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner is explored by Mary Shelley herself both in her direct 
allusion to the poem in the text20 and to Walton’s own allusion to the poem:  
I am going to unexplored regions to ‘the land of mist and snow’; but I 
shall kill no albatross, therefore do not be alarmed for my safety, or if 
I should come back to you as worn and woeful as the ‘Ancient 
Mariner’. You will smile at my allusion; but I will disclose a secret. I 
have often attributed my attachment to, my passionate enthusiasm 
for, the dangerous mysteries of the ocean, to that production of the 
most imaginative of modern poets. There is something at work in my 
soul, which I do not understand. I am practically industrious—
painstaking; a workman to execute with perseverance and labour:-but 
besides this, there is a love for the marvellous, a belief in the 
marvellous, intertwined in all my projects, which hurries me out of 
the common pathways of men, even to the wild sea and uninvited 
regions I am about to explore.21 
 
 Walton also compares himself explicitly to a romantic poet, and further implies that 
his vocation as an explorer arises from his failure as a poet: 
I also became a poet, and for one year lived in a Paradise of my own 
creation; I imagined that I also might obtain a niche in the temple 
where the names of Homer and Shakespeare are consecrated. You are 
well acquainted with my failure, and how heavily I bore the 
disappointment. But just at that time I inherited the fortune of my 
cousin, and my thoughts were turned into the channel of their earlier 
bent.22 
 
Walton signifies the displacement of the romantic poet into the realm of physical 
exploration; the hopes of the English Romantics are embodied in Walton’s 
expeditionary hopes; and his final aporia represents equally the aporias and ironies 
explored and experienced by the romantic poets. The romantic poet is therefore 
displaced in Mary Shelley’s feminist poetics into the arctic explorer and a fortiori by 
the framing device, the romantic scientist, both romantic archetypes of the solitary 
individual whom takes his place outside of society. Moreover, in attempting to 
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traverse the philosophical, poetic and scientific bounds these thinkers inversely 
place themselves outside of society, creating personal alienation and anomie.  
     This sense of alienation from the world paradoxically stems from an initial 
eagerness on Victor’s part to understand nature more deeply. But rather than being 
concerned with the aesthetic appreciation of nature, the Wordsworthian organic 
sense in which the poet absorbs nature into the overall Idea, Victor attempts to apply 
the inorganic to the organic; he wishes to apply the mechanical tools of the 
understanding to the organic realm of nature. Thus, instead of finding organic and 
aesthetic recognition of himself within nature, Victor alienates himself from nature 
in attempting to become master over nature. In effect, Victor attempts to enslave 
nature and from the outset finds no recognition. Early on in the novel, in comparing 
himself to Elizabeth, Victor claims: 
While my companion contemplated with a serious and satisfied spirit 
the magnificent appearances of things, I delighted in investigating 
their causes. The world was to me a secret which I desired to divine. 
Curiosity, earnest research to learn the hidden laws of nature, 
gladness akin to rapture, as they were unfolded to me, are amongst 
the earliest sensations I can remember.23 
 
Victor realises that in Elizabeth there resides a Wordsworthian appreciation of 
nature itself but for him this will not suffice. Whilst Elizabeth is satisfied with the 
appearances of the phenomenal world as exhibited in nature, Victor wishes to 
penetrate into the noumenal world. This is a situation that can be compared to 
Cavell’s reading of Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner and the Mariner’s desire to 
penetrate beyond scepticism, and beyond the world of appearances. He attempts this 
through a sort of philosophical disembodiment from the phenomenal world of 
appearance, and through this to initially deny his social (and at a higher level 
linguistic) connection with others. This is the situation that leads to the isolation of 
the romantic hero such as Victor or the Mariner. Cavell writes: 
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 I note here merely that “being driven to deny my agreement or 
attunement in criteria” is my lingo for being driven to deny my 
internal, or natural, connection with others, with the social as such. 
As if my reaction to the discovery of my separateness is to perpetuate 
it, radicalize it, interpreting finitude as a punishment, and converting 
the punishment into self-punishment.[…]Hence the poet may have 
cause to fear that his art is as fatal as science’s; more fatal, because 
he had hoped to overcome (what has appeared to the likes of him as) 
science’s or the intellect’s murdering to dissect; whereas now he 
finds that he has murdered to connect, to stuff nature into his words, 
to make poems of it, which no further power can overcome, or 
nothing further in the way of power.24 
In going beyond the line of philosophical scepticism, or in attempting to access the 
noumenal world, Victor has himself been driven to deny his “internal, or natural 
connection with others, with the social as such.” This is further a “self-punishment” 
that results in the most extreme breaking of bonds with the natural or phenomenal 
world of appearances, and it commences with the breaking of his filial ties. As the 
Mariner, on Cavell’s reading and upon mine, is never fully reintegrated into society, 
but lives to tell his cautionary tale to others, so does Victor.25 As the poet manages 
“to stuff nature into his words, to make poems of it, which no further power can 
overcome, or nothing further in the way of power”, so Victor as the romantic 
poet/scientist manages to “stuff nature” into his own poem, a corporeal poem which 
certainly no “further power can overcome.” Cantor emphasises this allegorical 
aspect of the story: 
Frankenstein is not simply an example of Romantic myth; it is also 
on the deepest level of interpretation a myth about Romanticism, a 
mythic dramatization of the dangers of an unbridled idealism. At first 
sight, Frankenstein seems to provide a clear case of a Romantic 
creation myth, since its explicit theme is remaking man. The scientist 
becomes a metaphor for the poet—Frankenstein’s physical attempt to 
reconstruct the human frame serves as an image for the goal of 
Romantic artists: the spiritual regeneration of man.26 
 
The spiritual goal of the romantic poet is embodied in Victor’s creation of the 
creature out of body parts: a sort of corporeal formalism. Indeed, not only is it a 
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myth about Romanticism, but an embodiment of the romantic ideal and its aporetic 
disclosures. This “stuffing” of nature into the corporeal formalism of Mary Shelley’s 
moral tale results in a recognition once again of the contingency of man’s existence, 
and the limits of our knowledge. Mary Shelley has, as an artist, overcome science’s 
“murdering to dissect” as Cavell has it, in that her book self-consciously critiques 
the limits of scientism. However, at the figurative level Shelley is also critiquing the 
further limits of the romantic artist who has himself attempted to overcome the 
fatality of scientism only to discover his own aporetic fatalism. Poovey claims of 
Mary Shelley’s attitude to English Romanticism in general: 
[Mary] Shelley explodes the foundations of Romantic optimism by 
demonstrating that the egotistical energies necessary to self-
assertion—energies that appear to her at the heart of the Romantic 
model of the imagination—inevitably imperil the self-denying 
energies of love. To accommodate this reservation, which implicitly 
indicts all artistic endeavors as well as more insidious forms of 
egotism. […] But besides the beneficial results imagined by 
Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, and Percy Shelley, the gifts Mary 
Shelley’s “modern Prometheus” brings threaten to destroy society 
and the blasphemous artist as well.27   
This destructive element within the Frankenstein story is result not simply of 
Victor’s overreaching, but also of his romantic fantasy of imaginative 
disembodiment, the ultimate example of egotism. The self-denying, and recognitive 
elements of humanity that Victor fails to acknowledge in his disembodied egotism 
eventually return to haunt him.  
     In his rejection of nature, and through his hubristic scientism, Victor sets in play 
a series of events that in effect depict an anti-recognitive state of being—a state of 
being whereby the romantic anti-hero becomes alienated from all forms of 
receptivity to the world; starting with the natural world and a fortiori extending to 
his own familial links: 
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     The summer months passed whilst I was thus engaged, heart and 
soul, in one pursuit. [On the creation of the creature.] It was a most 
beautiful season; never did the fields bestow a more plentiful harvest 
or the vines yield a more luxuriant vintage: but my eyes were 
insensible to the charms of nature. And the same feelings which made 
me neglect the scenes around me caused me also to forget those 
friends who were so many miles absent, and whom I had not seen for 
so long a time.28 
 
Only when Victor returns from the nightmare of his creation of the creature, after he 
recovers from his mental breakdown, does he start to feel the anodyne effect of 
organic nature and rediscover his connection to the natural world: 
It was a divine spring, and the season contributed greatly to my 
convalescence. I felt also sentiments of joy and affection revive in my 
bosom; my gloom disappeared, and in a short time I became as 
cheerful as before I was attacked by the fatal passion.29  
 
The restorative effects of organic nature temporarily revive Victor, however 
Frankenstein is a tragedy and Victor’s hamartia and act of hubris, or his 
unrecognitive transgression have already set the wheel of fortune in motion. Victor, 
in the same fashion as the Mariner, having returned from a region beyond the 
romantic lines of scepticism, now has to complete his tale and recount to his own 
guest, Walton, the rest of his experience.  
     The rejection of a recognitive relationship with nature is also commented on by 
Poovey: 
The course of Frankenstein’s decline suggests, in fact, that in the 
absence of social regulation the formation of the ego is primarily 
influenced by the imagination’s longing to deny fundamental human 
limitations—in particular the body’s determinate bondage to nature 
and to death. Frankenstein “penetrate[s] into the recesses of nature” 
in search of the secret life, but what he discovers in the “vaults and 
charnel houses” is the “natural decay and corruption of the human 
body.”30 
Victor’s transgression of his bodily limitations, of his inherent embodiment within 
the natural world, which is also his non-recognition of his self as part of the organic 
world at large, has in fact led to his fantasy of disembodiment. This hubristic fantasy 
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however paradoxically leads Victor back to the “natural decay and corruption of the 
human body.” The lack of “social regulation” and the recognitive structures of the 
social world, on top of a lack of recognition in the natural world, have also led 
Victor to this state of alienation and moral turpitude. The paradox is of course that 
through his un-recognitive transgression he has actually returned to the natural 
world of embodiment, and like the Mariner, has an even keener sense of our deeper 
moral connection to the everyday world in which we live. He has a deeper sense of 
our embodied and organic relationship to the world around us. As Cantor also 
claims: 
Frankenstein wishes that human beings could create life with their 
minds alone. He is most fundamentally a Romantic in his faith in the 
power of the imagination to shape a world in accord with man’s 
dreams and visions, although ironically his attempt to realize his 
dreams only draws him deeper and deeper into contact with the 
corrupt material world he is seeking to avoid.31 
The recognition of Victor is a phenomenological one: his realisation of the limits of 
humanity and their ability to create a race of “super-beings” coincides with his 
recognition of his own embodied nature within the world which he has been trying 
to transcend. Although Cantor and Poovey characterise the corporeal world as 
“corrupt” and “decay and corruption” respectively, Victor acknowledges over and 
above this, his place within the organic unity of nature, and his own error in 
attempting to overreach these embodied limits. 
     The organicism adumbrated in Frankenstein is also of a different nature to that 
outlined by Beiser, wherein the organicism is teleological, resulting in a 
combination of Spinozist monism and Leibnizean entelechy. This traditional 
romantic organicism places man as the Gnostic spiritual head of the natural world—
as I quoted Beiser in Chapter Three “Since artistic creativity and philosophical 
contemplation is the highest organization and development of all the powers of 
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nature, the artist’s and the philosopher’s awareness of nature is nothing less than the 
self-awareness of nature through the artist and the philosopher.” In contrast, 
Frankenstein remains closer to a more exclusively Spinozist organicism in that the 
protagonist becomes aware of his ignorance of the full powers of the organic 
universe, and realises his place within that universe: his place within the natural 
order. His original attempts to transcend nature through the use of mechanistic 
principles results in a move away from a quasi-Cartesian view of the universe to a 
monistic organicism in which he becomes re-embodied. Thus, this organicism is 
also of a different nature to the Gnostic organicism depicted by Wordsworth; in 
Wordsworth’s discourse the poet is indeed at the head of the natural world, depicting 
the “self-awareness” of nature. On the other hand, in Mary Shelley’s didactic 
organicism the poet/scientist/explorer becomes subsumed within nature, and as with 
P.B. Shelley’s realisation in “The Triumph of Life,” becomes aware of his 
contingent and historical place within the universe.  
      The sense of limit and embodiment within the natural world, and the 
paradoxically didactic outcome of Victor’s attempt at romantic transcendence of the 
natural world, has also been characterised by Cantor in terms of a recognition of our 
own “creaturely dependence”: 
The desire to remake man’s being until it becomes entirely the 
product of his own will, or at least to reject a situation not of his own 
making and choosing, is what is expressed in the gnostic pattern of 
romantic creation myths. Though they express it in different ways, 
both the monster and Frankenstein share this attitude. Convinced that 
only a defective providence denied him happiness, and armed with 
hard and fast evidence of the limitations of his creator, the monster 
expresses the Romantic sense of man as a creature. Confident in his 
ability to remake human nature, Frankenstein expresses the Romantic 
hope in man as a creator. One of the profound ironies of Mary 
Shelley’s myth is that the visionary creator can only produce a 
heightened version of human creaturely dependence.32 
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This “heightened version of creaturely dependence” is the moral key to the central 
irony of the novel. On my reading, this is in fact the recognition (or 
acknowledgment) of man’s receptivity towards the corporeal, the natural and 
ultimately the social, culminating in a philosophic awareness of man’s place within 
the universe. The “creaturely dependence” is of course represented clearly in the 
creature himself. His awareness of dependence on Victor places him in a strange 
position: he is aware of the limitations of his creator and wishes himself to transcend 
this “defective providence.” This awareness gives him an ontological understanding 
unavailable to mortal man: it gives him a physical awareness of the limits and 
‘creaturliness’ of his creator, and also supplies his own rejection of the myth of the 
fall. The fall was in fact not his, but his creator’s. His awareness of this gives him 
the spur to remake himself as it were, to command his own destiny. Metaphysics are 
removed from the creature’s world, and perhaps one of the other didactic lessons of 
the novel is the nightmare of a world without metaphysics—a world with permeable 
and tangible limits that can only lead to an ontological hell. This is the hell suffered 
by the creature in the novel. Of course, the hell is a result of the fact that the creature 
is unable to find any form of recognition in a world from which he feels 
permanently alienated—the will-to-self-creation ultimately results in an ontological 
insecurity, which is inexorable. The creature is ultimately autonomous—and 
ultimately destroyed by this autonomy, which is meaningless without the 
recognition of self in society, in nature, or in another subject. We all require 
receptivity to the world at large, and without this one’s autonomy becomes vacuous. 
As Poovey also claims of the creature’s experience of the world: 
For the monster, self-consciousness comes with brutal speed, for 
recognition depends not on an act of transgression but only on literal 
self-perception. An old man’s terror, a pool of water, a child’s fear 
are all nature’s mirrors, returning the monster repeatedly to its 
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grotesque self, “a figure hideously deformed and loathsome...a 
monster, a blot upon the earth.”33 
There is no sense of recognition for the creature, either in the sense of Anerkennung 
or of cognitive recognition—no recognition is available either socially or within the 
organic universe at large. This is the result of autonomy from both metaphysics and 
the natural world. His only recognition is one of “literal self-perception” and this, in 
Hegel’s sense, is no recognition at all.  
     This lack of recognition is further the reason for the master slave relationship that 
develops between creator and creature, the oscillation between pursuing and being 
pursued and the life-death struggle that finally takes place between the creature and 
creator. The asymmetrical relationship, and the lack of recognition, lead to a 
progressively more destructive narrative pattern; in one sense Mary Shelley reverses 
the Hegelian pattern of Anerkennung as described in The Phenomenology: the 
creature seeks recognition in its creator at its birth and finds none; the incident with 
the de Lacey’s, the villagers and the young girl compound this failure of recognition. 
Consequently, the master-slave dialectic is entered into between the two characters. 
When the creature confronts Victor after Victor has destroyed his bride to be (and 
his only actual hope of any form of recognition) he treats Victor with all the malice 
compounded by his ontological insecurity: 
 “Slave, I before reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself 
unworthy of my condescension. Remember that I have power; you 
believe yourself miserable, but I can make you so wretched that the 
light of day will be hateful you. You are my creator, but I am your 
master; - obey!”34  
 
The creature and Victor are heading in an aetiological direction, moving away from 
any sense of recognition towards the situation of the life-death struggle, where both 
will perish in the North Pole at the end of the book. The “light of day” is potentially 
a horror in Frankenstein, because as the creature experiences it, there is no sense of 
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wonder. Our philosophical beginnings in wonder are what make us human, and this 
wonder is at the root of our need for recognition within the world at large. This 
wonder is not available to the creature, as it has been taken away by his fallen 
creator: Victor. “Creaturely” human dependence is recognition, and without 
recognition one’s autonomy is meaningless. In fact, one becomes ultimately self-
destructive without the receptivity and recognition required in order for us to fully 
understand (or cognise) our own autonomy. 
     The creature also displaces his own potential for autonomous imaginative vision 
into his creator, and in this sense also loses his autonomy. Humankind has to bridge 
the gap between its existence and essence, and due to this ontological anguish 
authentically create itself anew. In contrast, the creature does not have this gap—it is 
bridged by his knowledge of Victor as his fallen creator. The creature is in the 
strange ontic position of being an object with a consciousness, but no hidden or 
ineffable essence. In this sense the creature is living his imaginative vision 
vicariously through his creator, and his own corporeal poem, his wife, has to be 
created likewise by his creator. Therefore the creature, because of his alienation 
from the organic world, does not actually posses the gift of autonomous 
imagination, which is only available to humans within a fully recognitive 
relationship with the world. Victor, on the other hand, starts out with an apparently 
autonomous vision, whereby he can live the romantic creation myth, and in the 
process recognises not only his own need for receptivity to the organic world, but 
also the moral limitations of romantic creation mythology. All of these factors 
reflect the deeper philosophical workings of Mary Shelley’s cautionary tale, and her 
own reaction to the Romanticism being explored in the discourse of Wordsworth 
and Coleridge. Her own reflections are also however carried out in the medium of 
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art, and Mary Shelley places our special organic relationship to nature in sharp 
contrast to the mechanism of scientism. In so doing she also figuratively depicts the 
struggles for aesthetic recognition of these poets, and the embodied limits of their 
own particular visionary yearnings. She presents this through her own representation 
of the need and struggle for recognition that permeates our human existence.  
     Mary Shelley reverses the tripartite model employed by Hegel in which 
philosophy is in a position higher than aesthetics and religion in its apprehension of 
the concrete universal, and shows the moral utility of aesthetics in its place in acting 
in a regulatory and didactic fashion. She accomplishes this in her novel by 
illustrating the limits not only of romantic aesthetics but also of scientism and 
romantic philosophy. The novel works on a literal level in its didactic refutation of 
the possible hubristic pretensions of scientism, but also on a figurative and 
allegorical level in its analysis of a particular discourse of English Romanticism. 
This self-consciousness can only be attained in aesthetics, and Mary Shelley 
therefore uses her novel in order to depict these epistemic limitations. The central 
aspect to Mary Shelley’s story is recognition (both social and cognitive) and the 
tragic effect of a breakdown of recognition, both in the social and natural world.  
     Wordsworth gains an organic unity that is of a different nature to the organicism 
envisioned by Mary Shelley—hers is an organicism that reflects our place within a 
predisposed natural order, not as the Gnostic spirit-head of a teleological 
organicism. As such, even though she references at various points in the story the 
Wordsworthian conceptualisation of nature, she ultimately sets the story against the 
sublime mountains of the Alps, referencing the same “mysterious doubt” 
countenanced by her husband, and sets the beginning and the end of the story within 
the arctic climes of the North Pole. This serves to remind the reader of our place 
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within an immutable universe and a natural world of which we are not the Gnostic 
head. Victor invites tragedy by playing hubristically with nature’s immutable laws, 
and Walton backs down in the face of the immutable arctic wastes. The fact that that 
the story employs a framing device, of which the locale of the first narrative of 
Walton is set within the frozen wastes further adds to the sense of the overall 
sublime immutability of the organic and ubiquitous, natural world. The removal of a 
romantic and organic teleology is also at the heart of Frankenstein, and is an echo of 
the Shelleyan conception of the sublime outlined in “Mont Blanc.” 
     These overall limits of certain discourses of Romanticism, recognised in second-
order romantic discourses of writers such as P.B. and Mary Shelley beckon in a new 
acknowledgment of aesthetics as best representing our limited conception of the 
world at large. Borgmann writes of a need in modernity to rediscover a moral 
cosmology, of the kind discussed by the ancients such as Aristotle. He argues that 
thinkers such as Goethe, Kant and Schelling have all attempted this holistic 
enterprise with varying degrees of success (we can also add Hegel to this list). Art 
needs to attend to nature, and perhaps help form a moral reflection of the universe 
that can be combined interdependently with our scientific view of the natural world. 
Borgmann writes: 
   The interdependent complement of a law of nature is the insistence 
that constrains the law to yield the description and explanation of a 
state of affairs or an event. Newton’s laws of motion merely outline a 
possible space. They describe an actual world when we insert the 
values of, for example, the solar system in place of the variables for 
mass, acceleration, distance, etc. Among the greatest of instantiations 
are works of art. They are the most eminent compliments to laws. 
They are instances of high contingency—unpredictable and 
unprocurable and, in that sense, free. So are the nuisances of life and 
the results of throwing dice. But these are part of the low contingency 
of everyday reality. Works of art rise above and lend orientation to 
the plains of normalcy.35 
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For Borgmann, there needs to be a modern rapprochement of the mechanical laws of 
science and the living and contingent force of the world in which we live. Borgmann 
believes in the romantic attempt to combine Goethean “presence” (the contingent 
view of immanent reality) with Kant’s sense of nomos. This is another way of 
extending Schelling’s 1803 conception of art as an example of the natura naturans, 
and thereby a representation of the essential vitalism of the universe. In 
Frankenstein, Mary Shelley attempts to challenge the scientific attempts at 
discovering the “hidden laws of nature” and also its attempt to debunk Borgmann’s 
and Schelling’s aestheticism by giving the scientist privileged access to the natura 
naturans. For Mary Shelley the work of art concretely represents this moral 
cosmology; it acts in a didactic fashion in demonstrating the limits of science itself 
to fully appreciate a moral cosmology. The novel’s morality consists in returning us 
to a state of organicism through an aesthetic recogntion that Victor originally 
chooses to ignore. He regains access to a truly Spinozist natura naturans but this 
moral reconciliation happens too late. The important fact is that the work of art 
stands as the ultimate signifier of a moral cosmology. It further teaches us of a moral 
cosmology wherein there is a requirement of human receptivity in order to partake 
in the overall organic system of which we are a part. This law, if transgressed, leads 
to the alienation and horror of Victor and his creature. The contingency of our place 
within this cosmology can only be represented by self-conscious works of art such 
as Frankenstein, which illuminate the lawful limits to our contingent place in the 
universe.                 
 
5. Conclusion 
I would finally like to discuss how the relation Hegel envisages between philosophy, 
religion and art is reversed if we consider art, in particular poetry, in light of the 
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concept of aesthetic recognition. In my discussion of English Romanticism I sought 
to show how different poets, in certain canonical poems conceived and expressed 
their relationship to the problem of deworlded subjectivity. I developed the idea of 
deworlded subjectivity with reference to post-Kantian German thought and by 
extension a number of English romantic poets. In particular, and fully 
acknowledging Hegel’s own criticism of romantic thought, I identified Hegel’s 
teleological organicism as the ultimate example of romantic narrative, or romantic 
mythology. This is because this is a teleological, or what one could label romantic 
mythology—that is, a story that attempts to re-integrate the human subject into the 
natural world whilst at the same time retaining a sense of autonomous subjectivity. 
Using Hegel’s social form of recognition, Anerkennung, and introducing a broader 
notion of cognitive recognition, I sought to develop a notion of what I called 
aesthetic recognition. The concept refers to an aesthetic struggle whereby the poet 
seeks to deal with the issue of deworlded subjectivity, by virtue of attempting to 
reintegrate himself through his poetry into a unified conception of the world. On the 
argument presented here, a significant shift in this struggle for aesthetic recognition 
has taken place by the time of P.B. Shelley’s final poem and Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. This is due to the fact that in “The Triumph of Life” there is an 
aesthetic recognition of the historicity, contingency and ultimately ironic nature of 
our experience of the world. Moreover, in Mary Shelley’s novel we see expressed 
the aporetic character of Romanticism, and a dramatisation of its hopes, conflicts 
and disappointments. 
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1. Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 
Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 32. 
2. Cavell, p. 74. 
3. Cavell writes of Coleridge’s treatment of Wordsworth’s incipient animism in 
the phrase “communicating with objects” thus: “ Coleridge will not allow 
Wordsworth to mean much, if anything, coherent by that phrase. In volume 
2, chapter 17 of the Biographia he says, criticizing Wordsworth’s preface: ‘If 
to communicate with an object implies an acquaintance with it, as renders it 
capable of being discriminately reflected on; the distinct knowledge of an 
uneducated rustic would furnish a very scanty vocabulary.’ This wilfully 
takes Wordsworth to be praising the rustic’s knowledge, say, of the paths 
through his woods, as superior to, and in the same line as, the knowledge 
that surveyors and cartographers could acquire of them. Not only does this 
refuse to interpret the preposition “with,” pretending that what Wordsworth 
likes in his rustics is their ability to discourse in endless monologues about 
their belongings and neighbourhood, as though they were veritable and 
boring Coleridges; but it perversely turns a deaf ear to Wordsworth’s evident 
wish to speak of the kind of knowledge that is, let us say, wordless.” Cavell, 
pp. 71-72. 
4. Cavell, p. 72. 
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Smith (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 128. 
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7. Terry Eagleton, After Theory (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 170. 
8. Rajan, p. 454. 
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in Romanticism, 10:3 (1971: Summer), p. 159. Hall states that “I shall argue 
that the meaning of these poems lies neither in despairing irony nor 
pantheistic affirmation, but in a humanism which borders on the tragic and 
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Wordsworth’s poetic development.”  
11. Hall, p. 170. 
12. This sense of dialectic of a “pantheistic affirmation” on the one hand and 
“despairing irony” on the other is essentially the debate between Mellor and 
de Man on the subject of allegory and symbol that I discussed in Chapter 
Two when addressing Coleridge’s theory of the symbol in relation to his 
overall poetic enterprise, and as exhibited in “Kubla Khan.” Both discuss “A 
Slumber Did my Spirit Seal” in terms of this debate and de Man reads the 
poem as being Wordsworth’s poetic affirmation of the ironic distance 
between his experience and the linguistic rendering of that experience. 
13. Rorty himself, in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), claims of the issue of utilising the Wittgensteinian 
tools in order to formulate one’s own language “This Wittgensteinian 
analogy between vocabularies and tools has one obvious drawback. The 
craftsman typically knows what job he has to do before picking or inventing 
the tools with which to do it. By contrast. Someone like Galileo, Yeats, or 
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14. Rorty, p. 53. 
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their concealed life-in-death, accordingly, the Mariner has to break into their 
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